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AN 


ESSAY 


J    "I 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY 


BY  LEONARD  WOODS,  D.  D. 

Pro£  of  Chriitioa  Tbeolo^  in  the  vlteolugical  Semiuary,  Aodover. 


BOSTON: 
PUBLISHED   BY  WILLIAM   PEIRCE. 

JS  O.    9,    CORNHIL.L.. 

1835. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1835,  by 

WI1.LIAM      PEIRCE, 

in  the  Clerk's  office  of  the  District  Court  of  Massachusetts. 


'_iS^^ 


BOSTON: 

Webster  &  Southard,  Printers, 

No.  9,  Cornhill. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 
Preliminary  remarks 9  —  21 

CHAPTER  II. 

General  remarks  on  the  evidence  of  depravity  arising  from  hu- 
man conduct. — Scripture  proof  of  the  universality  of  sin  21  —  44 

CHAPTER  HI. 
Total  depravity  explained  and  proved 44 — 51 

CHAPTER  IV. 

JVaHtJC  depravity.  Explanation  of  terms.  —  Marks  which  dis- 
tinguish other  things  allowed  to  be  natural  or  native. — These 
marks  belong  to  man's  sinfulness 52  —  71 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  doctrine  of  native  depravity  continued.  Scripture  evi- 
dence.    Consequences  of  denying  the  doctrine 71  —  99 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Common  objections  to  native  depravity  inadmissible  ....  99 — 117 


VI  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Objections  to  native  depravity  particularly  examined .. .  117  — 145 

CHAPTER  Vni. 

State  of  the  infant  mind.  Considerations  in  favor  of  supposing 
that  an  infant  is  incapable  of  moral  affections,  not  conclusive. 
Reasons  in  favor  of  the  contrary  supposition 145  — 156 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  infant  mind  considered  as  the  subject  of  a  wrong  dispo- 
sitiori,  or  corrupt  nature.  Remarks  on  the  words  dispo- 
tion,  propensity,  nature,  &c.  That  man  has  originally  a 
propensity  to  sin  generally  held  by  Orthodox  divines.  Is  this 
propensity  sinful  ?  The  ^oint  at  issue  between  Dr.  John 
Taylor  and  Edwards.  Considerations  on  both  sides. — A 
united  view  of  the  subject 157  — 195 

CHAPTER  X. 

Remarks  on  the  words  innate,  transmitted,  hereditary,  con- 
stitutional, imputed 195  —  210 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Every  other  theory  as  much  encumbered  with  difficulties  as  the 
Orthodox.  The  spirit  of  caviUing.  Proper  influence  of  the 
doctrine  of  native  depravity ..,,...,...,,,.,.,..,  219  —  2§0 


NOTICE. 

The  premium  of  three  hundred  dollars  which  was 
awarded  to  the  writer  of  the  following  Essay,  was 
offered  by  Mr.  John  Dunlop  of  Edinburgh,  Scot- 
land. The  Judges  appointed  were,  the  Reverend 
Jeremiah  Day,  D.  D.  L.  L.  D.  President  of 
Yale  College,  the  Reverend  Edward  D. 
Griffin,  D.  D.  President  of  Williams  Col- 
lege, and  tfhe  Reverend  Heman  Humphrey, 
D.  D.  President  of  Amherst  College.  The 
publication  of  the  Essay  was  delayed  some  time, 
for  the  purpose  of  receiving  the  directions  of  Mr. 
Dunlop. 


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ESSAY 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY 


CHAPTER    T. 


Preliminary    Remarks. 


The  following  remarks  are  intended  to  guard 
against  wrong  modes  of  reasoning,  and  to  prepare 
the  way  for  a  just  and  profitable  discussion  of  the 
subject. 

First,  The  consideration  of  the  divine  character 
cannot  be  made  the  ground  of  any  presumption 
against  the  doctrine  of  human  sinfulness^  and  can 
have  no  influence  to  invalidate  the  arguments  hy 
which  the  doctrine  is  supported. 

In  reasoning  on  the  present  subject  I  shall  proceed 
on  the  principle,  that  the  existence  and  moral  per- 
fectioa  of  God  have  been  satisfactorily  proved,  and  are 
2 


10       PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS. 

unhesitatingly  believed ;  and  that  he  is  a  righteous 
and  benevolent  Governour.  My  position  is.  that  this 
cannot  be  adduced  as  proof  against  the  doctrine  of 
man's  apostacy  and  ruin. 

No  man  can  urge  the  moral  character  of  God  as 
an  argument  against  the  doctrine  of  man's  depravity, 
except  upon  the  supposition,  that  we  are  competent  to 
determine,  by  our  own  reason,  in  what  manner  God's 
moral  perfection  will  be  developed.  If  we  make  an 
appeal  to  revelation  or  experience,  w^e  shall  find  what 
all  Christians,  and  what  the  most  enlightened  of  the 
heathen,  have  found  and  ackn6wledged ;  that  man  is 
the  subject  of  a  deep  moral  depravity.  But  suppose 
that  we  were  now  at  the  period  immediately  after  the 
creation  of  man,  and  that,  with  our  rational  powers  in 
full  exercise,  we  should  look  upon  the  innocent,  happy 
pair  in  the  garden  of  Eden,  under  the  inspection  of 
their  Creator,  and  enjoying  his  constant  kindness.  And 
suppose  the  inquiry  should  be  made  ;  "  Will  these 
holy  and  happy  beings  ever  become  transgressors 
of  God's  righteous  laiv  ?  Will  God  suffer  them  to 
fall  into  sin  7  And  7vill  their  posterity  have  their 
existence  in  a  state  of  moral  ruin  V  —  What  would 
be  the  proper  answer  to  such  an  inquiry  ?  —  the 
answer  which  would  accord  with  the  truth?  We 
might  be  inclined  to  say,  such  a  disastrous  event  can 
never  take  place.  God  is  infinitely  good,  and  he 
will  watch  over  his  dependent,  feeble  creatures,  and 
effectually  guard  them  against  all  danger,  especially 
against  the  pollution  and  ruin  of  sin.      But  if  we 


PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS.       11 

should  wait  a  little,  and  observe  the  course  of  events, 
we  should  learn  that  our  judgment  was  preraature. 
We  should  see  the  happy  parents  of  the  human  race 
fallen  into  a  state  of  guilt,  and,  through  their  offence, 
all  their  posterity  "  constituted  simiersP  And  thus 
the  iiistory  of  God's  providence  would  teach  us,  that 
we  were  not  of  ourselves  competent  to  determine,  in 
what  particular  manner  his  infinite  perfections  would 
be  displayed. 

The  fact  is,  that  the  goodness  of  God  is,  in  various 
respects,  immensely  different  from  all  that  we  call 
goodness  in  man.  And  if  we  should  undertake  to 
determine,  in  particular  cases,  that  such  and  such  acts 
will  result  from  the  divine  goodness,  because  similar 
acts  result  from  such  goodness  as  we  possess ;  we 
should  fall  into  the  most  hurtful  mistakes.  Our  pro- 
ceeding in  this  manner  would  be  to  assume  the 
principle,  that  we  can  measure  the  infinite  perfections 
of  God  by  our  own  views  and  feelings.  It  would  be 
to  forget  that,  while  we  are  of  yesterday  and  know 
nothing,  the  mind  of  God  is  infinite  ; — that,  while  ^:r 
our  views  are  confined  within  a  very  narrow  compass,  xs 
the  mind  of  God  comprehends  the  whole  extent  of 
the  universe,  and  reaches  through  everlasting  ages,  j 
Nothing  can  be  more  reasonable  than  to  believe 
that  the  divine  wisdom  and  goodness,  which  are  infi- 
nite, and  which  have  respect  to  the  whole  system  of 
the  creation,  and  to  the  whole  of  a  coming  eternity, 
must  dictate  measures  exceedingly  diverse  from  those 
which  our  finite  minds  would  be  likely  to  adopt. 


12       PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS. 

This  general  principle  is  of  special  use  in  regard  to 
a  great  variety  of  subjects,  especially  with  regard  to 
the  one  now  under  consideration.  We  are  to  make 
no  inference  from  the  moral  perfection  of  God,  which 
will  interfere  with  our  belief  of  man's  depravity.  We 
are  utterly  unable  to  determine,  from  our  notions  of 
the  divine  goodness,  whether  all  or  any  human  beings 
will  be  transgressors,  or  in  what  degree  they  will  be 
depraved,  or  at  what  period  of  their  existence,  or  in 
what  manner,  their  depravity  will  commence.  Facts 
show,  and  the  Scriptures  show,  that  many  things  are 
consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God,  which,  judging 
from  our  own  reason,  we  should  have  thought  wholly 
inconsistent.  We  are  to  remember  this ;  and  to  come 
to  the  inquiry,  what  is  the  moral  state  of  man  7  with 
a  mind  free  from  prepossession,  ready  to  believe  what 
is  proved  by  proper  evidence,  and  with  a  full  persua- 
sion that,  whatever  we  find  to  be  fact  as  to  the  exist- 
ence, the  degree,  the  commencement,  or  the  conse- 
quences, of  depravity  in  man,  must  be  perfectly  con- 
sistent with  the  moral  attributes  of  God.  Accordingly, 
the  consideration  that  God  is  infinitely  benevolent,  can 
have  no  more  influence  upon  our  inquiry  respecting 
man's  moral  character  and  state,  than  respecting  the 
natural  faculties  of  his  mind,  or  his  bodily  senses. 
The  subject  must  be  treated  wholly  as  a  matter 
of  fact. 

This  principle  will  entirely  free  us  from  one  of  the 
most  perplexing  difficulties  respecting  the  re-ility  and 
the  degree  of  human  corruption.     If  we  take  care  to 


PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS.       13 

understand  this  impoitant  principle,    and  to  have  it 
fixed  in  our  minds,  we  shall  no  longer  deny  that  man  ^ 
is  dead  in  sin,  because  God  is  good.     It  will  no  long- 
er appear  to  us  any  stain  upon  the  character  of  God, 
that  a  world  of  rational,  moral  beings  have  rebelled 
against  him,  and  exposed  themselves  to  his  wrath. 
•  Peeling  ourselves   utterly  incompetent  to  judge  what^.^^^^ 
wotild  be  suitable  for  a  Being,  of  infinite  perfectidn  to    xq  u^jfe 
do  in  such  a  case,  we  shall  take  the  attitude  of  learn-     ijdUJL 
ers ;  and,  as  soon  as  we  find  what  Gd^  has  actually-;'    .t 
done,  and  what  hWhas  not  done, —  what  events  have   ^^'^y^ 
occurred  among  his  creatures,  and  how  he  treats  those 
events,  we  shall  be  satisfied.     Indeed,  we  shall  be  so 
far  firom  thinking  anything  which  takes  place  among 
created  beings  incompatible  with   the   perfections    of 
God,  that  we  shall  regard  all  his  arrangements  and 
operations,  especially  in  the  moral  world,  as  manifesta- 
tions of  his  attributes,  and  as  means  of  giving  us  just 
conceptions  of  his  character.    And  as  to  his  works,  —  if, 
in  any  case,  even  where  we  find  the  greatest  mystery, 
the  question  arises,  why  has  God  done  so  7  we  can 
readily  answer,  because  he  sees  it  to  be  right.     This 
general  answer,  which  arises  altogether  from  our  con- 
fidence in  the  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God, 
should  be  perfectly  satisfactory,  even  though  the  par- 
ticular,   specific  reasons    of    his  conduct   lie   wholly 
beyond  the  sphere  of  our  intelligence. 

Secondly.     No  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  human 
depravity  can  be  derived  from  the  fact,   that  God 
created  man  at  first  in  his  own  moral  image.     In 
*2  ■ 

C&X  ,  f 'VvYV  tC^  ^^  ^^     ' 


14       PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS. 

•^  Other  words,  the  doctrine  of  man^s  original  holiness 
is  not  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  his  'present 
sinfulness, 
y  Man,  from  the  very  constitution  of  his  nature,  was 
finite  and  mutable.  Though  he  was  created  holy,  he 
was  liable  to  become  unholy.  He  had  no  such  inflex- 
ibility of  principle,  no  such  strength  of  character,  no 
such  confirmation  in  virtue,  as  absolutely  to  secure 
him  against  sin.  His  certain  perseverance  in  holi- 
ness could  not  then  be  inferred  from  anything  in 
himself  He  was  in  his  nature  changeable,  aud  was 
exposed  to  temptations  which  might  influence  him  to 
become  a  sinner. 

There  was,  therefore,  no  certain  ground  of  his  con- 
tinuance in  a  state  of  hoHness,  unless  God  saw  fit  to 
afford  him  certain  preservation.  And,  as  we  have 
already  remarked,  it  could  in  no  way  be  inferred 
from  God's  moral  perfection,  that  he  would  preserve 
man  from  sin.  He  was  under  no  obligation  to  do  it. 
He  would  violate  none  of  his  perfections  by  not 
^  doing  it. 

Thus  the  matter  stood.  Man,  as  a  moral  agent,  in 
a  state  of  trial,  might  fall  into  sin.  He  was  liable  to 
change,  and  was  exposed  to  the  influence  of  causes, 
which  might  induce  him  to  change.  God  was  not 
pledged  to  preserve  him  from  falling  into  sin,  and 
none  of  his  perfections  required  him  to  afford  such 
preservation.  And  there  might  be  special  reasons 
relating  to  his  own  glory  and  the  interests  of  his  moral 
kingdom,  why  he  should  not  effectually  preserve  him. 


^74. 


PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS,.       *.- *j-  .%. 

>    ^/. 

When,  therefore,  sin  occurred,  we  cannot  say  thfe^fls  i^^^  ^  V 
was  anything  incredible  in  it,  or  anything  inconsistent 
with  man's  having  been  originally  holy.  And  his 
original  holiness  cannot  be  mentioned  as  diminishing 
at  all  the  evidence  of  his  apostacy,  or  as  presenting 
any  obstacle  in  the  way  of  believing  it.  Difficulties 
may  exist,  and  difficulties  not  to  be  solved,  respecting 
this  matter.  But  what  has  now  been  stated  is  plain 
truth ;  and  we  ought  to  remember  it ;  namely,  that 
man,  though  at  first  holy,  was  changeable,  and  was 
exposed  to  the  influence  of  circumstances,  which  might 
induce  him  to  sin  ;  and  that,  as  there  is  evidence  that 
he  actually  sinned,  we  are  to  admit  the  fact  without 
hesitation,  and  can  never  consider  it  as  incredible,  that 
a  moral  agent,  in  a  state  of  probation,  should  transgress 
the  divine  law  and  fall  under  its  penalty. 

Thirdly.  The  chief  reason  which  prevents  men 
from  rightly  understanding  and  receiving  the  doctrine 
of  human  corruption,  is,  their  blindness  to  the  excel- 
lence of  the  divine  laWy  and  their  ignorance  of  their 
own  hearts. 

'  The  moral  law  is  the  standard  of  character.  If  we 
are  conformed  to  its  requisitions,  we  are  holy  ;  if  not 
conformed,  we  are  sinners.  But  men  in  general  have 
no  proper  discernment  of  this  perfect  law,  and  no  prac- 
tical regard  to  it,  as  the  rule  of  their  actions.  Their 
eyes  are  directed  to  other  and  very  different  standards, 
according  to  which  they  can  think  highly  of  them- 
selves, though  in  truth  they  are  guilty  and  vile. 
Every  human  being  is  in  himself  an  example  of  de- 


16       PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS. 

pravity.  And  he  must  learn  its  nature  and  malignity 
by  a  careful  survey  of  his  own  heart  and  life.  While 
he  neglects  to  examine  himself,  and  to  judge  of  his 
moral  feelings  and  actions  by  God's  holy  law,  argu- 
ments from  Scripture  and  experience  will  fail  to  con- 
vince him  of  the  truth,  or  at  best  will  give  him  only 
an  intellectual  conviction,  a  dry,  speculative  notion  of 
what  his  heart  does  not  feel.  Here  is  the  great  hin- 
derance  to  the  reception  of  that  humihating  doctrine 
which  we  hold  respecting  the  moral  corruption  and 
ruin  of  the  human  race.  Men  are  occupied  with  other 
concerns  and  do  not  look  into  themselves.  Or  if  at 
any  time  they  do  this,  they  disregard  the  only  true 
standard  of  moral  actions,  and  the  only  just  measure 
of  their  obligations,  and  substitute  another  standard, 
which  leads  them  to  overlook  their  moral  dehnquencies 
and  the  utter  alienation  of  their  hearts  from  God,  and 
to  form  an  opinion  of  themselves  which  will  gratify 
their  self-love,  and  free  them  from  the  pain  of  self- 
reproach.  They  are  like  a  man  who,  having  a  de- 
formed countenance,  induces  a  painter  to  make  such  a 
picture  of  him  as  shall  conceal  his  deformities,  and 
please  his  vanity  by  imaginary  beauties,  and  then 
looks  at  it  as  a  true  picture  of  himself. 

The  fact  that  most  men  reject  the  doctrine  of  human 
depravity  and  guilt,  or  form  so  very  inadequate  and 
erroneous  a  conception  of  it,  is  so  far  from  being  a  con- 
futation of  the  doctrine,  that  it  is  in  reahty  a  striking 
illustration  of  its  truth. 

Fourthly.    It  is  in  no  degree  inconsistent  with  the 


PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS.       17 

doctrine  of  depravity,  as  set  forth  in  the  Scriptures, 
and  as  maintained  by  evangehcal  Christians,  that  men 
in  their  natural  state  possess  and  exhibit  many 
amiable,  commendable  and  useful  qualities. 

Men  stand  in  various  relations.  Their  character 
must  of  course  be  viewed  in  a  variety  of  hghts,  and  in 
each  must  be  estimated  according  as  it  is  conformed  or 
not  to  the  rules  of  conduct  arising  from  these  various 
relations.  They  may  have  attributes  corresponding  to 
some  of  these  relations,  such  as  the  natural  relations  of 
domestic  and  social  life ;  and  in  reference  to  these  rela- 
tions merely,  they  may  be  considered  both  amiable  and 
useful,  and  even  praise-worthy;  while  they  have  nothing 
which  corresponds  to  the  high  relation  they  bear  to  God 
and  to  his  spiritual  law,  and  to  their  fellow  men  as  sub- 
jects of  that  law.  Accordingly  the  natural  affections  of 
parents  and  children,  and  what  are  commonly  called 
the  social  affections  and  sympathies,  are  just  as  consist- 
ent as  bodily  appetites  are,  with  the  fact  that  man  is 
without  holiness,  i.  e.  without  that  affection  which  is 
required  of  him  in  relation  to  God  and  a  moral  govern- 
ment. What  then  becomes  of  all  that  the  deniers  of 
human  corruption  have  said  of  the  lovely  simplicity, 
the  freedom  from  guile,  the  dutifulness  and  affection  of 
children,  and  the  sympathy,  good  will,  gratitude,  jus- 
tice, and  generosity  which  men  in  their  natural  state 
often  exhibit.  It  is  admitted  that  they  may  have  all 
these  lovely  and  useful  and  commendable  dispositions, 
and  that,  in  regard  to  all  the  common  domestic  and 
social  relations,  those  who  have  these  dispositions  are  to 


18       PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS. 

be  regarded  in  a  very  different  light  from  those  who 
are  destitute  of  them.  But,  after  all,  these  natural  dis- 
positions, however  amiable,  and  however  useful  their 
fruits,  do  not  touch  their  relation  to  God,  and  to  the 
immortal  beings  who  compose  his  moral  kingdom. 
And,  for  aught  that  appears,  they  may  be  as  really 
destitute  of  that  holy  love  and  obedience,  which  is  due 
from  them  in  this  paramount  relation,  as  if  they  had 
nothing  which  corresponded  to  their  other  relations. 
I  say  they  may  be  as  really  destitute  of  holiness.  I 
speak  not  of  the  degree  of  positive  wickedness.  For 
doubtless  the  extinction  of  the  natural  affections  shows 
an  extreme  degree  of  depravity.  Indeed,  there  is 
nothing  but  the  practice  of  wickedness  for  a  long  time 
and  with  uncommon  violence,  which  can  extinguish 
the  amiable  and  useful  dispositions  belonging  to  us 
as  domestic  and  social  beings.  Accordingly,  when 
the  apostle  speaks  of  persons  as  "  without  natural 
affections,"  his  object  evidently  is,  to  describe  those 
who  are  sunk  to  the  lowest  degree  of  vice.  To 
sum  up  all  in  a  few  words-;  the  natural  affections, 
however  cultivated  and  improved,  and  however  attrac- 
tive the  forms  in  which  they  may  be  exhibited,  do  not 
constitute  holiness,  and  are  often  found  where  no  de- 
gree of  holiness  exists.  Indeed  they  are  so  deeply' 
rooted  in  the  nature  of  man,  that  they  cannot  be 
eradicated,  except  by  the  influence  of  extreme  wicked- 
ness, nor  always  even  by  this. 

My  last  remark  is,   that   no   theory  intended  to 


PRELIMINARY  CONSIDERATIONS.       19 

account  'philosophically  for  the  fact  that  man  is 
depraved^  can  free  the  subject  from  difficulty. 

As  I  shall  enlarge  upon  this  view  of  the  subject  in 
another  place,  I  shall  treat  it  briefly  here.  It  will  be 
found,  I  think,  on  careful  inquiry,  that  the  common 
belief  of  the  orthodox  relative  to  the  doctrine  of  de- 
pravity, is  exposed  to  no  greater  objections  than  any 
other  belief ;  that  all  the  attempts  which  have  been 
made  by  philosophical  reasoning  to  avoid  or  even  to 
diminish  the  difficulties  attending  the  subject,  have 
effected  but  httle  ;  and  that  man's  universal  sinfulness 
is,  after  all,  left  as  it  was,  a  well  known^  dreadful 
fact^  —  a  fact ^  whether  explained  or  unexplained^ 
as  certain  as  our  existence.  Now  as  no  hypothesis 
which  has  been  invented  for  the  purpose  of  accounting 
for  man's  depravity,  and  freeing  it  from  objections  and 
difficulties,  has  answered  the  purpose ;  are  we  not 
brought  to  this  conclusion  ;  that  depravity  is  a  fact 
xchich  chiefly  concerns  us  not  in  an  intellectual^ 
hut  in  a  moral  view  ;  that  we  are  to  make  use  of 
the  doctrine  for  practical  purposes,  and  that  it  is 
the  part  of  Christian  wisdom  to  receive  those  par- 
ticular views  of  the  subject  which  best  agree  with 
the  current  representations  of  Scripture,  and  with 
what  experience  and  observation  dictate,  to  what- 
ever speculative  objections  those  views  may  be  ex- 
posed. 

I  have  said  this  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the  way, 
and  making  the  object  of  inquiry  as  simple  and  plain 
as  it  is  in  other  branches  of  knowledge.     In  physical 


20  PRELIMINARY    CONSIDERATIONS. 

science  we  inquire  for  facts ;  for  example,  we  inquire 
whether  all  bodies  have  a  tendency  to  the  centre 
of  the  earth,  or  to  the  centre  of  the  solar  system ; 
how  tliis  tendency  shows  itself,  and  acccording  to 
what  laws  it  is  regulated.  We  inquire,  what  peculiar 
tendency  or  power  the  loadstone  has,  and  in  what 
manner  it  operates.  The  same  in  every  branch  of 
natural  science.  Here  we  suffer  ourselves  to  be 
encumbered  with  no  hypothesis  and  no  preconceived 
opinion.  And  if  any  one  should  say  to  us^  this  or  that 
thing,  which  is  made  known  as  a  fact,  is  very  strange 
and  unaccountable,  entirely  different  from  what  we 
should  have  supposed,  and  liable  to  difficulties  which 
cannot  be  solved  ;  it  would  still  be  of  no  avail.  We 
should  be  satisfied  with  clear  evidence,  and  should 
unhesitatingly  believe  the  truth  of  facts,  made  known 
by  our  own  experience  or  that  of  others.  What  if 
they  should  appear  strange  and  unaccountable,  and 
should  be  attended  with  insolvable  difficulties?  To 
creatures  who  are  just  beginning  to  learn,  everything 
may  be  strange  and  unaccountable.  We  know  that 
many  things  with  which  we  are  familiar,  and  concern- 
ing which  we  have  no  difficulties,  are  very  strange 
and  attended  with  insurmountable  difficulties  to  a  little 
child  ;  and  that  they  were  formerly  so  to  us. 

What  a  pity  it  is  that  men  cannot  be  brought  to 
exercise  as  much  reason  and  common  sense  on  the 
subject  of  religion,  as  they  do  on  other  subjects  !  In 
every  department  of  natural  science,  they  readily  admit 
facts,  however  new  and  however  contrary  to  their  pre- 


DEPRAVITY    PROVED.  21 

conceived  opinions.  But  when  they  come  to  the 
subject  of  reUgion,  on  which  they  are  least  of  all  capa- 
ble of  knowing  anything  except  what  God  teaches 
them,  they  hesitate  to  admit  what  the  word  of  God 
and  common  experience  make  perfectly  plain  and  cer- 
tain. They  doubt  and  even  deny  a  doctrine  which 
rests  upon  obvious  facts,  occurring  around  them  and 
within  them  every  day  and  hour  of  their  lives.  What 
can  be  done  to  convince  men  of  the  unreasonableness 
and  folly  of  such  a  course,  and  to  prepare  them  to  re- 
ceive with  simplicity  whatever  God  makes  known  to 
them  as  truth  ? 


CHA  PTER    II. 

General  remarks  on  the  evidence  of  depravity  arising  from  human  conduct.  — 
Scripture  proof  of  the  universality  of  sin. 

It  may  be  proper  to  commence  the  argument  in  sup- 
port of  the  common  doctrine  of  depravity,  by  a  few 
general  remarks  on  the  evidence  which  arises  from 
human  conduct. 

This  is  a  kind  of  evidence  which  is  sanctioned  by 
our  Saviour  himself.  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know 
them.  Do  men  gather  grapes  of  thorns  or  figs  of 
thistles?  —  A  good  tree  cannot  bring  forth  evil  fruit; 
neither  can  a  corrupt  tree  bring  forth  good  fruit."  On 
this  principle  we  ground  all  our  judgments  of  ourselves 
and  others.  External  actions  are  the  only  evidence  of 
character  which  can  fall  under  our  observation,  in  re- 
3 


TSA  DEPRAVITY    PROVED 

spect  to  our  fellow  men.  And  external  and  internal 
actions  furnish  the  proper  evidence  of  our  own  char- 
acter. 

Now  the  general  current  of  human  actions  is  such 
in  regard  to  the  divine  law,  as  to  afford  conclusive  and 
overwhelming  evidence  of  man's  moral  corruption.  If 
we  turn  our  thoughts  to  the  history  of  human  conduct 
in  the  antediluvian  world,  and  since,  we  shall  see  that 
man  has  been  a  sinner.  If  we  survey  the  conduct  of 
man  at  the  present  day,  in  every  situation  and  at  every 
period  of  life,  we  still  find  evidence  of  the  fact  that  m^ari 
is  a  sinner.  And  this  fact  is  made  still  more  evident  to 
each  individual  by  his  own  moral  feelings  and  actions. 
Who  among  men,  who  among  the  wisest  and  best  of 
meji,  can  survey  his  own  life,  even  for  a  single  day, 
without  being  constrained  to  feel  that  man  is  a 
sinner  ?  Or  if  a  doubt  should  be  felt  in  his  mind  re- 
specting the  sinfulness  of  som^e  other  9nen,  could  he  be 
in  doubt  respecting  his  own  sinfulness?  Everyone 
who  attends  seriously  to  his  own  inward  exercises  and 
outward  actions,  and  compares  them  with  the  standard 
of  God's  law,  must  acknowledge  that,  whoever  may 
be  free  from  guilt,  he  himself  is  a  sinner. 

The  evidence  which  arises  from  human  conduct  in 
favor  of  the  common  doctrine  of  depravity,  is  exceed- 
ingly  various.  It  is  exhibited  in  all  conceivable  ways. 
Indeed  the  wickedness  of  the  human  heart  has  forced 
itself  out  in  ways  which,  had  it  not  been  for  our 
knowledge  of  facts,  we  should  have  pronounced  im- 
possible. 


FROM  man's  conduct.  23 

This  evidence  exists  in  a  very  high  degree.  The 
actions  of  men  are  not  such  that  we  are  merely  able, 
by  careful  examination,  to  discover  some  taint  of  moral 
evil  in  them.  They  have  an  obliquity  which  is  palpa- 
ble and  prominent.  They  have  a  deep  stain,  like 
scarlet  and  crimson. 

The  evidence  from  human  conduct  is  constantly 
exhibited  before  our  eyes.  Should  we  at  any  time 
forget  the  history  of  past  ages,  and  begin  to  think  that 
man  is  not  so  depraved  as  has  generally  been  sup- 
posed ;  we  should  soon  be  awakened  from  our  dream, 
by  the  fruits  of  depravity  in  those  around  us,  and 
especially  in  ourselves.  Whether  we  are  associated 
with  our  fellow  creatures  in  the  common  business  of 
life  or  in  the  concerns  of  religion,  we  cannot  fail  to 
witness  in  them,  whoever  they  may  be,  clear  indica- 
tions of  moral  corruption.  And  if  we  are  separated 
from  the  society  of  men  and  live  in  solitude,  we  shall 
still  have  evidence  of  this  corruption  from  what  takes 
place  in  ourselves.  Wherever  we  may  go  and  what- 
ever we  may  do,  this  evidence  will  be  continually  pres- 
ent with  us. 

From  the  history  of  human  conduct,  we  have  then 
evidence  of  depravity,  which  is  various,  powerful,  and 
constant.  Indeed  the  evidence  is  so  great,  that  it  is 
difficult  to  imagine  how  it  could  be  increased.  There 
is,  it  is  true,  an  effort  among  men,  and  we  may  often 
be  conscious  of  such  an  effort  in  ourselves,  to  draw  a 
veil  over  the  naked  deformity  of  sin,  and  to  put  on  the 
semblance  of  goodness  when  the  reaUty  is  wanting. 


24  DEPRAVITY    PROVED 

But  even  this  affords  additional  evidence  of  the  sinful- 
ness which  cleaves  to  our  character.  Deceit,  or  an 
unwillingness  to  appear  what  it  is,  must  be  regarded  as 
one  of  the  most  hateful  properties  of  the  depraved 
heart.  And  the  more  we  are  in  the  habit  of  searching 
out  the  deceitful  workings  of  sin,  and  the  various  false 
refuges  which  it  invents,  the  more  deep  will  be  our 
conviction  of  its  power  and  malignity.  Is  it  not  then 
difficult  to  conceive,  how  the  evidence  of  man's  de- 
pravity, arising  from  his  actions,  could  be  increased  ? 
It  is,  to  say  the  least,  so  great,  that  w^e  must  be 
the  subjects  of  singular  obstinacy  and  blindness,  not 
to  he  convinced,  and  of  singular  pride,  not  to  be 
humbled. 

The  evidence  already  brought  into  view,  even  if 
there  was  no  other,  proves  the  moral  depravity  of  man 
as  clearly,  as  the  evidence  of  facts  prove  any  principle 
in  natural  science.  Even  the  law  of  gravitation  can- 
not be  proved  more  certainly  than  "  the  law  of  sin''^  in 
man.  If  the  law  of  gravitation  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  all  bodies,  when  left  without  resistance,  show  a 
tendency  to  move  towards  the  centre  of  the  earth ;  the 
moral  depravity  of  man  is  proved  by  the  fact  that, 
when  left  to  himself  in  circumstances  which  lead  to  a 
Idevelopement  of  his  moral  character,  he  always  shows 
a  propensity  to  sin.  The  appearances  of  human  na- 
ture from  the  first  apostacy  to  the  present  time,  and 
from  early  childhood  to  old  age,  evince  the  existence 
of  a  deep-rooted  moral  disease.  That  the  nature  of 
man  has  a  wrong  bias,  or  tends  to  evil,  is  seen  and  ac- 


PROM  man's  conduct.  25 

knowledged  by  all  who  have  the  care  of  children  and 
youth,  or  who  seriously  endeavour  to  persuade  men  to 
conform  to  the  rule  of  duty.  It  is  proved  by  all  the 
restraints  which  discreet  parents  feel  themselves  obliged 
to  impose  on  their  children,  and  rulers  upon  their  sub- 
jects; especially  by  those  restraints  which  good  men 
find  it  necessary  to  impose  upon  themselves.  The  facts 
which  indicate  the  existence  of  moral  evil  in  man,  are 
as  various  and  clear,  as  those  which  ever  indicated  any 
bodily  disease. 

I  would  just  add,  that  the  more  perfect  our  acquaint- 
ance with  (he  conduct  of  men,  and  especially  our  own 
conduct,  the  deeper  will  be  our  impression  of  the  cor- 
ruption of  human  nature.  It  is  not  like  a  case  in 
which  a  partial  acquaintance  with  the  symptoms  of  the 
disease  excites  fears  which  are  allayed  by  a  more  per- 
fect acquaintance.  It  is  rather  like  a  case  in  which 
our  first  observation  might  lead  us  to  apprehend  that  a 
person  is  the  subject  of  some  infirmity,  still  however 
leaving  us  in  doubt  whether  there  is  any  serious  disor- 
der, or  what  the  disorder  is,  but  our  continued  obser- 
vation of  the  symptoms  gradually  increases  our  appre- 
hension, and  finally  makes  it  a  certainty  that  the  pa- 
tient has  a  disorder  of  the  most  alarming  character,  and 
incapable  of  being  cured,  except  by  the  speedy  applica- 
tion of  extraordinary  means. 


26  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 


Depravity  Universal. 


The  evidence  from  Scripture  that  all  men  are  sin- 
ners^ will  now  be  considered.  And  it  should  be  kept 
in  mind  that  this  evidence  is  nothing  less  than  the  tes- 
timony of  that  Being  who  perfectly  knows  what  is  in 
man  ;  who  is  no  respecter  of  persons,  and  who  is  per- 
fectly qualified  to  be  our  Judge.  It  is  the  testimony  of 
a  benevolent  Creator  respecting  his  creatures,  and  of  a 
holy  and  merciful  Father  respecting  his  children.  In 
such  a  testimony  we  may  be  sure  there  will  be  no  par^ 
tiahty  and  no  injustice. 

The  particulars  of  the  divine  testimony  in  proof  of 
the  universal  sinfulness  of  our  race,  will  be  presented  in 
the  following  order : 

1.  Passages  expressly  asserting  the  universality 
of  sin. 

2.  Passages  setting  forth  the  sinful  conduct  of  indi- 
viduals and  natio7is. 

3.  Representations  of  other  subjects  which  imply 
the  universal  sinfulness  of  man. 

1.  Passages  expressly  asserting  the  universality 
of  sin. 

Those  which  are  found  in  the  writings  of  the  Apostle 
Paul,  are  very  direct.  Rom.  5 :  12 — 19.  "  And  so  death 
passed  upon  all  m.en,for  that  all  have  sinnedJ^  The 
passage  clearly  implies  that  all  who  die  are  sinners,  or 
that  the  sinfulness  of  men  extends  as  far  as  their  mor- 
tality.    A  variety  of  expressions  follow  this,  showing 


DEPRAVITY   UNIVERSAL.  27 

that  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  are  in  a  state  of  sin  and 
ruin.  This  is  repeatedly  affirmed  in  ch.  iii:  "We  have 
before  proved,"  says  the  Apostle,  "  that  both  Jews  and 
Gentiles  are  all  under  sin ;  as  it  is  written  :  There  is 
none  righteous,  no,  not  one.  There  is  none  that  un- 
derstandeth,  there  is  none  that  seeketh  after  God. 
They  are  all  gone  out  of  the  way ;  they  are  together 
become  unprofitable,  there  is  none  that  doeth  good,  no, 
not  one."  He  then  comes  to  the  conclusion,  that  "  all 
the  world  are  guilty  before  God ;  so  that  by  the  deeds 
of  the  law  no  flesh  can  be  justified  in  his  sight;" 
which  would  not  be  true,  if  any  were  free  from  sin. 

The  declaration  of  God  by  the  prophet  Jeremiah, 
[ch.  17:  9,]  conveys  the  same  sentiment.  "  The  heart 
is  deceitful  above  all  things,  and  desperately  wicked ; 
who  can  know  it?"  The  sense  is  unlimited.  It  is 
not  the  heart  of  one  man,  or  of  one  society  of  men  ; 
but  the  heart  J — the  human  heart  universally.  This 
sense  is  confirmed  by  the  next  verse.  "  I  the  Lord 
search  the  heart ; "  the  heart  universally.  And  as 
there  can  be  no  limitation  in  this  case,  there  can  be 
none  in  the  former.  The  heart  which  God  searches, 
is  that  which  is  deceitful  and  desperately  wicked.  In 
Eccl.  9 :  4,  we  find  a  similar  expression.  "  The  heart 
of  the  sons  of  men  is  full  of  evil."  So,  Gen.  8:  21 ; 
"The  imagination  of  m,an^s  heart  is  evil  from  his 
youth."  What  does  the  anatomist  mean,  when  he 
gives  a  description  of  the  form  and  uses  of  the  hearty 
as  a  part  of  the  human  body?  And  what  does  the 
writer  on  mental  philosophy  mean,  when  be  speaks  of 


28     .  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

the  mind,  the  understanding,  the  willj  and  the  con- 
science 7  Does  not  the  form  of  expression  always  de- 
note that  what  is  said  relates  to  man  as  a  species,  and 
is  true  of  the  species  universally ^  unless  there  is  an 
express  or  implied  limiiation?  But  it  may  be  said, 
there  is  such  a  limitation,  inasmuch  as  the  same  wri- 
ters who  declare  that  all  are  sinners,  all  corrupt, — 
that  there  is  none  that  seeketh  after  God,  or  doeth 
good,  no,  not  one,  also  speak  frequently  of  those  who 
are  righteous,  of  those  who  seek  God  and  do  good. 

To  set  this  matter  right,  we  have  only  to  make  the 
Bible  its  own  interpreter.  How  does  the  sacred  vol- 
ume account  for  the  fact,  that  there  are  some  who 
form  an  exception  to  the  general  character  of  man, 
and,  in  the  midst  of  a  wicked  world,  are  holy  and  obe- 
dient ?  Does  it  teach  that  they  are  so  hy  nature  7 
No.  It  unequivocally  ascribes  the  character  of  those 
who  are  holy,  to  the  new  creating  influence  of  the 
Divine  Spirit.  They  were  "by  nature  children  of 
wrath,  even  as  others.  But  they  are  ^^born  again ;^^ 
they  "are  washed,  they  are  justified,  they  are  sancti- 
fied in  the  name  of  the  Lord  Jesus,  and  by  the  /Spirit 
of  their  God."  They  are  what  they  are,  "6y  the 
grace  of  God."  Now  if  they  were  holy  by  nature, 
the  texts  which  declare  that  there  is  none  righteous, 
would  evidently  be  subject  to  limitation.  But  as  those 
who  are  holy,  are  not  so  in  their  natural  state,  and 
become  so  only  by  the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost, 
they  furnish  no  exception  to  the  universal  sinfulness 
of  man,  as  he  is  by  nature.     Whatever  men  may  be- 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

come,  in  this  world  or  in  the  next,  by  redeerale^^^iSacfe-    ^J'^ 
tifying  grace,  they  are  all,  in  their  natural  state,  with-     r  a 
out   exception,    dead  in  sin.     And   it  is   not   to  ^iH^ 
forgotten  that  even  those  who  are  holy  and  obedient, 
are  so  only  in  a  very  imperfect  measure,  having  much 
remaining  sin.     So  that  if  any  say  they  have  no  sin, 
"they  deceive  them^elves,"  and  "  make  God  a  liar." 

2.  I  argue  from  those  texts  which  set  forth  the  sin- 
fulness of  individuals  and  nations  at  particular  times. 
Such  as  Gen.  6:5;  "And  God  saw  that  the  wicked- 
ness of  man  was  great  in  the  earth,  and  that  every 
imagination  of  the  thoughts  of  his  heart  was  only  evil 
continually."  This  passage  shows  what  was  the  char- 
acter of  the  human  race  before  the  flood.  "The 
wickedness  of  man  was  great."  To  the  same  class 
belong  all  the  passages  which  describe  the  impiety  and 
wickedness  of  Jews  and  Gentiles  at  different  periods. 
These  passages  are  very  numerous,  and  are  found  in 
the  writings  of  Moses  and  the  Prophets,  in  the  Psalms 
and  in  the  New  Testament. 

It  is  indeed  said,  in  the  way  of  objection  to  the  com- 
mon mode  of  reasoning  from  such  texts,  that  they 
relate  to  men  in  particular  places  and  at  particular 
times,  and  to  those  who  were  subjects  of  an  uncom- 
mon degree  of  depravity,  and  that  it  would  be  very 
unjust  to  understand  them  as  descriptive  of  the  char* 
acter  of  the  whole  human  race. 

This  objection  can  be  obviated  by  considering  the 
manner  in  which  the  subject  is  treated  by  writers  in 
the  New  Testament.     They  refer  to  the  account  given 


30  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

in  the  Old  Testament,  of  the  depravity  of  men  in 
former  times,  as  descriptive  of  the  character  of  the 
human  race  generally.  Tiie  prophet  Isaiah  said : 
"  Who  hath  believed  our  report,  and  to  whom  is  the 
arm  of  the  Lord  revealed?^'  And  in  Isaiah  vi,  God 
said  to  the  prophet :  "Go,  and  tell  this  people;  hear  ye 
indeed  but  understand  not,  and  see  ye  indeed  but  per- 
ceive not.  Make  the  heart  of  this  people  fat,  and 
make  their  ears  heavy,  and  shut  their  eyes."  In  this 
commission  God  signified  what  was  the  character  of 
the  people  to  whom  the  prophet  was  sent,  and  pointed 
out  the  fearful  effect  which  his  ministry  would  have 
upon  them.  The  words  related,  primarily  and  di- 
rectly^ to  those  who  were  contemporary  with  the 
prophet  Isaiah.  But  in  the  New  Testament,  these 
words  are  repeatedly  referred  to  as  descriptive  of  the 
character  of  the  Jews  under  the  Gospel  dispensation. 
Take  the  following  instances.  John  12:  37  —  40; 
"But  though  he  had  done  so  many  miracles  before 
them,  yet  they  believed  not ;  that  the  saying  of  Isaiah 
the  prophet  might  be  fulfilled,  which  he  spake;  Lord^ 
who  hath  believed  our  report,  and  to  whom,  is  the 
arm  of  the  Lord  revealed?  Therefore  they  could  not 
believe,  because  that  Isaiah  saith  again;  He  hath 
blinded  their  eyes  and  hardened  their  hearts,  that 
they  should  not  see  with  their  eyes,  nor  understand 
with  their  heart,  and  be  converted,  and  I  should 
heal  them.^^  Thus  the  writer  of  the  evangehcal  his- 
tory took  two  passages  which  described  the  stupidity 
and  wickedness  of  the  Jews,  at  a  former  period,  and 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL.  31 

applied  them  to  those  who  were  contemporary  with 
him.  The  Apostle  Paul  did  the  same  to  the  Jews  in 
Rome.  In  his  final  address  to  them,  in  order  to  make 
a  deep  impression  of  their  guilt,  he  said  ;  "  Well  spake 
the  Holy  Ghost  by  Esaias  the  prophet  unto  your 
fathers;"  —  repeating  the  same  words  from  Isaiah  vi, 
with  the  manifest  and  cutting  implication,  that  the 
words  described  their  character,  as  well  as  the  char- 
acter of  their  fathers.  In  his  epistle  to  Titus,  Paul, 
in  the  same  way,  takes  a  passage  from  the  poet  Epi- 
menides,  and  applies  it  to  the  Cretans  of  his  day. 
"  One  of  them,  even  a  prophet  of  their  own,  said : 
The  Cretans  are  alxoays  liars^  evil  beasts,  sloto  bel- 
lies. This  witness  is  true:  wherefore  rebuke  them 
sharply,  (fcc."  The  passage  from  the  poet  not  only 
suggested  that  the  Cretans  were  depraved,  but  that 
they  were  characterized  from  age  to  age  by  particular 
forms  of  depravity.  But  the  example  of  the  Apostle 
in  Romans  iii,  is  most  directly  in  point.  In  making  out 
the  proof  that  all  men  are  sinners,  he  enumerates  the 
several  forms  of  wickedness  which  had  been  exhibited 
by  men  in  particular  places,  and  at  particular  times. 
The  argument  is  unquestionably  good.  And  of  course, 
it  is  just  and  proper  for  us  to  regard  all  the  particular 
instances  of  wickedness  which  the  liistory  of  any  por- 
tion of  mankind  brings  to  view,  as  indicating  what  is 
the  common  character  of  the  species.  In  several  of 
the  Psalms,  particularly  the  v,  x,  xiv,  xxxvi,  and  xl, 
and  in  Isaiah  lix,  the  writers  described  the  sins  which 
prevailed  in  their  day.     "They  are  corrupt,  they  have 


32  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

done  abominable  works ;  they  are  all  gone  aside,"  (fee. 
The  passages  are  indeed  descriptive  of  the  Jewish 
character  in  times  of  great  degeneracy.  But  the 
Apostle  makes  use  of  these  very  passages  to  set  forth 
the  character  of  the  Jews  in  his  day.  And  indeed  he 
fails  as  to  the  great  object  of  his  reasoning,  and  the 
conclusion  at  which  he  arrives  is  false,  if  the  passages 
he  quotes  from  the  Old  Testament  do  not  contain, 
substantially,  a  true  account  of  the  character  of  man- 
kind universally  in  their  natural  state.  For  he  ad- 
duces the  passages  for  the  very  purpose  of  proving  that 
all  the  world  are  guilty  before  God.  It  is  a  connected 
chain  of  reasoning ;  and  unless  the  texts  cited  are,  as 
to  the  substance  of  them,  justly  applicable  to  the 
whole  race  of  man,  the  reasoning  is  without  force,  and 
the  conclusion,  that  all  are  guilty  and  in  need  of  sal- 
vation by  grace,  is  broader  than  the  premises.  But 
when  depravity  is  thus  predicated  of  all  men  alike,  it 
by  no  means  implies  that  all  have  the  same  degree^  or 
exhibit  the  same  forms  of  depravity.  This  was  not 
the  case  even  with  those  of  whom  the  Psalmist  and 
the  prophet  Isaiah  originally  spoke.  The  truth  of  the 
passages  quoted,  and  the  propriety  of  reasoning  from 
them  as  the  Apostle  does,  need  not  be  supposed  to 
imply  more  than  this,  namely,  that  all  men  in  their 
natural  state  are  unholy  and  disobedient,  and  so,  as  to 
wickedness  of  heart,  are  substantially  alike;  or  that 
they  have  the  same  moral  nature^  the  same  wrong 
propensities,  the  same  elements  of  m,oral  evil ;  and 
that  the  variety  of  characters  existing  among  men  is 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL.  33 

not  to  be  accounted  for  by  any  essential  difference  as 
to  moral  nature,  but  by  their  different  bodily  consti- 
tutions, by  the  different  circumstances  in  which  they 
are  placed,  and  the  different  influences  under  which 
they  act. 

It  may  possibly  be  thought  that,  as  the  passages 
quoted  related  to  the  Jewish  nation  in  former  times, 
the  Apostle  meant  to  apply  them  merely  to  those  Jews 
who  had  a  similar  character  in  his  time,  and  that  it 
would  be  improper  to  consider  them  as  a  proof  of  uni- 
versal depravity.  I  admit  that  the  primary  design  of 
the  passages  related  to  Jews ;  but  the  Apostle  shows 
that  his  argument  was  meant  to  have  a  wider  range. 
His  conclusion  is,  that  "the  whole  world,"  whether 
Jews  or  Gentiles,  are  guilty,  that  is,  convicted  of  sin, 
and  so  must  look  for  justification  by  grace,  not  by 
works.  I  would  not  deny,  that  in  coming  to  this 
conclusion  he  might  refer  to  what  he  had  said  to 
the  Gentiles  in  ch.  i,  in  connection  with  what  he 
had  said  of  the  Jews  in  ch.  iii.  Nor  would  I  deny 
that  he  might  take  it  for  granted,  and  as  what 
would  not  be  called  in  question  by  those  to  whom  he 
wrote,  that  the  Gentiles  were  as  wicked  as  the  Jews, 
and  as  worthy  of  the  charges  which  he  recited  from 
the  Old  Testament.  On  this  ground,  his  making 
good  his  charge  against  the  Jews,  was,  by  obvious 
consequence,  making  it  good  against  the  Gentiles. 

If  any  should  allege  that  the  passages  quoted  were 
meant  by  the  Apostle  to  be  applied  only  to  the  unbe- 
lieving' and  ungodly  part  of  the  Jewish  nation ;  my 
4 


34  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

reply  is,  that  the  Apostle's  design  was  to  show,  that 
there  is  only  one  mode  of  acceptance  with  God,  namely, 
by  faith  in  Clirist,  in  contradistinction  to  salvation  by 
works.  And  was  it  not  true  of  believers^  as  well  as 
of  others,  that  there  was  no  way  of  justification  for 
them  except  by  grace  ?  Had  they  not  been  sinners  ? 
And  were  they  not  sinners  still?  Does  not  the  Apos- 
tle, in  the  next  chapter,  speak  of  Abraham  and  David, 
as  those  who  were  justified  in  the  gratuitous  way,  that 
is,  pardoned  ;  —  implying,  that  they  were  transgres- 
sors? So  that  what  the  Apostle  here  asserts  of  all 
men,  is  not  to  be  limited  to  the  unbelieving  and  un- 
godly, but  is  to  be  considered  as  justly  applicable  to  all 
who  were  ever  in  a  state  of  sin,  that  is,  to  the  whole 
race  of  man,  without  exception  ;  as  he  says,  verse  23, 
"  for  all  have  sinned  and  come  short  of  the  glory  of 
God,"  —  and  so  need  the  grace  of  the  Gospel. 

There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt,  therefore,  that 
the  passages  quoted  in  Romans  iii,  from  the  Old  Tes- 
tament, are  a  true  description  of  the  character  which, 
for  substance,  all  men  naturally  possess.  These  pas- 
sages show  that,  whatever  may  be  the  different  forms 
_of  character  among  men,  they  all,  without  exception, 
'^^  agree  in  this,  that  they  are  sinners.  And  if  these  pas- 
sages are  to  be  regarded  in  this  light ;  it  is  evidently 
proper  that  other  similar  passages  should  be  regarded 
in  the  same  light.  Accordingly,  the  account  given  of 
the  wickedness  of  the  antediluvian  world,  and  of  par- 
ticular portions  of  mankind  in  different  ages,  may  be 
produced  as  a  true  exhibition  of  the  natural  character 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL.  35 

of  man,  a  developement,  varied  by  circumstances,  but 
siibstantialbj  the  same,  of  man's  unrenewed  heart. 
What  if  men,  who  are  educated  in  a  Christian  land, 
and  under  the  influence  of  Christian  instruction,  are 
free  from  the  odious  forms  of  vice  described  by  the 
Apostle  ?  Are  they  not  "  by  nature  children  of  wrath 
even  as  others?"  In  forming  a  correct  judgment  of 
their  case,  we  pass  by  what  is  fair  and  lovely  in  their 
visible  conduct ;  —  we  pass  by  all  the  diversities  of 
their  intellectual  and  social  qualities,  and  fix  our  eye 
upon  the  moral  affections  of  the  heart.  In  these  ele- 
ments of  evil  all  agree.  And  although  they  have  not, 
by  formal  outward  acts,  committed  theft,  murder,  (fee, 
they  all  have  in  their  unrenewed  hearts  what  may  be 
called  the  principles  or  seeds  of  these  hateful  vices. 
And  admitting  them  to  be  alike  in  these  original 
affections,  we  can  satisfactorily  account  for  all  the 
varieties  of  character  existing  among  them,  by  the  in- 
fluence of  circumstances.  Who  can  suppose  that  the 
different  degrees  of  wickedness,  and  all  the  varieties  of 
character  among  men,  are  to  be  traced  back  to  a  dif- 
ference in  their  moral  nature,  or  their  original  moral 
dispositions?  Nothing  could  be  more  unreasonable,  or 
contrary  to  the  word  of  God,  than  this.  It  is  clearly 
suggested  by  common  observation  and  experience,  and 
especially  by  Scripture,  that  human  nature,  as  to  its 
grand  moral  features,  is  always  the  same;  and  that  the 
wickedness  committed  in  any  age  or  countr}',  is  a  true 
exhibition  of  what  is  in  man  as  a  species.  Were  it 
not  so,  the  writings  of  historians,  whether  sacred  or 


36  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

profane,  would  be  of  little  use  to  us.  We  have  been 
taught  to  regard  it  as  one  of  the  pecuHar  advantages 
of  history,  that  it  gives  us  lessons  respecting  human 
nature,  or  makes  us  acquainted  with  what  is  in  man, 
and  so  is  calculated  to  profit  us  as  individuals  of  the 
species.  But  of  what  advantage  would  history  be  to 
us,  if  it  gave  a  description  of  the  dispositions  and  ac- 
tions of  those  who  have  no  common  nature  with  us, 
and  to  whom  we  bear  no  moral  resemblance?  On 
this  supposition,  why  did  the  Apostle  John  refer  to  the 
conduct  of  Cain,  for  the  purpose  of  counselling  and 
warning  those  to  whom  he  wrote?  Why  did  the 
Apostle  Paul  say,  "Whatsoever  things  were  written 
aforetime,  were  written  for  our  learning  ?  "  And  why 
did  he  bring  into  view  the  ingratitude,  unbehef,  mur- 
muring, and  obduracy  of  the  Israelites  in  the  wilder- 
ness, for  the  purpose  of  admonition  to  his  contempora- 
ries? Suppose  men  in  former  times  were  chargeable 
with  various  kinds  of  wickedness;  what  is  that  to  us,  if 
we  have  no  tendency  in  our  nature  to  the  same  wick- 
edness? History  has  been  regarded  as  a  faithful  mirr 
ror  in  which  we  may  discern  the  features  of  our  own 
character,  even  those  which  were  before  unobserved, 
and  may  learn  the  dangers  against  which  we  ought  to 
guard.  But  on  the  supposition  above  made,  history 
could  no  longer  be  used  for  these  important  purposes, 
but  must  be  considered  merely  as  a  gratification  to  our 
curiosity.  Nay  more,  those  texts  in  which  the  sacred 
writers  make  the  most  general  declarations  respecting 
the  sinfulness  of  man,  must  be  limited  to  those  tq 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL.  37 

whom  the  writers  originally  applied  them.  If  they 
said  "  that  which  was  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh,"  and 
that  "  they  who  are  in  the  flesh  cannot  please  God  ;  " 
they  must  have  said  it  of  the  carnal  race  of  men  who 
lived  at  that  time ;  but  it  by  no  means  proves  that  men 
at  the  present  day  arc  in  this  condition.  If  Christ  de- 
clared that  "except  a  man  be  born  again  he  cannot  see 
the  kingdom  of  heaven,"  —  and  if  the  Apostles  spoke  of 
all  Christians  as  actually  renewed  by  the  Divine  Spirit ; 
we  cannot,  upon  this  principle,  consider  such  passages 
as  intended  to  show  what  the  natural  state  of  man  is, 
and  what  is  necessary  to  the  Christian  character,  at 
this  period  of  superior  light  and  refinement.  Indeed, 
if  the  principle  involved  in  the  objection  is  correct,  we 
cannot  conclude  that  any  Scripture  precept  is  obliga- 
tory on  us.  For  all  the  commands  of  God  contained 
in  the  Bible,  were  given  to  men  who  lived  in  former 
times.  And  how  can  those  commands,  which  were 
given  to  generations  of  men  long  since  passed  away, 
show  what  God  requires  of  us7  Those  who  were 
spoken  to  by  Moses  and  the  Prophets,  and  by  Christ 
and  the  Apostles,  were  required  to  repent  of  sin,  and  to 
love  God  with  all  their  hearts,  and  their  neighbours  as 
themselves.  But  when  has  the  inspired  teacher  said, 
that  these  requisitions  related  to  men  who  should  live 
in  the  nineteenth  century  ?  In  fact,  all  parts  of  the 
Bible  were  addressed  to  men  of  other  times  and  in 
other  circumstances;  and  how  can  any  of  its  doctrines 
be  applicable  to  us  ?  How  can  its  precepts  bind  us  ? 
And  how  can  its  promises  animate  and  comfort  us  ? 
% 


38  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

All  the  good  which  the  sacred  vohime  can  now  do,  is 
to  teach  us  what  mankind  were,  and  how  God  treated 
them  in  former  times.  To  all  these  extremities  should 
we  be  carried,  if  we  should  admit  the  supposition  which 
we  haA^e  been  considering.  For  the  same  principle 
which  would  free  us  from  the  high  charges  of  de- 
pravity and  guilt  found  in  the  Bible,  would  authorize 
us  to  set  aside  all  the  other  doctrines  connected  with 
that  of  human  corruption, — would  prove  us  to  be  free 
from  the  obligations  of  all  the  precepts  of  the  Bible, 
and  would  entirely  deprive  us  of  its  gracious  and 
cheering  promises.  And  so  the  sacred  volume  would 
be  to  us  an  antiquated,  obsolete,  and  useless  book. 

I  well  know  it  is  maintained  by  all  sober  men,  that 
the  general  instructions,  and  precepts,  and  promises  of 
God's  word,  relate  to  us  as  really  as  to  those  who  lived 
in  the  time  of  the  Prophets  and  Apostles.  But  on  what 
prmciple  are  they  to  be  so  understood  1  How  is  it  that 
we  directly  conclude,  that  all  men  now  living  are  bound 
by  the  moral  precepts  contained  in  the  Bible  ?  —  that 
wherever  we  find  human  beings,  we  feel  it  to  be  proper 
at  once  to  address  to  them  the  offers  and  the  promises 
of  the  Gospel,  and  to  call  upon  them  to  repent  and 
believe  ?  It  can  be  on  no  other  principle  than  this ; 
that  as  to  whatever  is  necessary  to  constitute  accounta- 
ble beings,  and  as  to  the  essential  qualities  of  moral 
character,  all  men  are  alike.  This  is  a  principle  which 
we  almost  instinctively  admit.  Who  doubts  that  the 
human  beings  whom  he  meets  for  the  first  time,  even 
if  it  be  in  the  most  distant  part  of  the  world,  have  the 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL.  39 

same  rational  and  moral  faculties  with  those  men 
whom  he  has  familiarly  known  ;  that  they  possess, 
and  will,  as  occasion  prompts,  exhibit,  self-love,  pride, 
a  disposition  to  resent  injuries,  and  all  the  other  moral 
affections  which  he  is  conscious  of  in  himself,  or  has 
witnessed  in  others  around  him  ?  And  who  does  not 
feel  it  to  be  proper  and  necessary  in  all  his  intercourse 
with  men,  whether  familiarly  known  to  him  or  not,  to 
act  on  the  principle  that  they  are  subject  to  all  the 
depraved  affections  which  the  inspired  teachers  charged 
upon  the  wicked  world  in  their  day?  If  a  man  should 
act  on  any  other  principle,  he  would  be  considered  as 
deficient  in  the  knowledge  of  human  nature.  And  if 
any  one  should  think  his  own  heart  free  from  that  de- 
pravity which  has  misguided  and  ruined  others,  he 
would  show  that  he  is  ignorant  of  himself. 

This  leads  me  to  say,  that  the  propriety  of  consid- 
ering the  description  of  human  sinfulness  found  in  the 
Bible,  as  of  universal  application,  is  evident  from  the 
experience  and  consciousness  of  every  sober,  reflecting 
man.  Let  such  a  man  read  what  the  sacred  writers 
affirm  of  the  wickedness  of  individuals  and  of  nations ; 
and  then  look  into  his  own  heart,  and  ponder  well  the 
emotions  which  have  been  excited  and  the  principles 
which  have  operated  there  ;  and  must  he  not  be  satis- 
fied that  he  has  within  him,  the  elements  of  all  that 
the  Apostles  and  Prophets  charged  upon  the  wicked 
world  ?  Nay,  it  will  not  be  difficult  for  him  to  discover 
in  himself  a  real  moral  resemblance  to  those  who  have 
been  stigmatized  by  the  most  hateful  vices. 


40  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

I  appeal  to  those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  look 
into  their  own  hearts.  You  know  a  man  who  is 
guilty  of  a  heinous  crime,  —  theft,  adultery,  or  murder; 
and  you  know  all  the  unpropitious  circumstances  of 
his  case  from  early  childhood;  the  wrong  instruction  he 
has  received,  the  corrupting  manners  of  his  associates, 
the  influence  of  wealth  or  poverty,  of  excessive  indul- 
gence, or  irritating  severity,  which  has  operated  upon 
him,  —  yea,  the  whole  combination  of  hurtful  causes 
by  which  his  moral  faculties  have  been  perverted,  and 
his  heart  prepared  for  acts  of  wickedness.  Now  had 
you  been  placed  in  the  same  circumstances,  would 
you  not  have  been  likely  to  commit  the  same  crime? 
Have  you  not  already,  in  many  instances,  done  that 
which  is  equally  contrary  to  the  divine  law?  And 
have  you  not  a  painful  consciousness  of  those  unholy 
dispositions,  which,  had  there  been  no  influence  to 
subdue  or  restrain  them,  and  had  they  been  elicited 
and  strengthened  by  temptation,  might  have  made 
you  a  Cain,  a  Pharaoh,  a  Saul,  or  a  Judas?  Are  you 
not  convinced  that  you  have  in  yourself  the  elements 
of  the  same  moral  deformity  ?  and  that  it  is  owing, 
not  to  the  natural  purity  of  your  hearts,  but  to  the 
influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit,  or  to  the  restraints  of 
Divine  Providence,  that  you  are  not  actually  num- 
bered with  the  most  vile  and  wretched  of  the  human 
race  ? 

3.  I  argue  from  those  representations  of  Scripture 
which  teach  the  depravity  of  all  the  human  race  by 
inan'ifest  irnplication. 


DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL.  ff^^*»       ^  J"  ^^^^ 

W  ■  ^>>  <, 

Those  passages  which  teach  the  necessity I5f  regeil-  *  <>      < 
eration,  or  which  assert  that  the  obedient  and  pious       *5  ^ 
have  been  regenerated,  clearly  imply  that  all  men  ^J^J^, 
naturally  in  a  depraved  state.     For,  if  any  human   — ' — ^ 
being  is  not  depraved,  surely  he  does  not  need  to  be 
born  again.     He  is  holy  and  obedient  without  regen- 
eration. 

The  first  passage  I  shall  quote  is  John  3:  1 — -7, 
containing  the  discourse  of  our  Saviour  with  Nico- 
demus.  The  four  thousand  years  which  had  passed 
away  from  the  creation,  had  furnished  abundant  evi- 
dence of  the  natural  character  of  man.  A  thorough 
experiment  had  been  made  of  the  disposition  of  the 
human  heart  in  a  great  variety  of  circumstances. 
Commands  and  warnings,  promises  and  threats,  favors 
and  judgments,  displays  of  wonderful  mercy  and  of 
tremendous  wrath,  had  been  repeatedly  tried.  Jesus 
stood  upon  an  eminence  from  which  he  witnessed  the 
w^hole  developement  which  had  been  made  of  human 
nature,  and  all  the  affections  of  man's  heart.  And 
he  set  forth  the  grand  result,  —  the  momentous  truth 
which  the  history  of  all  ages  had  taught,  and  which, 
without  the  history  of  past  ages,  was  perfectly  mani- 
fest to  his  heart-searching  eye,  when  he  said  to 
Nicodemus;  "Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto  thee,  except 
a  man  be  born  again,  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom 
of  God'''  It  is  evident  that  the  change  here  spoken 
of,  is  a  moral  or  spiritual  change;  because  it  is  to 
prepare  men  for  a  spiritual  kingdom.  And  it  is 
necessary  for  all  men,  E&v  ^ir^  tic,  etc.     ^^  Except  any 


42  DEPRAVITY    UNIVERSAL. 

one  is  born  again."  No  human  being,  who  is  not 
regenerated,  can  enjoy  the  blessedness  of  Christ's 
kingdom.  And  so  it  is  most  clearly  implied,  that 
every  human  being  is  in  a  state  of  moral  depravity, 
which  renders  him  unfit  for  Christ's  kingdom.  To 
illustrate  the  necessity  of  a  spiritual  renovation,  our 
Saviour  added,  "  That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is 
flesh."  This  implies  that  the  children  of  men  are  the 
subjects  of  such  sinful  propensities  as  render  them 
incapable  of  holy  enjoyment.  And  as  this  state  of 
depravity  is  the  direct  and  certain  consequence  of  our 
natural  birth,  it  of  course  belongs  alike  to  all.  The 
various  places  where  the  duty  of  repentance  is  en- 
joined, or  the  necessity  of  it  asserted,  imply  the  same 
doctrine.  For  how  can  repentance  be  regarded  as  the 
duty  of  men,  or  as  necessary  to  their  salvation,  unless 
they  are  sinners  ? 

The  sinfulness  of  all  mankind  is  imphed  in  the 
work  of  redemption,  particularly  the  death  of  Christ 
and  the  dispensation  of  the  Spirit.  The  reasoning  of 
the  Apostle  is,  that  ''if  Christ  died  for  all,  then  were 
all  dead,"  i.  e.  dead  in  sin.  If  any  of  our  race  were 
not  sinners,  they  would  need  no  atonement,  and 
Christ's  death  could  have  no  relation  to  them ;  for  he 
is  everywhere  represented  as  having  died  for  sinners, 
the  just  for  the  unjust.  Redemption  by  the  blood  of 
Christ,  for  those  who  are  free  from  sin,  would  be 
totally  incx)ngruous.  The  same  is  true  as  to  the  work 
of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  Spirit  is  sent  to  convince 
men  of  sin,  to  quicken  them,  to  make  them  holy,  to 


DEPRAVirV    UNIVERSAL.  43 

shed  abroad  the  love  of  God  in  their  hearts.  But 
what  need  of  all  this,  nay,  what  place  for  it,  in  regard 
to  those  who  are  not  sinners  ?  Unless  the  heart  is 
impure,  what  occasion  is  there  for  purification  ?  Un- 
less the  mind  is  darkened  by  sin,  what  occasion  for 
special  divine  illumination  ?  And  unless  man,  in  his 
natural  state,  is  depraved,  what  necessity  is  there  of 
his  being  renewed  by  divine  influence  ?  If  then  there 
IS  any  being,  who  has  no  sin,  he  can  have  no  concern 
with  the  special  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  for  him 
to  ask  for  sanctifying  influence,  or  for  others  to  ask  it 
for  him,  would  be  unreasonable  and  senseless. 

The  universality  of  sin  is  implied  in  the  fact,  that 
all  men  die.  Death,  including  the  dissolution  of  the 
body,  is  the  penalty  of  the  law.  Natural  death  is  a 
great  and  appalling  evil,  and  when  inflicted  upon  those 
who  are  the  subjects  of  God's  government,  is  a  mani- 
fest token  of  his  displeasure.  If  men  had  been  per- 
fectly obedient  and  holy,  they  would  not  have  suffered 
death.  This  is  fully  confirmed  by  the  Apostle,  in 
Rom.  5: 12 ;  "By  one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world, 
and  death  hy  sin  ;  and  so  death  hath  passed  upon  all 
men,  for  that  all  have  sinned."  Death  came  in  as 
the  result  of  sin,  and  extended  as  far  as  sin  and  no 
farther.  The  Apostle  speaks,  verse  14,  of  those  who 
lived  from  Adam  to  Moses,  and  teaches  that  death 
reigned  over  them  also,  and  consequently  that  they 
were  sinners,  though  they  had  not  sinned  in  the  same 
manner  that  Adam  did.     The  reasoning  of  the  Apos- 


44 


DEI^RAVITY    IJNIVEtiSAL. 


tie  is  perfectly  clear,  and  the  conclusion  certain  :  Death 
befalls  all  men  ;  therefore  they  are  all  sinners. 

In  proof  of  the  universality  of  sin  among  men,  I 
might  say.  that  the  fact  has  been  acknowledged  by  all 
nations ;  that  the  structure  of  civil  laws,  and  the  ad- 
ministration of  civil  government,  have  always  pro- 
ceeded on  the  principle  of  human  corruption  ;  and  that 
no  government,  whether  civil  or  domestic,  would  be 
fitted  to  its  end,  or  have  any  prospect  of  success,  if  it 
should  overlook  human  corruption.  I  might  say,  too, 
that  no  man  ever  attempted  in  earnest  to  govern  him- 
self by  the  rules  of  right  reason,  without  finding 
abundant  and  mortifying  evidence  of  his  own  moral 
depravity,  and  that  the  farther  any  one  goes  in  the 
work  of  a  just  self-government,  the  clearer  will  he  find 
the  evidence  of  "a  law  in  his  members  warring  against 
the  law  of  his  mind,"  i.  e.  of  a  corrupt  disposition  of 
heart  opposing  his  reason  and  conscience,  and  urging 
him  to  transgress  the  divine  commands.  The  best 
men  on  earth  have  been  sinners,  and  are  the  subjects 
of  sin  still.  "If  we  say  that  we  have  no  sin,  we  de- 
ceive ourselves,  and  the  truth  is  not  in  us." 


CHAPTER    III. 
Total  depravity  explained  and  proved. 


Having  shown  that  all  men,  without  exception,  are 
sinners,  1  shall  next  inquire,  what  is  the  degree  of 
sinfulness  which  belongs  to  unrenewed  man? 


TOTAL    DEPRAVITY.  45 

This  is  an  inquiry  entirely  distinct  from  the  pre- 
ceding. For  the  fact  that  all  are  sinners,  does  not 
necessarily  imply  that  they  are  sinful  in  any  par- 
ticular degree,  and  certainly  not  that  they  are  totally 
sinful.  We  well  know  that  all  who  are  renewed  are 
still  the  subjects  of  sin,  though  they  have  a  degree  of 
holiness. 

The  total  depravity  of  man  in  his  natural  state,  is 
to  be  considered  altogether  as  a  matter  of  fact ;  and 
to  be  proved  by  appropriate  evidence.  But  before 
entering  on  the  proof  of  the  doctrine  that  man  in  his 
natural  state  is  totally  sinful,  it  will  be  important  to 
obtain  a  clear  and  correct  idea  of  the  meaning  of  the 
doctrine. 


Explanation  of  Total  Depravity. 

The  doctrine  relates  to  man  as  a  moral  being,  sub- 
ject to  a  moral  government ;  and  accordingly  the  de- 
pravity predicated  of  him  is  a  moral  depravity.  And 
it  is  to  be  farther  remarked  that  moral,  in  relation 
to  this  subject,  is  used  in  its  highest  sense.  The 
word  is  not  unfrequently  applied  to  those  affections 
which  attend  our  domestic  and  social  relations,  and 
to  the  conduct  which  those  affections  prompt.  Such 
affections,  generally  called  natural  affections,  may  in- 
deed be  regarded  as  of  a  moral  nature  in  a  secondary 
sense.  They  possess  a  higher  excellence  than  the 
animal  appetites,  and  more  directly  involve  our  moral 
interests.     But  the  word  moral,  as  commonly  used 


46 


EXPLANATION    OF 


with  regard  to  the  present  subject,  respects  the  high 
standard  of  God's  holy  law,  the  sum  of  which  is,  to 
love  God  loith  all  the  hearty  and  our  neighbour  as 
ourselves.  So  far  as  we  are  wanting  in  this  affection 
for  God,  and  our  fellow  men,  and  so  far  as  we  have  an 
affection  of  a  contrary  kind,  we  are  morally  depraved. 
And  if  we  are  entirely  destitute  of  the  holy  love  re- 
quired by  God's  law,  and  if  all  the  affections  we  have 
in  relation  to  that  law  are  of  an  opposite  nature,  then 
we  are  totally  depraved. 

According  to  this  view  of  the  subject,  the  objectiori 
most  frequently  urged  against  the  doctrine  of  total 
depravity  is  manifestly  without  force.  To  disprove 
the  doctrine,  the  objector  alleges  that  men  in  general 
possess  many  amiable  and  useful  qualities,  and  that 
very  few  go  to  that  degree  of  wickedness  which  they 
are  capable  of  reaching.  We  acknowledge  the  facts 
alleged,  but  deny  that  they  are  of  any  weight  in 
opposition  to  the  doctrine.  The  simple  question  is, 
whether  a  moderate  degree  of  wickedness,  and  the 
existence  of  the  amiable  and  useful  quahties  referred 
to,  may  consist  with  the  entire  absence  of  that  holy 
love  which  God's  law  demands,  and  with  the  pre- 
dominance of  an  opposite  affection.  If  they  may, 
then  the  facts  alleged  by  the  objector  are  not  con- 
clusive against  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity.  For 
the  doctrine,  properly  explained,  affirms  only  that 
man  in  his  natural  state  has  no  holiness,  and  that 
the  affections  which  he  exercises,  so  far  as  they  relate 
to  the  high  standard  of  God's  law,  are  wrong.  The 
doctrine  admits  that  man  without  regeneration  may 


li'OTAL    DEPRAVITY.  47 

possess  a  great  variety  of  dispositions,  and  perform  a 
great  variety  of  actions,  which  are  lovely  and  im- 
portant,—  which  are  indeed  what  they  ought  to  be, 
so  far  as  they  respect  his  domestic  and  social  relations 
in  the  lower  sense.  But  the  doctrine  asserts  that, 
notwithstanding  all  these,  unrenewed  man  has  no 
holiness  and  is  the  subject  of  total  moral  depravity. 
And  if  any  one  thinks  it  best  to  use  the  word  moral 
in  the  lower  sense,  and  to  say,  that  the  amiable 
natural  affections  above  mentioned  are  morally  good ; 
it  is  sufficient  for  us  to  say,  that  in  regard  to  this 
subject  we  use  the  word  moral  in  a  different  sense. 

It  may  perhaps  appear  strange  and  almost  incredi- 
ble to  some,  that  so  many  estimable  and  lovely 
qualities  should  be  found  in  those  who  are  entirely 
without  love  to  God.  But  it  is  a  well  known  fact, 
that  a  high  degree  of  domestic  and  social  affection  is 
often  found  in  those  who  are  most  distant  from 
religious  principle.  Besides,  the  natural  affections 
manifestly  relate  to  a  different  standard,  have  a 
different  nature,  and  are  designed  for  different  pur- 
poses, from  religious  affection.  They  may  therefore 
exist  where  this  higher  affection  is  wanting.  That 
spiritual,  holy  love  which  God's  law  requires  us  to 
exercise  towards  our  fellow  men,  does  indeed  imply 
the  existence  of  love  to  God ;  and  love  to  God  im- 
plies love  to  men.  It  is  so  because  the  affection  in 
both  instances 'is  of  the  same  nature,  and  the  exercise 
of  it  in  both  instances  indicates  the  same  state  of 
mind.  —  Accordingly  the  second  command  is  like  to 


48 


EXPLANATION     OP 


the  first,  and  every  one  who  loves  his  brother  as  the 
law  requires,  loves  God  also.  But  it  is  not  so  with 
the  natural  affections.  We  cannot  say  that  every 
parent  who  has  a  tender  natural  affection  for  his 
offspring,  has  a  holy  affection  for  God ;  or  that  every 
one  who  has  a  heart  to  sympathize  with  the  afflict- 
ed, has  a  heart  to  feel  for  the  interests  of  Christ's 
kingdom.  The  natural  affections  and  sympathies 
have  no  more  necessary  connection  with  hohness, 
than  the  animal  appetites  ;  and  it  is  as  really  contrary 
to  fact,  to  say,  he  that  has  natural  affection 
loves  God,  as  to  say,  he  that  has  the  appetite  of 
hunger,  loves  God.  So  our  Saviour  taught.  To  a 
youth,  who  possessed  amiable  sensibilities,  attractive 
manners,  and  a  fair  rharartpr  in  thft  world's  view,  he 

said;  "  One  thing  thou  lackest;"  and  that  one  thing 
was,  love  to  God.  That  lovely  youth  idolized  the 
world. 

It  ought  to  be  remembered  that  we  are  as  ready  as 
those  who  entertain  the  laxest  views  of  religion,  to 
acknowledge  the  beauty  and  utility  of  those  domestic 
and  social  qualities  which  naturally  belong  to  man. 
But  we  are  admonished  by  the  word  of  God  and  by 
common  observation  not  to  put  them  in  the  place  of 
religion. 

The  proof  of  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity  is 
found  in  the  representations  of  Scripture  and  in  the 
consciousness  of  enlightened  Christians. 

There  is  indeed  no  text  which  affirms  in  so  many 
words  that  all  men  in  their  natural  state  are  totally 


TOTAL    DEPRAVITY.  49 

sinful.  But  there  are  many  texts  which  clearly  im- 
ply this.  Christ  said  to  the  unbelieving  Jews ;  "  I 
know  that  ye  have  not  the  love  of  God  in  you : "  and 
he  even  charged  them  with  hating  God. 

All  unbelievers,  by  not  receiving  Christ,  give  the 
same  evidence  of  disaffection  to  God,  as  the  unbeliev- 
ing Jews  did.  And  as  it  is  a  plain  doctrine  of  the 
Bible  that  no  one  believes  in  Christ  unless  he  is  born 
of  God,  it  follows  that  all  the  unrenewed  have  a  heart 
to  reject  Christ,  and  of  course  that  they  are  without 
love  to  God.  -^ 

In  accordance  with  this  the  Apostle  says ;  "  The 
carnal  mind  is  enmity  against  God."  By  comparing 
this  passage  with  John  3 :  6,  we  learn  that  the  carnal 
or  fleshly  mind  is  that  which  we  have  naturally. 
"  That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh,  is  flesh."  And  as 
the  carnal  mind  is  thus  the  certain  consequence  of 
our  natural  birth,  it  of  course  belongs  to  all  men. 
The  only  remaining  question  is,  whether  the  enmity 
implied  in  the  carnal  mind,  is  exclusive  of  love.  And 
of  this  there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt,  as  the 
Apostle  says  without  qualification,  that  they  who  have 
the  carnal  mind,  are  in  such  a  state  that  they  cannot 
be  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  and  cannot  please  God ; 
which  would  not  be  the  case,  if  they  had  any  degree 
of  holy  love. 

The  representation  often  made  in  Scripture  that 

unconverted  men  are  dead  in  sirij  fairly  implies  that 

they  are  destitute  of  holiness.    For  holiness  is  spiritual 

life.     And  if  unrenewed   sinners  had  any  degree  of 

*5 


50  EXPLANATION    OF 

this,  they  could  hardly  be  said  to  be  dead,  and  dead 
too  in  such  a  sense  that  they  need  to  be  quickened  or 
made  alive  by  supernatural  power,  according  to  the 
representation  in  Ephesians  ii. 

This  leads  me  to  say,  that  the  necessity  of  regen- 
eratiotij  as  asserted  by  our  Saviour,  (John  iii,)  is  an 
obvious  proof  of  man's  total  depravity.  "  Ye  must  be 
born  again."  "  Except  a  man,  [except  any  one]  be 
born  again,  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  heaven." 
Why  is  such  a  change  universally  necessary,  if  men 
in  their  natural  state  have  any  degree  of  holiness? 
The  Bible  proniises  heaven  to  those  who  have  holi- 
ness, or  love  to  Christ,  in  any  degree.  Even  one  who 
gives  a  cup  of  cold  water  to  Christ's  disciples  from  a 
right  motive,  has  the  promise  of  a  future  reward. 
The  existence  of  holiness  in  man  is  in  Scripture 
attributed  to  the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  In  all 
its  branches  and  in  all  its  degrees,  it  is  the  fruit  of  the 
/Spirit.  It  is  perfectly  obvious  then  that  man,  in  his 
natural,  unrenewed  state,  is  wholly  destitute  of  holi- 
ness, and  that  his  moral  affections  are  all  sinful. 

In  support  of  our  doctrine  I  might  urge  the  failure 
of  the  most  powerful  motives  to  induce  unrenewed 
man  to  turn  from  sin  and  believe  in  Christ.  When 
the  persuasive  considerations  of  the  Gospel  are  clearly 
presented  before  the  mind  of  a  sinner,  they  would 
certainly  influence  him  to  the  exercise  of  penitence, 
faith,  and  love,  if  he  had  any  degree  of  moral  recti- 
tude. What  could  be  a  more  decisive  proof  that  his 
moral  nature  is  entirely  perverted,  than  the  fact  that 


TOTAL    DEPRAVITY.  51 

the  amiable  and  glorious  character  of  Christ  is  held 
up  before  him,  and  yet  excites  no  love ;  that  when  the 
condescending  kindness  and  grace  of  God  are  de- 
scribed to  him,  he  feels  no  gratitude ;  and  that  he 
renders  no  cordial  obedience  to  that  law  which  is 
holy,  just,  and  good?  What  greater  evidence  of 
man's  total  moral  corruption  could  there  be  than  this, 
that  he  is  not  persuaded  to  forsake  sin  and  follow  ./  ti  f\ 
Christ,  either  by  the  threat  of  eternal  rhisery  or  the'"^^'*'^^ 
offer  of  eternal  blessedness?  'tfmJ^iA 

I  appeal  for  proof,  finally,  to  the  experience  and'%.  ^y^ 
consciousness  of  the  enlightened  Christian.  When 
he  reflects  upon  the  exercises  of  his  own  heart,  and 
compares  them  with  the  demands  of  God's  perfect 
law,  he  is  satisfied  that  in  him,  naturally,  there  was 
no  good  thing,  that  he  was  wholly  alienated  from  God, 
and  that  the  first  existence  of  holy  affection  in  his 
heart  was  the  fruit  of  regenerating  grace.  And  he  is 
equally  satisfied  that  he  is  still  dependent,  and  must 
continue  to  be  dependent  for  all  holy  affections,  upon 
the  sanctifying  influence  of  God's  Spirit ;  and  that,  if 
that  Holy  Spirit  should  be  wholly  taken  from  him,  he 
would  sink  at  once  into  a  state  of  entire  moral  pollu- 
tion. If  any  Christian  afiirms  that  he  had  any  holy 
affections,  or  performed  any  holy  actions,  in  his 
natural  state,  it  must  be  because  he  uses  words  in  a 
very  vague  sense,  or  because  he  has  not  properly 
reflected  on  the  nature  of  that  divine  law  which  is 
the  standard  of  holiness. 


52  NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

J^Mive  depravity.     Explanation  of  terms.  —  Marks  which  distinguish  other  things 
allowed  to  be  natural  or  native.  —  These  marks  belong  to  man's  sinfulness. 

Having  considered  the  depravity  of  man  as  uni- 
versal and  as  total^  1  now  proceed  to  inquire  whether 
it  is  native. 

The  dottrine  of  native  depravity  has  been  held  by 
all  orthodox  churches  in  Europe  and  America,  both 
Lutheran  and  Calvinistic.  It  is  contained  in  all  their 
creeds.  It  is  distinctly  asserted  even  in  the  creed  of 
Arminius.  It  is  a  prominent  article  in  the  only  public 
confession  of  faith  ever  adopted  by  the  Congregational 
churches  in  New  England,  and  by  the  Presbyterian 
and  Dutch  Reformed  churches  in  America.  It  is 
maintained  also  by  the  Episcopalians,  the  Methodists, 
and  the  Baptists.  The  opposite  doctrine  has  been 
held  by  no  respectable  society  of  men  in  Christendom, 
except  Pelagians  and  Socinians.  Among  those  who 
profess  to  maintain  the  substance  of  evangelical  truth 
at  the  present  day,  there  are  a  few  individuals  who  set 
aside  the  common  doctrine  of  native  depravity ;  but 
they  are  not  so  much  as  one  to  a  thousand  of  those 
ministers  and  intelligent  Christians  who  unhesitatingly 
believe  the  doctrine.  And  yet  some  of  those  few 
individuals,  though  they  still  profess  to  adopt  the  com- 
mon orthodox  creeds,  represent  the  doctrine  of  native 
depravity  as  a  doctrine  which  was  bred  in  an  age  of 
ignorance  and  superstition,  and  as  destined  to  vanish 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  53 

with  other  forms  of  ancient  error.  Yea,  they  some- 
times speak  of  it  as  though  it  had  aheady  past  away 
from  the  minds  of  all  enlightened  Christians.  And  I 
am  sorry  to  add,  that  instances  are  not  wanting  in 
which  professedly  orthodox  men  treat  the  doctrine 
with  ridicule  and  scorn.  Whether  all  this  is  just  and 
proper,  and  indicative  of  a  becoming  state  of  mind,  I 
leave  to  the  judgment  of  others.  We  must  Indeed 
acknowledge  that  the  great  body  of  Christians,  being 
uninspired,  have  been,  and  are  still,  liable  to  error; 
and  their  opinions  have  no  authority  to  bind  our  faith. 
The  word  of  God  is  our  only  sure  guide.  This 
divine  word  we  must  examine  for  ourselves.  And  in 
present  circumstances  it  is  important  that  we  should 
examine  it  with  special  care,  guarding  against  preju- 
dice, opening  our  hearts  to  conviction,  keeping  our 
minds  candid  and  patient  and  our  feehngs  unruffled, 
and  looking  continually  to  God  for  the  guidance  of 
his  Spirit.     And  if  we  would   be  established  in  the  _ 

truth  and  secure  the  benefits  of  Christian  faith,  we  ^^-^-^^ 
must  resolutely  avoid  the  pernicious  habit  of  ruminat-^,«f*^^^ 
ing  perpetually  on  objections  and  difficulties,  and  must  ^  y^ 
give  our  undivided  attention  to  the  evidence  which 
supports  the  truth.  '^ 

Ab  the  topic  now  introduced  is  the  principal  one 
which  is  to  be  discussed  in  this  Essay,  I  shall  consider 
it  more  at  large.  And  to  avoid  ambiguity,  and  to 
prepare  the  way  for  a  fair  investigation  of  the  subject, 
I  shall  briefly  explain  the  terms,  commonly  employed 
in  relation  to  it. 


54 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 


The  word  depravity^  relating  as  it  here  does  to 
man's  moral  character,  means  the  same  as  sinful- 
ness^ being  the  opposite  of  moral  purity  or  holiness. 
In  this  use  of  the  word  there  is  a  general  agreement. 
But  what  is  the  meaning  of  native  or  natural! 
Among  the  variety  of  meanings  specified  by  Johnson, 
Webster,  and  others,  I  refer  to  the  following,  as  relat- 
ing particularly  to  the  subject  before  us. 

^^  Native.  Produced  by  nature.  Natural^  or 
such  as  is  according  to  nature ;  belonging  by 
birth;  original.^^  Natural  has  substantially  the 
same  meaning  :  "  produced  by  nature  ;  not  acquired." 
—  So  Crabbe.  "  Of  a  person  we  say,  his  worth  is 
native^  to  designate  it  as  some  valuable  property  born 
with  him,  not  foreign  to  him  or  ingrafted  upon  him ; 
"but  we  say  of  his  disposition,  that  it  is  natural,  as 
opposed  to  that  which  is  acquired  by  habit."  And 
Johnson  defines  nature  to  be  ^^the  ?iative  state  or 
properties  of  any  thing,  by  which  it  is  discrim,- 
inated  from  others.''''  He  quotes  the  definition  of 
Boyle ;  "  Nature  sometimes  means  what  belongs  to  a 
living  creature  at  its  nativity,  or  accrues  to  it  by  its 
birth,  as  when  we  say  a  man  is  7ioble  by  nature,  or  a 
child  is  naturally  f or  10 ard.  "  This,"  he  says,  "  may 
be  expressed  by  saying,  the  man  was  born  50." 

After  these  brief  definitions,  which  come  to  nearly 
the  same  thing,  I  proceed  to  inquire,  ivhat  are  the 
m^arks  or  evidences  lohich  show  any  thing  in  vnan 
to  be  natural  or  native  ;  and  hoio  far  these  "marks 
are  found  in  relation  to  depravity. 


NATIVE     t)EPriAVITY.  55 

What  then  are  the  evidences  that  any  thing  belong- 
ing to  man  is  natural  or  native?  What  are  the 
circumstances  which  mark  that  which  is  so?  There 
will  be  some  evident  advantages  in  pursuing  this 
inquiry,  in  the  first  place,  in  relation  to  those  things 
concerning  which  our  minds  cannot  be  subject  to  any 
prepossession,  or  wrong  bias.  Having  the  advantage 
of  an  impartial,  candid  state  of  mind,  we  shall  be 
likely  to  arrive  at  a  just  conclusion.  And  then  we 
can  apply  the  same  reasoning,  and  bring  the  same 
impartial  state  of  mind,  to  the  subject  before  us,  and 
so  have  the  same  prospect  of  coming  to  an  equally 
just  conclusion. 

1.  One  of  the  marks  which  we  should  expect  to 
find  belonging  to  a  native  attribute  or  quality  of  man, 
is,  its  being  universal.  There  are  indeed  charac- 
teristics of  particular  individuals  or  famihes,  which  we 
consider  to  be  native,  although  they  are  not  found  in 
men  generally.  But  if  we  say  that  any  attribute 
natw^lly  belongs  to  man,  as  a  species,  or  that  it 
belongs  to  human  nature^  it  would  seem  to  be  implied 
that  it  is  universal ;  unless  some  special  change  occurs 
in  individuals  touching  that  particular  attribute. 

Thus  we  consider  memory  to  be  a  natural  attribute 
of  the  human  mind,  as  it  is  universally  found  in  man, 
except  in  those  instances  in  which  its  operation  is 
prevented  by  some  disorder. 

It  is  specially  in  favor  of  supposing  that  a  particular 
attribute  is  natural  to  man,  if  it  is  not  only  found  in 
all  men  of  the  present  generation,  but  has  been 


56  NATIVE  DEPRAVITY. 

found  in  all  the  individuals  of  the  human  race 
from  generation  to  generation  in  times  past.  This 
would  show  clearly,  that  the  attribute  intended  does 
not  arise  from  any  particular  causes  which  operate  at 
one  time  or  in  one  part  of  the  world  more  than  an- 
other, but  from  a  cause  which  affects  all  alike  ;  that  it 
belongs  to  the  very  nature  of  man,  or  certainly  results 
from  it,  so  that  wherever  human  nature  exists,  there 
this  attribute  will  exist. 

2.  Another  circumstance  showing  a  particular  attri- 
bute to  be  natural  to  man,  is,  its  developing  itself  in 
early  life.  If  any  thing  begins  to  manifest  itself  very 
early ;  if  without  exception  it  comes  out  in  visible 
operations  and  fruits  as  soon  as  the  bodily  and  mental 
powers  of  individuals  render  them  capable  of  such 
operations  ;  in  other  words,  if  it  is  developed  as  early 
as  there  is  opportunity  or  capacity  for  its  develope- 
ment ;  we  consider  this  as  a  proof  that  it  is  natural  to 
man,  or  a  native  quality. 

3.  It  is  a  circumstance  which  affords  additional 
proof  that  a  particular  attribute  or  quality  is  natural  to 
man,  if  it  is  evident  that  it  is  not  owing  to  any 
change  which  takes  place  in  him  subsequently  to 
his  birth.  Should  we  be  able  to  trace  the  particular 
thing  which  is  early  exhibited  l^y  any  individual,  to  a 
change  which  occurred  in  him  still  earher ;  we  should 
consider  it,  not  as  a  native  property,  but  as  attributable 
to  that  change,  or  perhaps  more  properly,  to  the  par- 
ticular cause  from  which  the  change  resulted.  But  if 
there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  any  such  change  pre- 


NATIVE    DEt»RAVITY.        \c-''      ''   ^^7.  ^^</^  '^^ 

vious   to  the   developeaient   of   the   particvKgir  \l8^       J*^ 
under  consideration,  we  should  of  course  regard  thai;-  ^  ,      ^ 
thing  as  natural.  \'  ^^ 

4.  Another  circumstance  whi6h  generally  marks  an 
attribute  which  is  natural  to  man,  is,  Us  operating 
freely  and  spontaneously.  This  may  indeed  be 
found  to  belong  to  some  things  which  are  not  natural. 
But  we  expect  that  a  principle  or  disposition  which  is 
natural  to  man,  will  operate  with  freedom  ;  that  when 
a  fair  occasion  comes,  it  will  show  itself  spontaneously. 

5.  That  which  is  natural  to  man  is  generally  hard 
to  he  resisted  and  overcome.  This  is  the  case  with 
all  those  affections  which  are  usually  called  natural. 
They  are  deeply  rooted  in  man's  nature  ;  and  no 
ordinary  means  are  sufficient  to  eradicate  or  subdue 
them.  Accordingly  when  we  find  it  so  with  any 
particular  tiling,  we  regard  it  as  a  mark  of  its  being 
natural ;  although  the  same  is  true  of  some  of  those 
habits  or  propensities  which  are  acquired. 

6.  There  is  one  more  mark  of  what  is  natural 
to  man,  which,  though  not  essentially  different  from 
the  first,  may  be  distinctly  considered,  namely,  that 
we  can  predict  with  certainty  that  it  lo ill  in  due 
time  act  itself  out.  This  we  are  able  to  do  in  regard 
to  every  native  principle  or  quality  in  man ;  but  we 
cannot  do  it  in  regard  (o  any  thing  which  is  not  natu- 
ral, or  which  does  not  certainly  result  from  the  original 
nature  of  man.  If  it  depends  on  external  circum- 
stances which  may  belong  to  some  individuals  and  not 

6 


58  NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 

to  Others,  how  can  we  be  sure  that  it  will  ever  show 
itself  or  ever  have  existence  in  any  particular  person  ? 
Nt(  I  might  mention  other  marks  of  what  is  natural  to 
'^man,  but  these  seem  to  be  the  most  obvious  and  im- 
portant. If  now  we  examine  any  thing,  whether 
bodily  or  mental,  which  we  consider  as  natural  to 
man,  we  shall  find  it  has  these  or  most  of  these  marks, 
and  that  we  have  no  other  way  of  proving  it  to  be 
natural  but  by  referring  to  these  very  marks.  How 
do  we  prove  the  bodily  appetites  or  senses  to  be  natural? 
How  do  we  prove  the  faculties  and  propensities  of 
the  mind,  such  as  reason,  will,  memory,  conscience, 
parental  love,  sympathy  and  gratitude,  to  be  natural  ? 
Have  we  any  better  evidence,  or  any  other  evidence 
than  this,  that  they  are  found  universally  to  exist  in 
mankind,  except  in  cases  where  some  extraordinary 
cause  has  operated  to  produce  an  exception ;  that  they 
show  themselves  very  early,  or  at  farthest  as  soon  as 
circumstances  exist  which  are  suited  to  call  them 
forth  ;  that  they  are  evidently  not  owing  to  any  essen- 
tial change  which  takes  place  in  man's  nature  after 
his  birth,  that  they  are  found  to  operate  spontaneously; 
that  they  are  hard  to  be  resisted  and  subdued  ;  and 
that  it  is  manifestly  certain  that  every  human  being 
who  comes  into  the  world  will  in  due  time  exhibit 
them,  unless  some  extraordinary  cause  turns  him  from 
his  natural  course.  That  the  bodily  senses  and  appe- 
tites are  natural  to  man,  no  one  doubts.  Nor  is  there 
any  more  doubt  as  to  the  leading  attributes  of  the 
mind.     Who  does  not  admit  that  reason  and  moral 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  59 

sense  and  memory  and  sympathy  and  love  of  offspring, 
are  as  natural  to  man  as  the  bodily  appetites  or  senses? 
that  they  as  really  appertain  to  the  nature  which  man 
possesses?  The  corporeal  and  the  mental  attributes 
of  man,  are  indeed  brought  into  visible  action  at  differ- 
ent periods,  some  at  the  very  commencement  of  life 
and  others  afterwards.  But  this  makes  no  difference 
in  our  judgment  on  the  present  subject.  We  always 
consider  the  sense  of  seeing,  hearing,  and  tasting,  as 
native  properties  of  man ;  and  we  should  consider 
them  in  the  same  Ught,  if  they  were  first  exercised  at 
a  much  later  period  than  is  common.  So  it  is  with 
reason,  memory,  conscience,  and  parental  affection. 
They  do  not  develope  themselves  at  the  commence- 
ment of  life.  The  new  born  child  does  not  immedi- 
ately show  reason,  or  memory,  or  conscience.  And 
that  love  to  off*spring  which  is  by  way  of  eminence 
called  natural  affection^  does  not  appear  to  rise  in  the 
mind  and  to  act  itself  out,  before  the  parental  relation 
exists.  The  faculty  of  speech,  which  is  natural  to 
man  in  distinction  from  the  brutal  species,  waits  for 
its  developement  till  the  bodily  organs  and  the  mental 
faculties  have  acquired  the  necessary  strength  and 
activity ;  and  then  it  developes  itself  very  gradually, 
beginning  with  broken,  defective  expressions,  and 
proceeding  slowly  to  a  perfect  language. 

These  remarks  prepare  the  way  for  a  proper  con- 
sideration of  the  subject  of  depravity.  For  if  this  has 
all  the  marks  belonging  to  other  things  which  are 
^acknowledged  to  be  natural  to  man,  why  should  it 


60  NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 

not  be  considered  in  the  same  light  ?  The  question 
then  is ;  Has  it  the  same  marks  7  Are  there  as 
many  and  as  strong  reasons  for  calling  man's  sinful- 
ness natural,  as  for  calHng  any  of  his  other  attributes 
so?     In  my  apprehension  there  are. 

In  the  first  place,  moral  depravity,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  is  imiversal.  It  extends  through  the 
whole  species.  All  are  sinners.  We  can  no  more 
find  those  who  are  free  from  depravity,  than  we  can 
find  those  who  are  without  reason,  or  memory,  or 
social  affection,  or  bodily  appetites. 

Secondly.  Depravity  shows  itself  very  early. 
As  soon  as  children  acquire  such  strength  of  body  and 
mind,  as  to  be  capable  of  unfolding  their  true  charac- 
ter, they  show  that  they  are  depraved.  As  soon  as 
they  manifest  any  moral  feelings,  they  manifest  those 
which  are  sinful.  Among  the  earliest  things  which 
we  can  observe  in  others,  or  recollect  in  ourselves,  we 
find  the  indications  and  incipient  exercises  of  wrong 
affection.  Has  not  this  then  the  same  mark  of  be- 
longing naturally  and  originally  to  man,  as  anything 
else  which  begins  to  act  itself  out  in  early  life  ? 

Thirdly.  The  sinfulness  which  thus  early  shows 
itself  in  man,  canyiot  he  traced  to  any  antecedent 
change  in  his  moral  character.  Were  it  owing  to 
such  a  change,  it  could  not  with  propriety  be  called 
natural,  however  early  it  might  appear.  Suppose 
any  disorder  or  defect  of  mind,  for  example,  idiocy, 
shows  itself  very  early  in  a  child  ;  yet  if  it  can  be 
traced  to  any  injury  or  bodily  distemper  which  occur- 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  61 

red  after  birth,  we  never  speak  of  it  as  native.  But 
if  there  has  been  no  such  calamity  ;  if  without  any 
injury  or  any  boilily  distemper  occurring  subsequently 
to  his  birth,  the  child  shows  uniformly,  as  soon  as  he 
shows  any  thing,  that  he  is  wanting  in  the  power  of 
understanding;  then  we  consider  his  idiocy  as  native. 
We  say,  he  was  horn  an  idiot.  Now  what  is  the 
fact  in  regard  to  our  moral  depravity  ?  Does  it  appear 
to  result  from  any  change  which  occurs  in  our  moral 
nature?  If  there  is  such  a  change,  it  must  evidently 
take  place  very  early  in  life ;  because  the  sinfulness 
which  is  here  supposed  to  result  from  it,  shows  itself 
as  soon  as  children  are  capable  of  manifesting  by  intel- 
ligible signs  what  is  in  their  hearts.  The  change 
supposed  must  also  be  universal.  At  the  very  dawn 
of  existence,  even  before  any  distinct  and  visible 
exercise  of  reason,  it  must  take  place  in  the  nature  of 
every  human  being.  Is  there  any  proof  that  this  is 
the  case?  Is  the  supposition  one  which  any  reasona- 
ble man  will  admit?  And  would  not  such  a  supposi- 
tion, if  admitted,  be  attended  with  all  the  difficulties 
which  attend  the  common  doctrine,  and  with  others  in 
addition  ? 

Is  there  any  conclusion  left  for  us  but  this,  that  as 
moral  depravity  shows  itself  at  so  early  a  period  in 
human  life,  and  as  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that 
it  results  from  any  change  in  man  subsequent  .to  his 
birth,  it  must  belong  to  his  original  disposition,  and  so 
deserves  to  be  called  native. 
*6 


62  NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 

Fourthly.  The  moral  depravity  of  man  operates 
spontaneously.  Like  the  other  natural  principles,  it 
freely  acts  itself  out  as  soon  as  the  faculties  of  body 
and  mind  are  sufficient,  and  objects  of  moral  feeling 
are  presented.  The  sinfulness  of  man  is  not  a  thing 
which  it  needs  hard  labor  to  produce,  or  which  it  re- 
quires great  urgency  of  motives  to  call  forth.  Just  as 
soon  as  an  occasion  offers,  it  rises  to  view  of  its  own 
accord.  Instead  of  waiting  for  pressing  solicitation,  it 
seems  to  have  an  inward  force  which  can  hardly 
brook  restraint,  and  is  impatient  to  break  forth  into 
action  almost  without  occasion.  How  soon  does  moral 
evil  in  some  form  or  other  show  itself!  How  readily 
does  the  feeling  of  pride  or  selfishness  or  ill-will  come 
out  to  view  in  the  looks  and  actions  of  little  children ! 
It  waits  not  to  be  elicited  by  overpowering  induce- 
ments, or  to  be  produced  by  long,  laborious  effort.  It 
is  not  like  the  useful  vegetable,  which  will  not  spring 
up  and  grow  unless  it  is  planted  and  cultivated  ;  but 
like  the  useless  weeds,  which  are  natural  to  the  soil, 
^  and  spring  up  and  grow  spontaneously,  yea  in  spite  of 
<^?r:-all  our  efforts  to  destroy  them.  Sinful  affection  takes 
-possession  of  the  minds  of  children  before  they  are 
aware.  It  becomes  active  and  predominant  in  them 
before  they  deliberately  inquire  whether  it  is  good 
or  bad,  and  so  they  first  become  distinctly  acquainted 
with  its  turpitude  by  being  conscious  of  its  operation  in 
their  own  hearts.  And  this  spontaneous  putting  forth 
of  the  energy  of  the  soul  in  moral  evil  is  characteristic, 
not  only  of  early  childhood,  but  of  every  period  of  hfe. 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  63 

This  mark  belongs  to  human  depravity  as  much  as 
to  any  of  those  propensities,  whether  corporeal  or  men- 
tal, which  are  universally  allowed  to  be  natural. 

Human  depravity  has  also  the  fifth  mark  above 
mentioned  as  belonging  to  what  is  natural  ;  namely, 
its  being  overcome  loith  great  diffimdty.  The  en- 
lightened and  pious  parent  is  aware  of  the  strong  and 
early  propensity  of  his  children  to  evil.  He  makes  use 
of  all  possible  means  to  restrain  and  subdue  that  pro- 
pensity. But  it  breaks  through  all  restraints.  And 
even  when  he  succeeds  in  preventing  his  children 
from  exhibiting  their  depravity  in  gross  outward  acts 
of  wickedness,  it  still  maintains  its  dominion  in  their 
hearts,  and  gives  character  to  all  their  affections.  But 
in  this  respect  the  Christian's  own  experience  furnishes 
more  striking  proof  than  any  observation  he  makes 
upon  others,  that  sin  is  no  superficial,  accidental 
thing  ;  that  it  is  deep-rooted  in  his  nature ;  that  it  is, 
as  it  has  generally  been  called,  inbred  ;  that  it  makes 
a  part  of  himself ;  that  opposing  it  is  opposing  his  own 
natural  disposition  ;  and  that  getting  rid  of  it  is  cut- 
ting off  a  right  hand  or  plucking  out  a  right  eye. 
He  often  finds  that  the  most  resolute  resistance  which 
he  can  make  against  the  strong  bias  of  his  heart  to 
sin,  is  unsuccessful ;  that  all  the  forces  which  he  can 
array  against  it  have  no  effect,  but  to  make  its  supe- 
rior power  more  conspicuous.  And  he  well  knows 
that  no  motive  which  can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
mind  of  an  unrenewed  man,  w'\\\  ever  prevail  to  sub- 
due his  earthly,   selfish  affection,  and  excite  him  to 


64 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 


love  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  in  sincerity;  and  he  is 
convinced  that  no  power  short  of  omnipotence  can 
accomphsh  this. 

Sixthly.  That  which  I  have  adverted  to  as  the 
last  circumstance  attending  what  is  natural  to  man,  is 
not  introduced  as  what  is  essentially  different  from  the 
points  before  mentioned,  but  rather  as  what  results  from 
them.  In  regard  to  our  subject  it  is  this,  that  ive  can 
predict  with  certainty  that  every  human  being,  as 
soon  as  he  acts  out  his  moral  nature,  will  commit 
sin.  This  is  a  very  remarkable  fact.  We  fix  our  eyes 
upon  a  new  born  child,  now  incapable  of  exhibiting  any 
of  the  signs  of  rational  and  moral  existence ;  but  we 
can  certainly  predict  that  if  he  comes  to  be  capable  of 
intelligent  and  responsible  action,  he  will  be  a  sinner. 
We  do  not  speak  of  it  as  a  conjecture  or  a  probability. 
We  speak  of  it  as  a  certainty.  But  can  no  precautions, 
no  happy  combination  of  circumstances,  prevent  this 
dreadful  result?  Suppose  a  child  to  be,  from  the  first, 
placed  in  the  hands  of  parents  and  teachers  who  are 
among  the  wisest  and  holiest  of  mankind,  so  that  he 
hears  nothing  from  their  lips  but  words  of  truth  and 
wisdom,  purity  and  love.  The  conduct  which  he 
sees  in  them  is  marked  with  excellence  throughout. 
He  is  watchfully  guarded  against  whatever  would  cor- 
rupt him  or  lead  him  astray,  and  is,  with  the  utmost 
care,  placed  under  those  influences  which  tend  to  en- 
lighten the  understanding,  to  guide  and  strengthen 
conscience,  and  to  excite  every  good  affection.  May  it 
not  be  that  this  child,  living  in  such  circumstances, 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  65 

and  trained  up  under  such  salutary  influences,  will 
escape  the  fetal  contagion  and  be  pure  from  sin? 
If  ten  thousand  children,  yea  if  all  the  children  on 
the  face  of  the  earth,  should  be  placed  in  such  cir- 
cumstances, and  should  be  trained  up  in  the  wisest, 
purest,  holiest  manner;  may  it  not  be  that  some 
of  them  would  have  a  character  free  from  moral  evil? 
The  answer  must  be,  "  no,  not  one."  Now  how 
could  we  confidently  and  certainly  predict  that  all 
human  beings,  in  all  circumstances,  continuing 
unchanged  by  divine  grace,  will  sin  against  God,  were 
there  not  some  ground  of  this  certainty  in  the  moral, 
nature  of  man?  It  is  agreed  that  no  outward  circum- 
stances, no  influences  however  favorable,  which  can 
be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  minds  of  men,  will  ever, 
in  a  single  instance,  guard  them  against  the  pollution 
of  sin,  without  the  renewing  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 
The  evil  then  cannot  be  supposed  to  originate  in  any 
unfavorable  external  circumstances,  such  as  corrupting 
examples,  or  insinuating  and  strong  temptations  ;  for 
if  we  suppose  these  entirely  removed,  all  human 
beings  would  still  be  sinners.  With  such  a  moral 
nature  as  they  now  have,  they  would  not  wait  for 
strong  temptations  to  sin.  Nay,  they  would  be  sinners 
in  opposition  to  the  strongest  motives  to  the  contrary. 
Indeed  we  know  that  human  beings  will  turn  those 
very  motives  which  most  powerfully  urge  to  holiness, 
into  occasions  of  sin.  Now  does  not  the  confidence 
and  certainty  with  which  we  foretell  the  commission 
of  siuj  and  of  sin  unmixed  with  moral  purity,  presup- 


66  NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 

pose  a  full  conviction  in  us,  and  a  conviction  resting 
upon  what  we  regard  as  satisfactory  evidence,  that 
sin,  in  all  its  visible  actings,  arises  from  that  which  is 
within  the  mind  itself^  and  which  belongs  to  our 
very  nature  as  moral  beings?  Have  we  not  as  much 
evidence  that  this  is  the  case  with  moral  evil,  as  with 
any  of  our  natural  affections  or  bodily  appetites?  It 
should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  prediction  of  future 
sin,  as  above  described,  does  not  imply,  that  we  have 
a  particular  insight  into  the  mind  of  any  individual 
child.  It  is  sufficient  thai  we  know  the  child  to 
belong  to  our  species,  or  to  have  human  nature.  Our 
prediction  rests  solely  upon  this  fact.     We  knownt  to 

jC-  be  a  law  of  oar  fallen  nature^  or,  if  any  prefer  it,  I 
will  say,  we  know  our  moral  state  to  he  such\\\dii 

•^  every  one  of  our  species,  whether  now  born,  or  to  be 
born,  will  he  a  sinner^  and  a  sinner  wholly  and 
forever,  unless  he  is  created  anew  hy  the  Holy 
Spirit,  And  we  know  and  predict  this  on  the  same 
^^  9  general  principle  on  which  we  predict  any  fact  as  the 
result  of  the  known  la^:s  xsLihe  nioral  or  material 
w^orld.  There  are  doubtless  laws  in  the  moral  world 
as  settled  and  uniform,  or  a  connection  of  causes  and 
effects  as  certain,  as  in  the  physical  world.  Nor  does 
this  view  of  the  subject  involve  any  difficulty  in  regard 
to  our  responsibiUty  or  free  agency,  if  we  only  remem- 
ber that  the  causes  which  operate  in  the  moral  world 

(^  correspond  to  the  nature  of  the  m^ind,  while  the  causes 
which  operate  in  the  physical  world  correspond  to- the 
nature  of  material  substances  ;  and  that  the  influence 


n 


^  f 


A 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  ft  U  ^T  ^7  ^^  Th  ^ 

of  causes,  though  in  both  cases  equally  uniRm' and  ^  '^^3  7 
certain,  is  in  one  case  as  different  from  what  it  is  in      . 
the  other,  as  the  nature  of  mind  is  different  from  Ih^!:^^^}^  xt 
nature  of  matter. 

Now  if  there  is   no  such   invariable  law  as   that 
above  mentioned,  no  such  steady,  uniform  principle 
operating  in  the  human  mind  in  its  present  fallen 
state ;  how  can  we  certainly  conclude  that  every  de- 
scendant of  Adam  will  be  a  sinner,  however  many 
external  motives  and  influences  may  combine  to  pre- 
vent it?     Can   it  be  imagined   that  a  rational   a.nd.jYLL,  4a 
moral  being  will  certainly  and  constantly  resist  the  /iLj^ 
strongest  motives  which  urge  him  to  holiness  from 
without  and  from  within,  under  the  glorious  dispensa- 
tion of  the  Gospel,  and  rush  into  transgression,  with- 
out any  cause  1     Nay,  must  there  not  be  a  cause  <!^f^r  V* 
within  him  of  astonishing  power,  to  account  for  it    ^  -^  •  -^ 
that  he  should,  even  in  these  most  favorable  circum- 
stances, uniformly  be  a  sinner,  and  a  sinner  wholly  /v   - 
and  forever,  unless  he  is  created  anew  by  the  Holy 
Ghost?     Surely  that  is  a  most  deplorable  state  into    , 
which  man's  natural   birth   brings  him,  and  a  most 
fearful  internal  principle  under  the  influence  of  which 
his  natural  birth  leaves  him.     "  That  which  is  born 
of  the  flesh,  is  flesh.''''     And,  according  to  the  Apostle, 
the  fruit  of  the  flesh  is  sin  in  all  its  various  forms. 

In  opposition  to  the  general  course  of  reasoning 
here  exhibited,  it  is  sometimes  said,  that  Adam,  with- 
out any  original  corruption  of  his  nature,  was  exposed 
to  sin,  and  did  actually  commit  sin  ;  and  therefore  that 


68  NATIVE    DEIPRAVITY. 

the  occurrence  of  sin  in  moral  beings  is  no  certain 
proof  of  a  preceding  corruption  of  nature. 

In  reply  to  this,  I  would  first  reconnmend  the  re- 
marks of  Edwards  on  this  point  in  his  answer  to  John 
Taylor,  as  worthy  of  special  regard* 

Secondly;  allowing  it  to  he  possible  that  all  men 
would  sin  without  any  inherent,  natural  corruption, 
we  still  ask,  whether  it  is  probable.  Is  it  a  fact,  that 
men  go  into  the  commission  of  crimes,  without  any 
thing  faulty  in  their  previous  dispositions?  Does  ob- 
servation, and  does  our  own  consciousness  teach  this? 
It  is  certainly  most  natural  and  satisfactory,  in  all 
ordinary  cases,  to  refer  the  conduct  of  men  to  their 
disposition,  or  moral  state.  What  is  more  common 
than  to  trace  lying,  steaUng  and  murder  to  a  false, 
^~  thievish,  murderous  disposition  ?  We  account  for  it 
that  they  commit  such  crimes  by  the  existence  of  such 
a  disposition.  And  no  one  ever  doubts  that  the  dis- 
position exists,  if  the  crimes  are  committed.  The 
latter  is  always  regarded  as  a  proof  of  the  former. 

Such  is  the  mode  of  thinking  and  judging  which 
commonly  prevails  among  men  ;  and  such  doubtless  it 
will  be,  so  long  as  human  nature  remains  as  it  is. 
And  we  infer  men's  disposition  or  state  of  mind  from 
their  conduct,  with  special  confidence,  when  their  con- 
duct is  uniform  and  strongly  marked.  Now  if  any 
one  denies  this  inference  to  be  just  in  relation  to  the 
posterity  of  Adam,  and  maintains  that  the  fact  of  their 
uniformly  sinning  can  be  accounted  for  without  sup- 
posing any  thing  amiss  in  their  disposition  ;  he  sets 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  69 

aside  a  principle  which,  in  other  similar  cases,  is  fully 
admitted.     And  why  does  he  set  it  aside  here,  more 
than  in  other  cases  commonly  occurring?     Wiiy  here 
especially,  where  the  actions  denoting  the  disposition  f^Ju^at 
are   so   uniform,   uninterrupted,   and    unmixed?      It     {^^-^ 
would  seem  to  be  at  least  as  agreeable  to  the  common       ^ 
rules  of  judging,  to  say  that  the  deliberate  and  habitual    lyX^^ 
practice  of  theft  and  fraud  does  not  prove  a  thievish     ^Tj 
and  fraudulent  disposition,  as  to  say  that  the  fact  of 
men's  universally  sinning  does  not  prove  them  to  be 
the  subjects  of  a  sinful  dispositiont^Nor  can  I  see  the 
reason  why  any  one  should  take  this  position,  except 
it  be  out  of  respect  to  a  favorite  hypothesis,  or  because 
he  finds  the  common  theory  exposed  to  certain  meta- 
physical objections.     That  objections  of  such  a  kind 
should  not  be  permitted  to  influence  our  belief  in  mat- 
ters of  fact,  or  in  matters  of  revelation,  has,  I  appre- 
hend, been  made  sufficiently  clear. 

But  if,  after  all,  any  one  doubts  the  propriety  of 
inferring  from  men's  sinful  conduct  an  original  sinful 
disposition  or  corruption  of  nature,  and  asks  whether 
it  is  not  possible  to  account  for  their  sinful  conduct 
without  supposing  any  such  antecedent  corruption  ;  I 
will  endeavour  to  satisfy  bim  in  another  way,  that  is, 
by  proving  the  existence  of  such  an  original  corrup- 
tion of  human  nature,  from  the  holy  Scriptures.  This 
original  corruption  being  thus  satisfactorily  proved,  no 
one  can  deny  that  it  directly  leads  to  actual  sin,  just 
as  any  particular  disposition,  say  avarice  or  revenge, 
now  existing  in  a  man,  leads  to  a  corresponding  con- 
fer uv'.  T'   ■  Lr^^^iM  i\^ 


70  NATIVE    DEPRAVITY. 

duct ;  and  no  one  can  deny  that  actual  sin  directly 
proceeds  from  such  a  corrupt  disposition,  and  is  a  clear 
developement  of  it. 

That  Adam  commenced  his  existence  in  a  state  of 
moral  purity,  or  with  a  disposition  to  love  and  obey 
God,  is  generally  allowed.  That  his  posterity  com- 
mence their  existence  in  a  moral  state  materially 
different  from  what  his  originally  was,  and  from  what 
theirs  would  have  been,  had  not  he  apostatized,  is 
made  as  certain  as  language  could  make  it,  by  the 
fifth  chapter  of  Romans,  and  by  other  passages  of 
holy  writ. 

Such  being  the  principle  we  are  taught  by  the  word 
of  God,  and  such  being  the  natural  conclusion  from 
the  invariable  conduct  of  Adam's  posterity  ;  and  as  we 
can  satisfactorily  account  for  their  sinful  conduct  by 
the  admission  of  a  corrupt  disposition  in  them  ;  if  any 
one  rejects  this  commonly  received  principle,  he  ought 
to  be^ure  that  he  has  a  good  reason  for  so  doing,  and 
that  there  is  another  view  of  the  subject,  more  con- 
formable to  the  Scriptures,  and  to  the  facts  of  our  own 
experience. —  It  does  not  answer  the  purpose  to  argue 
from  the  case  of  Adam  ;  as  it  is  easy  to  reply  to  such 
an  argument,  that  there  may  have  been  something 
peculiar  in  his  case,  which  would  render  it  improper  to 
reason  concerning  it  as  we  do  concerning  the  case  of 
mankind  generally  in  their  present  fallen  state.  There 
is  this  difference  at  least,  that  while  Adam's  sinning 
implied  a  change  in  the  state  of  his  mind  from  what 
it  originally  was,  the  sinning  of  his  posterity  does  not 

^-  ,.    /,  -^       ,  If.     ./. 


SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE.  71 

imply  a  change  from  their  original,  native  character. 
They  are  born  in  sin;  he  was  created  holy.     Their<f^j 
first  moral  state  is  sinful ;  his  was  sinless.     And  if  his       j^^t 
sinning  implied   a  change  of  character,  it  of  course    V^*"  ^ 
could  not  result  from  his  original  character.     But  in  ^^  *^^^ 
his  posterity,   sinning   does   not   imply   a  change   of'^^^-^/^ 
character,  but  is  the  result  of  the  state  in  which  they"'^^^^^*'^"'^ 
are  born.  —  The  question  here  is  not  a  question  as 
to  what  is  possible,  but  a  question  as  to  what  is  fact. 


CHAPTER   V. 

The   doctrine    of  native  depravity    continued.      Scripture    evidence.      Conse- 
quences of  denying  the  doctrine. 

In  discussing  the  subject  of  native  depravity,  I  have 
proceeded  thus  far,  without  any  direct  appeal  to  the 
word  of  God.  I  have  inquired,  first,  what  particular 
marks  distinguish  those  things  which  are  generally 
allowed  to  be  natural  to  man.  I  have  specified  these 
marks,  and  have  shown  that  they  appertain  to  our 
depravity.  By  this  course  of  reasoning  1  think  it  has 
been  made  to  appear,  that  we  have  as  many  and  as 
powerful  reasons  to  consider  depravity  a  native  attri- 
bute or  quality  of  man,  as  most  of  those  things  which 
are  generally  acknowledged  to  be  native.  These 
reasons  have  satisfied  men  of  enlightened,  sober  minds, 
even  in  the  heathen  world.  And  why  should  they 
pot  satisfv  us  ?    What  should  hinder  us  from  acknowl- 


72  SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 

edging  our  sinfulness  to  be  natural,  when  we  have 
such  a  variety  of  proofs  that  it  is  so,  and  proofs  which 
in  every  other  case  are  perfectly  convincing?  Why 
sliould  the  same  evidence  be  received  as  satisfactory  in 
one  case,  and  rejected  in  the  other  ? 

The  way  seems  now  prepared  for  an  impartial 
consideration  of  the  Scripture  evidence.  As  we  have 
already  seen  that  so  many  reasons  exist  for  believing 
the  doctrine  of  native  depravity,  it  would  clearly  be 
wrong  for  any  one  to  come  to  the  word  of  God  with  a 
prepossession  against  the  doctrine.  If  any  preposses- 
sion is  proper,  it  is  a  prepossession  in  favor  of  it. 

But  I  ask  only  that  those  who  inquire  what  the 
Bible  teaches  on  this  subject,  would  free  their  minds 
from  prejudice ;  that  they  would  hold  themselves 
ready  to  receive  just  what  tlie  ^acred  writers  teach ; 
that  they  would  interpret  the  Scriptures  here  as  they 
do  in  other  cases,  without  the  influence  of  any  precon- 
ceived opinion,  or  the  influence  of  any  difficulties 
which  may  be  supposed  tp  attend  the  common 
doctrine. 

Scripture  argument  briefly  exhibited. 

The  first  passage  which  I  shall  produce  is  Rom.  5  : 
12  — 19.  It  is  far  from  my  design  to  consider  the 
various  difficulties  attending  the  explanation  of  this 
passage,  or  to  enter  into  the  controversies  which  have 
grown  out  of  it.  There  are  however  some  truths 
which  are  here  taught  with  great  clearness,  and  with- 
out  the  admission    of  wliich   the   reasoning   of  the 


L  icj     (. 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  73 

Apostle  must  be  nugatory,  and  the  effort  lie  makes  to 
magnify  the  grace  of  God  in  redemption,  totally 
fruitless. 

It  is  evident  that  the  Apostle  mentions  the  con- 
nection which  the  sin  of  Adam  had  with  the  state  of 
his  posterity,  not  as  something  neio,  but  as  a  mat- 
ter loell  ujiderstood.  He  brings  it  forward,  not  as  a 
doctrine  which  is  now  for  the  first  time  to  be  taught, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  making  out  a  forcible  illustra- 
tion of  his  subject ;  i.  e.  the  abounding  grace  of  God 
in  the  salvation  of  his  people.  The  manner  in  which 
the  Apostle  accomplishes  this  his  main  design,  clearly 
implies  a  fixed  and  very  close  connection  between 
Adam,  and  the  whole  race  of  mankind  ;  a  connection 
of  such  a  kind,  that  his  transgression  involved  them  in 
great  and  dreadful  evils.  These  evils  are  described  in 
a  variety  of  expressions.  "  By  the  offence  of  one  the 
many  died."  "  The  sentence  w£is  by  one  offence 
unto  condemnation."  "  By  the  offence  of  one,  death 
reigned."  "  By  one  offence  the  sentence  came  upon 
all  men  unto  condemnation."  "By  the  disobedience 
of  one  man  the  many  were  constituted  sinners."  Now 
if  by  these  expressions,  so  strong  and  so  often  repeat- 
ed, the  Apostle  did  not  mean  to  teach  that  the  sin  of 
Adam  brought  ruin  upon  his  posterity;  then  how 
does  he  make  this  case  an  illustration  of  the  everlast- 
ing blessings  which  Christ  procured  for  his  people? 
And  if  death  and  condemnation  come  upon  the 
posterity  of  Adam  by  his  offence,  or  in  consequence  of 
his  transgression,  it  would  seem  plainly  to  follow,  even 

*r 


74 


SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 


if  it  were  not  so  expressly  asserted  in  this  place,  that 
all  the  individuals  of  the  human  race  are  involved 
in  those  evils,  seeing  they  all  stand  in  the  same 
relation  to  him.  So  that  if  we  look  upon  any  who 
are  the  posterity  of  Adam,  we  see  those  upon  whom 
death  and  condemnation  come  by  his  offence.  There 
can  be  no  exception.  As  to  any  of  the  children  of 
Adam,  and  as  to  any  who  can  receive  the  benefits  of 
Christ's  death,  it  is  evident  from  this  passage,  that 
they  are  among  those  who  were  brought  into  a  state  of 
condemnation  and  death  by  the  "  one  offence."  The 
question  which  at  present  calls  for  attention,  is.  whether 
the  evils  which  are  the  consequence  of  Adam's 
offence,  come  upon  any  who  are  themselves  sitdess, 
and  who  are  so  regarded  by  the  divine  govern- 
ment. 

This  question  must,  I  think,  be  answered  in  the 
negative,  for  the  following  reasons. 

First.  It  is  represented  in  this  very  passage,  that 
one  of  the  consequences  of  Adam's  sin  is,  that  all  men 
are  "  constituted  sinners.''^  And  in  another  part  it  is 
taught  that  death  came  upon  all  men  for  the  very 
reason,  that  "  all  had  sinned."  Though  "  death,"  or 
"  the  sentence  of  condemnation,"  came  upon  all  by 
Adam's  offence,  as  a  distant  and  general  cause  ;  it 
might  still  come  upon  them  hy  their  own  personal 
sinfulness  as  tlie  proximate  cause.  Just  as  it  is 
said,  that  the  children  of  Israel  suffered  the  judgments 
of  heaven  from  generation  to  generation  "  for  the  sin 
of  Jeroboarn,"  —  this  having  been  the  more  distant 


OP    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  75 

cause  which  brought  those  judgments  upon  them, 
while  the  immediate  cause  of  their  sufferings  was 
their  own  wickedness.  The  sin  of  Jeroboam,  so 
often  mentioned  in  Scripture,  affected  them  ])rim,arily^ 
as  I  think,  by  leading  them  into  sin,  and  consequent- 
ly, by  bringing  just  punishments  upon  them  from  the 
hand  of  God.  This  example  may  show  that  when 
the  Apostle  says,  "  death,"  or  '*  the  sentence  of  con- 
demnation," came  upon  all  men  by  the  "offence  of 
Adam,"  there  is  no  reason  to  understand  him  as 
intending  to  exclude  their  own  personal  sinfulness 
from  having  an  influence  in  the  affair.  Why  is  it  not 
perfectly  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  natural  evil 
which  comes  upon  the  human  race,  may  have  a 
connection  both  loith  Adani's  sin,  and  their  otcn. 
It  may  have  been  the  effect  of  his  sin  as  a  general 
and  distant  cause,  and  the  effect  of  their  own  sin  as 
the  proximate  cause.  That  is,  it  may  have  been  the 
real  effect  of  both,  though  in  different  senses.  What 
is  more  common  than  the  connection  of  an  effect  with 
two  or  more  causes  in  different  respects  and  in 
different  degrees  ?  The  conclusion  then  which  seems 
clearly  to  result  from  this  passage,  is,  that  Adam's  sin 
does  not  bring  death  and  condemnation  upon  his 
posterity,  they  themselves  being  sinless  ;  that  none 
of  them  suffer  penal  evil  in  consequence  of  his  sin, 
without  being  sinful  themselves,  it  being  one  of  the 
effects,  and  as  I  think,  the  primary  effect  of  his  offence, 
that  they  are  all  constituted  sinners. 


76  SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 

Secondly.  Many  other  passages  of  Sciipture  teach 
that  the  evils  which  come  upon  mankind,  respect 
them  not  as  innocent  and  pure,  but  as  sinners. 
When  the  prophet  Ezekiel  declares,  that  the  son 
shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father,  it  would  seem 
to  be  his  object  to  guard  against  the  idea,  that  men 
suffer  for  the  sin  of  others  while  they  themselves  are 
free  from  sin.  The  meaning  of  the  complaint  made 
by  the  children  of  Israel  was,  that  they  suffered  what 
they  themselves  did  not  deserve,  on  account  of  their 
fathers'  wickedness.  The  prophet  corrects  the  mis- 
take. He  tells  them  that  punishment  follows  personal 
ill-desert.  But  surely  he  does  not  mean  to  contradict 
the  declaration  which  God  himself  had  made,  that 
he  would  visit  the  iniquities  of  the  fathers  upon  the 
children  unto  the  third  and  fourth  generation  ;  —  a 
principle  so  important,  that  God  appended  it  to  the 
second  command  in  the  decalogue,  and  wrote  it  on 
a  table  of  stone.  Notwithstanding  this  general  prin- 
ciple of  the  divine  government,  it  is  often  represented 
in  Scripture  that  the  soul  which  sinneth  shall  die,  — 
that  the  wages  of  sin  is  death  ;  sin  and  death  belong- 
ing to  the  same  subject. 

Thirdly.  It  seems  difficult  to  reconcile  it  with  the 
justice  and  equity  of  God,  as  moral  Governour,  that 
he  should  visit  the  evils  implied  in  "death"  and 
"condemnation,"  upon  any  who  are,  in  every  sense, 
free  from  moral  evil.  The  law  connects  the  death 
and  condemnation  of  men  with  their  own  disobedi- 
ence;   and  it  equally  connects  their  happiness  with 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  11 

their  obedience.  Now  it  would  be  quite  unreasonable 
to  suppose  that  there  is  any  thing  in  the  divine 
constitution  or  the  divine  conduct  which  tends  in  the 
least  to  subvert  or  contravene  this  grand  principle  of 
moral  governn^ent.  Whatever  may  be  said  as  to  the 
sufferings  of  the  brute  species,  it  is  certainly  the  case 
that  when  pain  is  inflicted  by  the  Governour  of  the 
world  upon  those  whom  he  has  made  intelligent, 
moral  beings,  and  placed  by  the  very  constitulion  of 
their  nature  under  his  moral  government,  our  impres- 
sion naturally  is,  that  the  infliction  indicates  divine 
displeasure,  and  so  implies  that  he  sees  sinfulness  and 
ill-desert  in  those  who  suffer.  Unless  therefore  there 
is  something  which  plainly  opposes  this  impression, 
we  must  conclude  that  among  intelligent,  moral 
beings,   sin   is   coextensive  with   suffering. 

The  application  of  this  principle  to  the  case  of 
infant  children,  will  be  particularly  considered  in  the 
sequel; 

In  attending  to  the  representation  of  the  Apostle, 
Rom.  V,  in  regard  to  the  death  and  condemnation 
which  come  upon  mankind  in  consequence  of  the 
offence  of  Adam,  the  question  arises,  whethei*  these 
evils  come  upon  them  as  beings  morally  pure ; 
in  other  words,  whether  the  Apostle  means  to  feach 
that  any  of  those  whom  he  represents  as  standing 
in  such  a  connection  with  Adam,  and  as  brought 
under  death  and  condemnation  by  his  offence,  do  in 
fact  suflfer  those  tremendous  evils  without  being 
personally   sinful.     I  answer  .in  the  negative,  for  the 


78  SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 

reasons  above  given.     First :    we  are  tauglit  in   this 
very   passage  that  those  who   suffer  these  evils,   are 
constituted  sinners,  and  that   death  comes   upon   all 
because  that  all  have  sinned.     There  is  no  exception 
made.      Secondly :    other   parts   of    Scripture    teach 
the  same.     i\.nd,  thirdly  :    it  is  a  well  known  princi- 
ple, and  one  which  we  almost  instinctively  admit,  that 
those  who  are  placed  under  a  just  moral  government, 
^\    never  suffer  without  sin.  *  The  result  of  the  whole  is, 
^   h^:    ^^^^  ^^^  f^^^  stated  Rom.v,  namely,  that  all  the  human 
«~  \y^      *'^ce  are  subjected  to  death  in  consequence  of  Adam's 
<ii^     -M'^  offence,  manifestly  imphes  that  they  are  all  per son- 
,  ally   depraved.     And    they   become   personally    de- 

^^^'^  praved  as  the  children  of  apostate  Adam;  are 
'^"^  constituted  sinners  by  his  offence.  His  sin  is  the 
^^^  <w occasion  of  their  being  sinners ;  and  it  has  this 
i-^-^^Ul)  influence  upon  them  by  the  sovereign  constitution  of 
^yj(^^!^  God,  which  brings  them  into  such  a  relation  to  their 
^^^  common  father.     They  are  depraved  in  consequence 

r^'of  their  coming  into  existence  as  A?'*  po5^6rt7y.     And 
-^ftv-v   what  is  this  but  saying  that  their  depravity  is  natural? 
^«st  I       that  it  belongs  to  them  in  their  native  state,  or  the 
state  in  which  they  are  born? 

The  next  passage   which  I  shall  cite,   and  which 
-O.n  '       will  directly   confirm   the   views  above   expressed,   is 
v^      ,    John  3:  6.     "That   which   is   born   of  the   flesh  is 
/      ^' flesh."     What  is  meant   by  flesh   at  the  close  of  the 
verse,  gag^  eun']     This  we  may  learn  from  the  con- 
nection   and    drift    of    the   discourse.     Our   Saviour 
evidently  meant  that  in   man   which  disqualifies  him 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  79 

for  the  kingdom  of  God,   and   which   renders  it  neces- 
sary that  he  should   be  created  anew  by  the  Divine 
Spirit.    And  what  is  this  but  moral  depravity?     What 
but   a   sinful   hearty,  can   debar    any    man  from   the  -ff  ^  ^i 
blessedness  of  heaven?     What  but  this  can  make  it  ;tc.^; V- 
necessary  to  our  happiness  that  we  should  experience 
so  great  a  change  as  tp  be  born  again  ?     It  is  then 
perfectly  obvious  that  the   word  flesh  is  here  used  to 
denote  a  sinful  nature,  a  state  in  whicli  the  soul  is  41 /^/^ 
subject  to  carnal  and  earthl}''  desires,  instead  of  being 
subject  to  the  law  .of  God. 

This  interpretation  of  the  word  is  supported  by  the 
fact  that  the  same  word  is  often  used  in  a  similar 
sense  in  other  passages  of  Scripture.  In  Rom.  vii 
and  viii,  to  be  "in  the  flesh,"  to  have  a  "fleshly"  or 
"carnal  mind,"  denotes  a  state  opposite  to  being  a 
Christian,  —  a  state  of  enmity  against  God,  —  a  state 
of  spiritual  death.  And  in  Gal.  v,  the  Apostle  speaks 
of  the  flesh  as  that  in  man  which  lusteth  against  the 
spirit,  i.  e.  has  desires  in  opposition  to  holiness  and  to 
that  Divine  Spirit  which  is  the  author  of  hohness. 
And  when  he  mentions  the  .works  of  the  flesh,  he 
mentions  the  various  forms  of  sin.  As  we  thus  find 
that  the  word  flesh  is  often  used  in  this  moral  sense, 
and  is  manifestly  intended  to  denote  the  sinful  disposi- 
tion and  character  of  man,  we  are  confirmed  in  the 
interpretation  which  has  been  given  of  it  as  used  in 
John  3 :  6. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  other  part  of  the  passage  : 
"  That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh,  <fec."     ''  Born  of 


fen  '  '  V ; 


ILa 


So  SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 


the  flesh"   is  the   common   characteristic  of  human 
beingg.     It  is  that  natural  birth   by   which  they  are 
brought  into  personal  existence  Now  Clirist  teaches 
us  that  the  depraved  moral  nature  of  man   comes  by 
his  natural  birth ;  "That  which   is  born   of  the  flesh 
is  flesh."     It  is  sometimes  thought  that  the  word  flesh 
in  this  verse  is  used    in  senses  altogether  different. 
But  may   not  tlie  senses  in  the  two  cases  be  more 
nearly  alike  than   has  bee-n  commonly  supposed?     It 
is  very  evident  that  the  word  in  tlie  last  case  denotes 
a  jnorally   depraved   nature,  ii  sinful  character  in   all 
who   are   born.     And  may  it  not   in   the   first   case 
denote  the  same  nature  in   those  of  whom  they  are 
born?     The  children   are  like  tlieir  parents.     This  is 
a  general  law  of  our  nature.     And  fact  proves,  as  well 
as  the  Bil^le,  that  tbis  is  as  true  in  a  moral  sense  as  in 
any    other.     Through    all    generations   parents   and 
children    have  had  the   same   unholy  affections,   the 
same  sinful  character.     The  only  exception  to  this  is 
the  ca«e  of  the  Saviour,    whose   conception  was  not 
according  to  the   established   laws  of  human  descent. 
The   fact  has   been   perfectly  well  known   from   the 
beginning  to  the  present  day.     So  that  it  was  a  very 
pertinent  question  in  Job's  time,  and  is  so  at  all  times ; 
"Who  can  bring  a  clean   thing  out  of  an  unclean?" 
and  "  how  can  he  be  clean  that  is  born  of  a  woman?" 
The    two   points   above    mentioned   are,   I   think, 
specially   important  in  the  interpretation  of  the  text, 
"  That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh,  is  flesh."     First, 
flesh,  as  used  at  the  close  of  the  sentence,  signifies 


NATIVE     DEPRAVITY.  81 

man's  sinful  disposition,  his  moral  depravity.  It  cer- 
tainly refers  to  man  as  a  moral,  accountable  being, 
and  indicates  such  a  sinfulness  in  his  character  that 
he  must  be  renewed  by  the  Spirit,  or  he  cannot  see  the 
kingdom  of  heaven.  And,  secondly,  this  depravity 
comes  by  natural  descent.  Man  has  it  in  that  state 
into  which  he  is  born,  or  as  he  is  born,  or  in  conse- 
quence of  his  birth  ;  but  it  is  in  consequence  of  his 
being  born  of  parents  who  have  the  same  character 
of  depravity. 

This  construction  is  sustained  by  the  clause  imme- 
diately following.  "  That  which  is  born  of  the  Spirit  is 
spirit."  "  Spirit,"  at  the  close,  must  mean  spiritual, 
holy  affections,  —  a  pure  and  heavenly  state  of  mind, — 
a  character  conformed  to  the  divine  law.  And  this 
character  is  that  which  he  has  as  born  of  the  Spirit,  or 
in  consequence  of  being  born  of  the  Spirit.  The  Holy 
Spirit  is  the  author  of  the  new  birth  ;  and  as  that 
which  is  derived  from  depraved  parents  is  depraved,  so 
that  which  is  derived  from  the  Holy  Spirit  is  holy. 
As  the  phraseology  in  the  two  parts  of  the  verse  is 
similar,  the  interpretation  of  both  proceeds  on  the  same 
principle.  That  which  is  born  in  each  case,  resembles 
that  of  which  it  is  born. 

The  sense  I  have  given  of  the  passage  is  maintain- 
ed by  the  best  commentators.  Even  Rosen  mailer 
gives  nearly  the  same  sense.  "  By  flesh,"  he  says, 
"is  meant  the  nature  of  man,  —  man  with  all  his 
moral  imperfection^  subject  to  the  dominion  of  his 
bodily  appetites.  And  he  that  is  horn  of  jjarents 
8 


oa  SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 

who  have  this  moral  imperfection,  is  like  his  pa- 
rentsP  So  Knapp :  "  That  which  is  horn  of  the 
flesh  is  flesh.  From  men  who  are  weak,  erring,  and 
sinful,  men  of  the  same  character  are  horn^  So 
Dwight :  "  The  fleshly  character  is  inseparably  con- 
nected with  the  birth  of  man. ^^ 

As  farther  proof  of  the  correctness  of  the  above 
interpretation,  and  of  the  truth  of  the  common  doctrine 
of  native  depravity,  I  cite  Ephes.  2:  3.  The  Apostle 
says  of  himself  and  other  Jews,  "  We  were  by  nature 
children  of  wrath,  even  as  others."  To  be  chil- 
dren of  wrath,  is  to  be  exposed  to  God's  displeasure,  to 
be  deserving  of  punishment.  So  Schleusner  and 
others.  Jews  and  Gentiles  then,  i.  e.  all  men  are 
deserving  of  divine  punishments,  "  poenis  divinis 
digni ; "  which  is  the  same  as  to  say,  they  are  sinners. 
And  the  Apostle  says  they  are  so  "  hy  natureP  The 
first  meaning  of  the  word,  according  to  Schleusner, 
Wahl,  and  others,  is,  ^'■hirth,  origin,  nativity."  Gal. 
2:  15.  We  were  by  nature  Jews,  ^vaei  lovdaiov. 
We  were  native  Jews,  —  horn  Jews.  —  The  next 
meaning  given  by  Schleusner  and  Wahl  is,  "  that 
which  helongs  to  a  thing  from  its  origin  or  birth ; 
native  disposition,  native  qualities  or  properties  of 
any  person."  When  therefore  the  Apostle  teaches 
that  men  are  sinners,  and  so  children  of  wrath,  "  by 
nature,"  the  obvious  meaning  is,  that  they  are  so  by 
birthy  or  in  that  state  irito  which  they  are  born  ; 
that  this  is  their  native  character  and  condition. 
If  a  man  comes  to  possess  a  particular  character  in 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  83 

consequence  of  a  change  which  takes  place  in  him 
when  he  is  a  child  or  afterwards,  we  never  say,  he  is 
what  he  is  hy  nature.  Accordingly  we  never  say  a 
man  is  by  nature  holy  ;  because  this  would  mean  that 
hoUness  is  his  native  character,  or  is  natural  to  him ; 
which  would  be  wholly  inconsistent  with  its  resulting 
from  a  spiritual  and  supernatural  change,  or  a  new 
birth.  We  say  of  some  persons  of  a  particular  tem- 
perament, that  they  are  naturally  indolent.  But 
suppose  their  indolence  is  the  consequence  of  disease. 
We  then  say,  indolence  is  not  their  natural  disposition, 
but  has  come  upon  them  in  consequence  of  a  partic- 
ular cause. 

Knapp,  in  his  remarks  on  Eph.  2  :  3,  explains  the 
term  ^vaig^  (nature,)  thus  ;  "  <Pvaig  properly  signifies, 
first,  origin,  birth,  from  <^yw,  nascor,  to  be  born.  So  in 
Gal.  2:  15,  '2>i'oret  lovdaioi^  Jews  by  birth,  native  Jqws; 
and  so  in  the  classics.  Secondly.  It  is  also  used  both 
by  the  Jews  and  classics  to  denote  the  original,  inborn, 
and  peculiar  properties,  attributes,  or  nature  of  a  thing 
or  person,  the  naturalis  indoles,  or  affectio,  as  Rom. 
11:  21,  24."  "  The  term  natural  is  used  in  this  doc- 
trine in  opposition  to  what  is  acquired,  or  first  produced 
or  occasioned  by  external  causes.  It  denotes  that  for 
which  there  is  a  foundation  in  man  himself"*     "  We 


*  So  Dr.  Nathaniel  Taylor,  in  his  Concio  ad  Cleram,  speaking  of 
the  sin  of  man,  says,  "  The  cause  is  in  his  nature,  not  in  his  cir- 
cumstances." He  says  also,  "All  the  world  ascribe  an  effect  to 
the  nature  of  a  thing,  when  no  possible  change  in  its  appropriate 
circimistances  will  change  the  effect." 


84  SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 

say  for  example,  that  such  a  man  has  natural  saga- 
city, that  a  disease  is  natural  to  another,  that  he  is  by 
nature  a  poet,  &c.  because  the  qualities  here  spoken 
of,  are  not  ihe  result  of  diligence,  practice,  or  external 
circumstances."  He  says,  "  Some  prefer  the  word 
innate,  a  term  which,  as  well  as  the  other,  is  Scrip- 
tural." He  refers  to  the  elder  Pliny's  use  of  the 
word  congenitus  in  the  sense  of  innate,  and  Cicero's 
use  of  nativum  ;  and  then  adds ;  "  It  is  with  justice 
that  a  quality  which  had  its  origin  at  the  same  time 
with  man,  which  is  found  in  him  from  his  earliest 
youth,  and  can  be  wholly  eradicated  by  no  effort,  is 
denominated  natural.  In  this  sense  we  speak  at  the 
present  day  of  innate  or  hereditary  faults,  virtues,  and 
excellencies."     Knapp's  Theology,  vol.  2,  pp.  65,  67. 

A  careful  comparison  of  Eph.  2:  3,  with  the  one 
before  considered,  (John  3:  6,)  would  confirm  all  that 
has  been  said.  Christ  expressly  represents  our  carnal, 
depraved  disposition,  as  arising  from  our  birth.  "  That 
which  is  born  of  the  flesh,  is  flesh;'-'  just  as  holiness 
arises  from  our  renewal,  or  the  second  birth.  And  here 
the  Apostle  says,  we  are  children  of  wrath,  (and  by 
implication  sinners,)  by  fiatnre.  The  general  idea  is 
manifestly  the  same, 

The  words  of  David,  Ps.  51:  3,  have  generally 
been  referred  to  as  evidence  of  native  depravity.  "  Be- 
hold I  was  shapen  in  iniquity,  and  in  sin  did  my 
mother  conceive  me."  A  similar  representation  is 
made  in  Ps.  58  :  3,  where  the  wicked  are  said  to  "  be 
estranged  from  the  womb,"  and  in  Isa.  58 :  8,  where 


OF  NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  85 

men  are  called  "  transgressors  from  the  womb."  The 
sense  of  the  text,  Ps.  51:  3,  may  be  determined,  first, 
by  the  general  scope  of  the  passage.  David  is  deeply 
impressed  with  his  own  sinfulness,  makes  humble  con- 
fession, and  prays  for  purification  and  forgiveness. 
"  Wash  me  thoroughly  from  my  iniquity  and  cleanse 
me  from  my  sin.  For  I  acknowledge  my  transgres- 
sion, and  my  sin  is  ever  before  me.  Against  thee, 
thee  only,  have  I  sinned,  and  done  this  evil  in  thy 
sight.  —  Behold  1  was  shapen  in  iniquity  (fcc."  Then 
he  recognizes  God  as  requiring  purity  of  heart,  and 
prays  that  he  would  impart  it.  "  Purge  me  with  hys- 
sop," &c.  The  declaration,  verse  3,  stands  thus  in 
the  midst  of  the  most  humble  confessions  of  moral 
pollution,  and  the  most  fervent  supplications  for  cleans- 
ing ;  and  it  doubtless  has  a  meaning  correspondent 
with  the  general  current  of  thought  in  the  place. 
When  the  same  writer  says  of  the  wicked,  that  they 
are  estranged  from  the  womb  and  go  astray  as  soon  as 
they  are  born,  and  the  prophet  says,  "  I  knew  that 
thou  wouldst  deal  very  treacherously,  and  wast  called 
a  transgressor  from  the  womb, "  they  evidently  intend 
to  make  a  strong  impression  of  criminality.  It  is  the 
same  as  though  they  had  said  of  the  wicked,  that  they 
have  not  only  sinned  in  particular  instances  and  under 
great  temptation,  but  have  always  been  wicked^  si7i- 
iiing  from  the  very  beginning  of  their  existence; 
in  the  forcible  language  of  Scripture,  sinning  from 
the  wombj  or  as  soon  as  born.  Now  what  is  more 
natural  than  to  consider  David  in  Ps.  51,  as  reflecting, 
*8 


^ 


,K/^c 


86 


SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 


first,  upon  the  particular  transgression  he  had  com- 
mitted ;  then  turning  his  eye  upon  the  fountain  of 
pollution  within,  and  upon  the  various  exhibitions  of 
it  in  his  past  hfe,  and  acknowledging  with  shame  and 
penitence  and  self-loathing,  that  he  had  been  sinful  all 
his  days;  that  he  was  even  born  in  sin.  Just  as  we 
sometimes  say  of  a  proud,  selfish,  malicious  man,  to 
aggravate  the  hatefulness  of  his  character,  he  has  had 
that  vile  disposition  ever  since  he  was  horii.  It  is 
his  very  nature  ;  he  was  horn  so.  The  language  in 
which  David  charges  himself  with  being  so  sinful 
from  the  beginning  of  his  life,  is  undoubtedly  figura- 
tive, and  expressive  of  strong  emotions.  But  because 
he  expresses  the  thing  very  forcibly,  and  in  language 
which  goes  beyond  what  is  customary  where  there  is 
no  emotion,  shall  we  coldly  explain  away  the  obvious 
sense  of  the  passage,  and  overlook  that  consciousness 
of  deep  pollution  which  the  words  reveal?  The  best 
means  of  understanding  the  passage  is,  to  possess  the 
same  state  of  mind  with  David.  If  any  of  us  were 
in  his  circumstances,  and  had  his  conviction  of  sin,  his 
penitence  and  self-loathing,  and  his  desire  for  purifica- 
tion, it  would  become  perfectly  natural  for  us  to  utter 
our  feelings  in  the  same  impassioned  language. 

But  the  sense  of  the  words  before  us,  which  is  so 
apparent  from  a  consideration  of  the  drift  of  the  pas- 
sage, will  be  still  more  satisfactorily  seen  by  comparing 
this  text  with  the  other  passages  before  mentioned, 
where  the  same  truth  is  set  forth  in  a  more  didactic 
form,  and  in  language  which  admits  of  a  more  exact 


# 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  87 

and  rigid  interpretation.  David  utters  the  sense  he 
has  of  that  deep  depravity  of  his  heart  which  had 
been  acting  itself  out  all  his  days,  by  saying,  that  he 
was  born  in  iniquity  and  conceived  in  sin,  i.  e.  was 
sinful  from  his  birth  and  by  his  birth.*  Paul  teaches 
that  w^e  are  children  of  wrath  "  fty  nature;"  and 
Christ  teaches  that  a  carnal  mind,  an  earthly,  sinful 
disposition,  is  born  with  us;  —  "  That  which  is  born  of 
the  flesh  is  flesh.^^  And  to  remove  every  reasonable 
doubt,  compare  all  these  texts,  and  others  bearing  on 
the  same  subject,  with  the  general  fact  which  every 
attentive  observer  of  human  nature  has  noticed, 
namely,  the  putting  forth,  of  a  wrong  spirit  of  mind 
in  early  life. 

On  the  whole  I  think  it  will  appear  to  every  one 
who  examines  the  subject  with  candor,  that,  even  with- 
out revelation,  we  have  as  much  evidence  in  this  case, 
as  we  have  in  other  cases  where  no  one  has  any  doubt. 
Take  those  things  which  are  usually  regarded  as 
natural  to  man, — native  attributes  or  quahties  of  his 
mind.  Take,  for  example,  intelligence,  a  disposi- 
tion for  society,  and  parental  affection.  Why  are 
these  regarded  as  native  properties  of  man?  Evi-  /,- 
dently  because  they  uniformly  and  spontaneously 
develope  themselves  when  his  bodily  and  mental 
powers  become  capable  of  making  such  developement,  sx 

♦Professor  Stuart  says,  *'It  may  be  that  David  means  to  say 
here,  /  am  sinful^  and  descended  from  a  transgressor.  I  am  a 
degenerate  plant  of  a  strange  vine.^' 

A^    if^  \rKii^L  :iy^  pi^^f-o^- 


OO  SCRIPTURE    EVIDENCE 

and  when  the  proper  occasion  for  it  occurs.  What 
other  evidence  have  we  that  these  are  natural  to  man? 
And  is  there  any  other  proof  than  wliat  I  have  above 
suggested,  that  it  is  natural  to  man  to  have  a  soul,  or 
that  he  is  born  with  a  soul  ?  Is  it  said  by  way  of  ob- 
jection, that  there  is  no  appearance  of  depravity  in 
man  for  some  time  after  his  birth  ?  This  is  admitted 
to  be  true.  And  is  not  the  same  true  of  reason,  of 
the  social  and  sympathetic  dispositions,  of  parental 
affection,  and  even  of  the  existence  of  the  soul? 
Some  of  these  are  indeed  developed  very  early,  as  the 
existence  of  mind,  and  reason,  and  a  social  disposition. 
But  other  properties  which  are  natural  to  the  mind 
are  developed  at  a  later  period  ;  and  the  parental 
affection  can  hardly  be  said  to  come  into  distinct 
operation  before  the  parental  relation  exists.  And 
yet  who  ever  hesitated  on  this  account  to  consider 
parental  affection  as  natural  to  man?  Is  it  not  just 
as  evident  that  this  affection  results  from  the  nature 
which  man  receives  at  his  birth,  as  it  would  be  if  it 
began  to  operate  as  soon  as  he  is  born?  Such  is  the 
argument  for  native  depravity,  even  without  calUng 
in  the  -evidence  from  revelation.  But  when  this  is 
added,  the  proof,  I  think,  is  in  the  highest  degree 
convincing. 

I  have  at  present  only  one  additional  view  of  the 
subject  to  present.  Suppose  we  had  the  same 
evidence  of  the  opposite  fact,  as  we  have  of  native 
depravity;  suppose  that  human  beings  were  univer- 
sally   holy,    as    Jesus    was ;     suppose    the    feeUngs 


OF    NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  89     * 

developed  in  early  life,  and  afterwards,  were,  in  every 
man,  uniformly  right ;  suppose  that  all  the  temptations 
to  sin  with  which  mankind  are  beset  from  the  begin- 
ning of  their  life,  should  fail,  as  they  did  in  the  case 
of  our  Saviour,  of  producing  the  least  moral  pollution  ; 
and  suppose,  in  addition  to  all  this,  we  had  a  declara- 
tion of  an  Apostle,  that  all  men  are  hy  nature  objects 
of  divine  complacency  and  heirs  of  heaven,  and  a 
declaration  of  Christ,  that  that  which  is  born  of 
earthly  parents  is  holy ;  and  accordingly  suppose  we 
found  that  there  had  been  good  reason  for  the  inquiry 
among  thinking  men,  how  can  that  which  is  born 
of  a  woman  be  impure?  and  that  an  eminent  saint, 
while  contemplating  with  complacency  his  own 
uniform  goodness  of  heart,  should  exclaim,  that  he 
was  conceived  in  purity  and  brought  forth  in  the 
holy  image  of  God ;  and  suppose,  once  more,  that 
if  there  were  any  instances  of  sjp,  they  were  instances 
of  a  change  from  a  previous  state  of  holiness,  brought 
about  through  the  influence  of  some  malignant  being  ; 
suppose  all  this  to  be  the  case ;  should  we  hesitate  a 
moment  to  say  that  man  is  naturally  holy  7  or  that 
moral  purity  is  his  native  character  7  Do  we  hesi- 
tate to  say  this  of  Jesus,  the  son  of  Mary?  And  if 
evidence  like  this  would  prove  the  doctrine  of  man's 
native  purity^  why  does  not  the  same  kind  and 
degree  of  evidence  on  the  other  side  prove  the  doctrine 
of  his  native  depravity  ?  And  if  any  are  not  con- 
vinced of  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  by  evidence  like 
this,   1   beg  leave  to  ask,   whether  any  conceivable 

^  ( 


9D  CONSEQ,UENCES  OF  DENYING 

evidence  would  convince  them  ?  Let  them  tell  what 
that  evidence  is.  Let  them  describe  the  proof  which 
y  they  would  think  it  reasonable  to  require,  and  which 
would  satisfy  them  of  the  truth  of  the  doctrine.  Do 
any  say,  the  doctrine  is  such  that  it  is  impossible  to 
prove  it ;  no  evidence  whatever  would  convince  us  of 
its  truth  ?  With  such  persons  arguments  would  be 
in  vain.  <They  take  the  position  of  those  Unitarians 
who  say  that  no  possible  evidence  could  prove  to  them 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity ;  a  position  which  we 
should  hardly  expect  would  be  taken  by  men  who 
entertain  even  a  common  respect  for  reason  and 
philosophy. 

Consequences  of  denying  native  depravity.     ' 

It  has  always  been  considered  proper  to  argue  in 
support  of  any  doctrine,  from  the  evident  conse- 
quences of  denying'it.  This  kind  of  argument  I 
think  not  unimportant  in  relation  to  the  doctrine  of 
native  depravity. 

Professor  Stuart  expresses  an  opinion  which  few 
will  call  in  question,  when  he  says,  "  Whatever  may 
be  the  degredation  into  which  we  are  now  born  —  we 
are  still  horn  moral  agents^  free  agents^  with 
faculties  to  do  good^  yea  all  the  facidties  that  are 
needed, "  This  is  a  point  in  which  sober  men  are 
generally  agreed.  We  are  born  with  an  intelligent 
and  moral  nature ;  in  other  words,  we  have  rational 
gouls  from  the  beginning.  If  any  one  denies  this,  he 
inust  hold  that  the  human  soul  is  created  after  the 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  91 

birth  of  the  body.  And  he  must  hold  that  this  crea- 
tion of  the  soul  takes  place  very  soon  after  the  birth 
of  the  body  ;  because  only  a  short  time  elapses  before 
the  human  offspring  begins  to  show  signs  of  thought. 
Does  any  one  hold  that  the  signs  of  thought  and 
feehng  which  a  young  child  at  first  exhibits,  are 
nothing  different  from  what  appear  in  the  brutal 
species,  and  so  are  no  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a 
rational  and  moral  nature?  And  does  he  hold 
accordingly  that  a  human  being  exists  for  a  consider- 
able time,  —  it  may  be  six  months  or  a  year,  —  with 
only  that  principle  of  intelligence  and  feeling  which 
belongs  to  irrational  animals,  and  afterwards  receives 
from  the  creative  hand  of  God  a  rational  and  immor- 
tal soul  ?  I  reply  :  if  a  child  may  exist  so  long,  and 
advance  so  far  towards  developing  a  human  character, 
without  a  human  soul ;  why  may  he  not  advance 
still  farther,  and  even  do  without  a  soul  ?  Or  if  it 
should  be  thought  that  after  a  time,  (six  months  or  a 
year  or  more,)  the  exigencies  of  human  existence 
demand  the  addition  of  a  soul,  we  should  suppose  that 
the  time  when  this  important  alteration  takes  place, 
must  be  attended  with  some  visible  signs ;  that  the 
transition  from  the  state  of  mere  animal  existence,  to 
rational  and  moral  existence,  must  be  followed  at 
once  by  some  remarkable  effects.  To  suppose  that  so 
momentous  a  change  could  take  place  without  being 
observed,  would  be  unreasonable.  On  the  contrary, 
we  should  suppose  that  past  experience  must  have 
shown  at  what  period  or  near  what  period  of  life,  such 


92  CONSEGIUENCES  OF  DENYING 

an  event  usually  takes  place ;  and  that,  when  the 
period  approaches,  an  intense  interest  must  be  waked 
up  in  the  minds  of  parents  and  friends,  —  an  interest 
far  greater  than  that  which  is  commonly  felt  in  the 
birth  of  the  body.  For  surely  the  production  of  an 
immortal  soul  is  a  vastly  more  important  event,  than 
the  bringing  forth  of  a  mortal  body.  If  the  opinion 
under  consideration  is  true,  then  we  should  think  that 
when  the  time  for  the  occurrence  of  such  a  wonderful 
event  draws  near,  whether  by  night  or  by  day,  all 
eyes  would  be  awake  to  observe  it.  For  who  can  be 
inattentive  when  a  little  child,  say  a  year  old,  is 
about  to  receive  from  the  hand  of  God  a  never  dying 
soul,  —  to  be  changed  from  a  mere  animal  to  a 
rational  and  moral  being,  and  so  to  be  joined  to  the 
society  of  those  who  are  subject  to  law  and  account- 
able for  their  actions  ?  But  what  evidence  is  there  of 
such  a  change?  To  suppose  such  a  thing  would  be 
unreasonable  and  unphilosophical,  if  not  ridiculous. 
On  such  a  supposition  we  might  wish  to  inquire,  what 
becomes  of  those  who  die  in  infancy  before  they  have 
a  soul?  Will  they  ever  have  a  soul?  If  so,  we 
suppose  it  must  be  created  and  joined  to  the  body  at 
or  after  the  resurrection ;  for  it  could  hardly  be 
thought  that  God  would  create  souls  in  the  interme- 
diate time  between  death  and  the  resurrection.  —  If 
those  who  die  in  infancy  die  without  souls,  and  are 
never  to  have  souls  ;  then  we  can  hardly  believe  that 
their  bodies  will  be  raised  from  the  dead  ?  For  what 
concern  can  mere  animal  bodies  have  in  the  judgment 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY^ t*.^  n?.  93  'JX>  ^^ 

day,  which  is  intended  for  moral  beiftgs,  and  app^  ^  r  ^ 
tains  wholly  to  a  moral  government?  And  \{  "^  *  ^ 
those  who  die  in  early  childhood,  are  not  to  be  raised  ^^ 
from  the  dead,  then  what  John  says,  "  I  saw  t 
dead,  both  small  and  great,  stand  before  God,"  must 
be  understood  in  quite  a  limited  sense ;  for  those 
who  die  in  infancy  make  no  inconsiderable  part  of 
the  human  race.  Such  a  notion  as  this  would  occa- 
sion great  difficulty.  How  would  parents  feel,  how 
ought  they  to  feel,  in  respect  to  children  who  live  and 
die  without  souls,  and  who  of  course  do  not  belong  to 
the  family  of  rational  and  moral  beings,  and  to  whom 
death  will  be  an  eternal  sleep?  What  would  parents 
do  with  their  natural  affections^  which  in  their  very 
nature  imply  that  their  offspring  have,  not  only  the 
same  animal  nature,  but  the  same  intelligent,  social, 
and  moral  nature  with  themselves?  How  should 
they  regulate  their  'prayers  for  their  children  ?  Or 
rather,  could  they  with  propriety  pray  for  them  at  all? 
And  if  they  pray  at  all,  for  what  should  they  pray  ? 
And  what  would  be  the  meaning  of  religious  rites  in 
relation  to  those  who  have  no  souls? 

Hut  I  have  said  enough,  perhaps  too  much,  on  such 
a  subject.  For  who  will  deny  that  human  beings  are 
born  with  souls,  —  born  rational  and  moral  agents? 
But  some  admit  that  men  are  born  rational  and  moral 
beings,  but  do  not  admit  that  they  are  born  subjects  of 
moral  depravity.  But  if  mankind  are  born  intelligent 
and  moral  agents,  and  yet  are  not  subjects  of  depravity 
at  the  commencement  of  their  being,  then  one  of  two 
9 


>^ 


94  CONSEaUENCES    OF    DENYING 

things  must  be  true;  they  are  either  holy^  or  they 
have  no  character  at  all^  i.  e.  are  in  a  state  of  indif- 
.  ference  as  to  holiness  and  sin.  Rational  and  moral 
beings  cannot  be  supposed  capable  of  existing  in  more 
than  three  states ;  a  state  of  holiness  or  moral  purity, 
a  state  of  sin  or  depravity,  and  a  state  of  tieutrality, 
in  which  they  are  neither  holy  nor  sinful.  But  human 
beings  as  they  commence  their  existence,  are  not  holy. 
This  is  proved  by  evidence  too  clear  to  be  resisted; 
and  it  is  a  point  in  which  all  who  believe  the  Bible  are 
agreed.  If  then  they  are  not  morally  depraved,  they 
are  in  a  state  of  neutrahty,  having  nothing  either 
morally  good  or  evil.  Our  present  business  is  to  ex- 
amine this  position  and  see  what  difficulties  attend  it 
and  what  consequences  would  seem  to  flow  from  it. 

Here  then  we  have  a  being  with  a  rational  soul,  — 
one  born  a  moral  age?it,  without  any  disposition, 
either  right  or  wrong,  and  without  any  bias  or  ten- 
dency either  to   good  or  evil ;  —  a  moral  nature  but 

.     no  moral  character  ;  not  even  the  first  elements  of  it ; 

' '  a  rational  and  immortal  mind  existing  in  no  state 
either  of  holiness  or  sin.  —  There  seems  to  be  some 
difficulty  too  of  another  kind,  and  still  more  important. 
A  rational  being,  a  moral  agent,  is  of  course  a  subject 
of  moral  government.  From  his  very  nature  he  is 
under  law.  But  according  to  the  supposition,  this 
being,  who  is  by  his  very  nature  under  law,  has  no 
relation  to  law ;  and  has  nothing  which  the  law  can 
pronounce  either  good  or  bad,  —  nothing  which  can  be 
either  approved  or  disapproved    by   the   final  Judge, 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  95 

Now  suppose  he  dies  ia  early  childhood.  As  he  is 
born  a  moral  agent,  a  subject  of  moral  government,  he 
will  exist  hereafter,  and  will  be  called  to  judgment  at: 
the  last  day.  But  what  can  the  judgment  day  have 
to  do  with  him  'I  What  sentence,  either  favorable  or 
unfavorable,  can  be  passed  upon  him?  He  is  neither 
righteous  nor  wicked, —  neither  pure  nor  impure  ;  has 
no  character,  and  is  in  no  moral  state,  unless  a  change 
has  taken  place  in  him  between  death  and  judgment. 
Accordingly  he  cannot  be  admitted  to  heaven,  because 
he  is  not  holy ;  nor  doomed  to  hell,  because  he  is  not 
sinful. 

Again  ;  if  man  is  not  the  subject  of  moral  depravity 
from  the  first,  then  there  is  a  period,  longer  or  shorter, 
at  the  beginning  of  Kfe,  during  which  regeneration  is 
not  necessary,  nor  even  possible.  It  is  not  necessary, 
because  there  is  no  impurity  to  be  removed,  no  sinful 
disposition  to  be  subdued,  no  moral  deficiency  to  be 
supplied.  And  as  to  the  holiness  which  God  requires, 
—  what  is  there  to  hinder  it  when  the  proper  time  for 
it  shall  arrive,  and  a  suitable  object  shall  be  presented 
to  vi9w?  Evidently  there  can  be  no  need  of  the 
renewal  of  the  heart  in  order  to  the  exercise  of  holi- 
ness ;  for  the  heart,  remaining  in  its  native  state,  in 
which  there  is  nothing  wrong,  will,  we  should  think, 
have  right  affections  when  it  has  any.  In  such  a  case 
how  is  regeneration  even  possible?  The  change 
implied  in  regeneration  is  a  change  from  sin  to  holi- 
ness. But  according  to  the  supposition,  man,  at  that 
period  of  his  existence,  neither  has  nor  is  capable  of 


)9^   CGi-^r- 

-  h' 

ll 

c^....:.. 

■^.^ 

^i    . 

n.'.'i^- 


96  COXSEaUENCES    OF    DENYING 

liaving  any  thing  either  sinful  or  holy,  either  morally 
right  or  wrong.  So  tliat  to  suppose  a  change  from  the 
one  to  the  other  would  be  absurd.  And  if  no  moral 
change  is  necessary  or  conceivable  during  the  first 
period  of  life,  then  it  would  be  manifestly  unsuitable 
to  pray  that  a  child  during  that  period  may  have  the 
influence  of  the  Spirit  to  sanctify  his  heart ;  and  all 
the  fervent,  agonizing  supplications  which  pious 
parents  have  offered  up  to  God,  that  their  infant 
children  might  be  born  again,  and  so  fitted  for  the 
kingdom  of  heaven,  liave  resulted  from  mistake,  and 
have  been  in  vain. 

If  infant  children  are  the  subjects  of  no  depravity 
and  no  moral  deficiency,  —  if  they  are  in  no  sense 
sinners ;  then  how  is  their  state  different  from  what  it 
would  have  been  if  Adam  had  not  sinned?  And  what 
is  the  meaning  of  Rom.  5  :  15,  and  what  follows  ? 

Farther;  if  the  children  of  men,  during  the  first 
period  of  their  life,  have  no  depravity ;  if  they  are  in 
no  sense  sinners;  then  how  are  they  capable  of  receiv- 
ing the  special  benefits  of  Christ's  death  and  media- 
tion? And  if  they  die  during  that  period  and  go  to 
the  state  of  the  blessed,  how  are  they  indebted  to 
Christ  for  salvation?  He  died  for  sinners.  He  came 
to  seek  and  save  that  which  was  lost.  The  Apostle 
says,  "  if  one  died  for  all,  then  were  all  dead  ; "  i.  e. 
dead  in  sin.  Thus  he  makes  the  design  of  Christ's 
death  reach  to  those,  and  those  only,  who  are  sinners^ 
or  in  a  state  of  spiritual  death.  Accordingly  if  there 
are  any  human  beings  who  are  not  sinners,  for  them 


\ 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  97 

Christ  did  not  die.  For,  unless  the  Apostle  was 
mistaken,  if  Christ  died  for  them,  they  were  sinner§»..-- 
If  he  died  for  all,  then  were  all  dead.  It  would  be 
contrary  to  the  uniform  representation  of  God's  word 
to  suppose,  that  the  death  of  Christ,  or  the  redemp- 
tion which  he  accomplishes,  relates  to  any  who  are 
not  sinners.  Theorizers  may  say  what  they  will ; 
this  plain  truth  will  come  out,  namely,  that  if  all 
those  who  die  during  the  first  stage  of  their  existence, 
(and  a  vast  multitude  they  are,)  die  without  any  sin, 
they  are  saved,  if  saved  at  all,  in  a  different  way  from 
the  rest  of  mankind.  They  owe  nothing  to  Christ  as 
Redeemer.  He  did  not  die  for  them.  And  they  can 
never  join  in  the  song  of  the  redeemed ;  "  Unto  him 
that  loved  us,  and  washed  us  from  our  sins  in  his  own 
blood,  —  be  glory  and  dominion  forever  and  ever," 
They  can  never  sustain  the  same  relation  to  Christ 
with  the  redeemed,  and  can  never  have  the  same 
emotions  of  gratitude  to  him.  The  two  great  bles- 
sings which  flow  from  Christ's  work  as  Redeemer,  are 
forgiveness  and  sanctijication.  If  the  doctrine  of 
native  depravity  is  not  true,  those  who  die  in  infancy 
are  incapable  of  receiving  either  of  these  blessings, 
There  can  be  no  forgiveness  where  there  is  no  guilt, 
and  no  sanctification  where  there  is  no  depravity  of 
heart.  If  mankind  are  not  naturally  depraved,  what 
significancy  would  there  be  in  the  baptism  of  infant 
children?  Would  not  this  divine  institution  becomeX 
totally  unmeaning  ?  As  this  ordinance  is  commonly 
understood,  it  denotes  purification,  i,  e.  spiritual  renew- 

/  t       <\- 


98 


CONSEatJENCES    OF    DENYING 


/ 


al,  considered  either  as  already  effected,  or  as  necessary. 
But  it  could  not  have  any  significancy,  if  infant 
children  were  not  in  any  sense  depraved.  And  if 
any  one  who  denies  native  depravity  administers  this 
rite  to  children,  he  will  probably  show  that  he  does 
not  know  what  he  is  doing.  He  may  pray  that  God 
would  bless  the  children,  and  preserve  their  hfe,  and 
make  their  parents  faithful.  But  unless  he  forgets 
himself  and  his  piety  prevails  over  his  unscriptural 
speculations,  he  will  not  pray,  as  is  usual,  that  w^hat 
is  signified  by  the  washing  of  water,  may  be  accom- 
plished in  the  souls  of  the  children,  that  they  may  now 
be  renewed  by  the  Spirit  and  made  the  children  of 
Gocl,  and  that  whether  they  hve  to  adult  years  or  die 
in  infancy,  they  may  thus  be  prepared  for  the  king- 
dom of  heaven.  And  if  the  same  Christian  minister 
is  called  to  pray  for  infant  children  who  are  about  to 
die,  he  will  not,  —  (unless  his  piety  prevails  over  his 
speculations,) — he  will  not  earnestly  pray  that  they 
may  be  renewed  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  that  the 
blood  of  Christ  may  cleanse  them  from  sin.  He  will 
not  look  to  redeeming  grace  to  save  them.  He 
cannot  do  this  consistently  tvith  his  denial  of  native 
depravity.  At  the  present  day  you  may  have 
witnessed  more  than  once,  how  a  minister  who  has 
renounced  this  doctrine  is  embarrassed  and  straitened, 
when  he  prays  for  infant  children,  either  publicly  or 
privately.  He  does  not  honestly  regard  them  and 
feel  for  them  as  belonging  to  the  ruined  race  of  man, 
upon  whom  death  or  the  sentence  of  condemnation 


k%u 


NATIVE    DEPRAVITY.  99 

has  come  through  the  offence  of  one;  and  he  does 
not  pour  out  his  heart  to  God  that  he  would  grant 
them  the  blessings  of  redemption.  He  does  not 
commit  them  in  faith  to  the  Lamb  of  God  that  taketh 
away  the  sin  of  the  world.  So,  alas !  does  vain  philos- 
ophy turn  man  aside  from  the  simplicity  of  the  Gospel, 
and  check  the  spirit  of  prayer,  and  chill  the  warmest  /r  - 
affections  of  the  soul.  Q.-^-^x.  ^ 

Such  as  I  have  now  described,  appear  to  me  to  beio>ti 
consequences  of  denying  the  native  depravity  of  man. 
I  might  mention  still  more.  Some  of  those  who  deny 
this  doctrine,  are  so  bold  and  independent  as  to  avow 
these  consequences,  at  least  the  most  important  of  >  -<^. 
them.  Now  in  view  of  these  consequences  which 
seem  plainly  to  flow  from  such  a  denial,  1  find  great 
reason  to  be  jealous  over  myself,  and  to  guard  my 
judgment,  my  imagination,  and  my  heart,  against 
either  neglecting  or  going  beyond  the  dictates  of  God's 
holy  word.  q. 


"^O^L^i^V  ^*^<^ 


LL 


(JU^  y.       .  CHAPTER    VI.      t'^x^^^ 

Common  objections  to  native  depravity  inadmissible. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  the  doctrine  of  man's 
natural  depravity  has  been  stated,  and  the  evidence 
which  supports  it  briefly  exhibited.  And  in  addition 
to  this,  some  of  the  consequences  of  denying  the 
doctrine  have  been  adverted  to.  Before  leaving  the 
subject  it   may   be  proper  to  consider  the  objections 


100  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

which  are  commonly  urged  against  the  doctrine. 
But  before  entering  upon  a  particular  consideration  of 
these  objections,  let  us  pause  a  little  and  inquire  what 
is  the  nature  of  the  objections  usually  brought  against 
our  doctrine,  and  how  far  objections  of  this  kind  are 
entitled  to  our  serious  regard. 

I  cannot  but  think  that  we  are  in  danger  of  being 
perplexed  and  led  into  hurtful  mistakes  by  admitting 
objections  of  every  kind  to  be  brought  against  a 
Scripture  doctrine,  and  allowing  them  to  have  influ- 
ence upon  our  faith.  My  meaning  may  be  illustrated 
by  an  example.  A  man  is  tried  for  the  murder  of 
his  wife,  and  by  evidence  which  is  clear,  abundant, 
and  unquestionable,  is  proved  to  be  guilty.  But  the 
counsel  for  the  accused  bring  forward  various  objec- 
tions to  the  fact  of  his  having  committed  the  deed. 
They  argue,  first,  that  it  is  extremely  improbable,  and 
even  incredible,  that  a  man  endued  with  reason  and 
conscience,  should  commit  such  a  crime  ;  especially 
that  a  man,  endued  with  self-love,  and  a  desire  for  his 
own  safety  and  happiness,  should  commit  a  crime 
which  would  certainly  expose  him  to  ruin.  Secondly, 
they  argue  that  it  is  specially  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  a  man  should  lay  violent  hands  upon  the  wife  of 
his  bosom,  the  mother  of  his  children,  and  long  the 
object  of  the  tenderest  affections  of  his  heart.  Thirdly, 
they  argue  that  the  man  had  a  good  education,  was 
brought  up  in  a  good  family,  was  esteemed  and  loved 
by  his  friends,  and  knew  the  happiness  of  domestic 
and  social  life;  and  that  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  he 


INADMISSIBLE.  101 

should  voluntaril}^  break  all  the  ties  which  bound  him 
to  his  relatives,  and  sacrifice  all  tlie  pleasure  he  might 
enjoy  in  their  friendship.  Fourthly,  they  say,  how 
can  we  believe  that  a  benevolent  and  powerful  God, 
who  directs  and  controls  all  events,  would  give  a  man 
up  to  do  a  thing  so  horrible  and  destructive,  or  that  a 
just  and  compassionate  God  would  suffer  a  harmless 
and  lovely  wife  to  fall  a  sacrifice  to  the  violence  of  her 
husband  ?  These  and  other  like  objections  are  urged 
to  discredit  the  fact  proved,  and  to  make  it  out  that 
the  man  cannot  be  guilty  of  the  crime  laid  to  his 
charge.  But  the  learned  and  upright  judge  tells  the 
advocates  for  the  accused,  that  their  arguments  are 
irrelevant  and  of  no  loeight ;  that  objections  of 
such  a  kind  are  roholly  inadmissible  in  a  Court  of 
Justice.  He  asks  them  whether  they  have  any  thing 
to  allege  against  the  character  of  the  witnesses,  or 
any  thing  to  invalidate  the  testimony  they  have  given. 
The  advocates  for  the  prisoner  at  the  bar  reply,  that 
they  have  nothing  in  particular  to  allege  in  that  way, 
but  that  they  verily  think  the  witnesses  are  somehow 
mistaken,  and  that  the  man  cannot  be  guilty  of  such 
a  crime.  The  judge  says  to  them  ;  "  We  do  not 
inquire  for  your  opinions^  but  for  facts.  These 
speculative  objections  which  you  urge  with  so  much 
warmth,  have  no  force,  being  mere  conjectures, 
empty  notions,  matters  of  imagination  or  feeling, 
which  have  no  agreement  with  the  rules  of  justice. 
The  Court  cannot  consent  even  to  take  such  objec- 
tions into   consideration.     They  ^xq  inadmissible, 


102  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

How  plausible  soever  tbey  may  be,  they  can  avail 
nothing  against  testimony  and  facts.  They  are 
excluded  by  the  laws  of  evidence." 

The  principle  involved  in  this  statement  is  of  great 
importance,  and  should  be  carefully  observed  in  regard 
to  every  doctrine  of  revelation  and  even  of  natural 
religion.  When,  for  example,  we  have  clear  and 
conclusive  evidence,  from  within  or  from  without,  of 
the  being  of  God,  of  his  providential  and  moral 
government,  and  of  the  truth  of  the  Jewish  and 
Christian  Scriptures,  we  believe  these  doctrines;  we 
believe  them  confidently,  notwithstanding  any  objec- 
tions which  can  be  urged  against  them.  But  suppose 
the  objections  are  such  that  we  cannot  obviate  them  ; 
in  what  way  do  we  dispose  of  them?  We  say,  these 
objections  are  nothing  but  speculative  opinions,  the 
product  of  an  irregular  imagination,  perhaps  of  a 
proud,  unsubdued  heart.  And  what  can  they  avail 
in  opposition  to  legitimate  evidence  and  facts  ?  The 
infidel  comes  forward  with  his  objections  to  the  exist- 
ence and  government  of  God.  Are  we  able  to  meet 
them  and  to  show  directly  that  they  have  no  force  'I 
No;  but  we  regard  them  as  inadmissible.  Why? 
Because  they  are  of  such  a  nature,  and  used  for  such 
a  purpose,  —  mere  opinions,  dubious  speculations, 
arrayed  against  clear  evidence  and  facts.  The 
Socinian  urges  a  multitude  of  difficulties  which  lie 
against  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  Are  we  able 
fully  and  satisfactorily  to  solve  them?  No;  we  do  not 
pretend  to  this.     How  then  do  we  proceed  ?     We  hold 


INADMISSIBLE.  .  103 

that  the  difficulties  insisted  upon  by  the  Socinian, 
being  made  up  of  mere  speculative  opinions  and 
conjectures,  cannot  be  admitted  to  have  any  weight  in 
opposition  to  plain  Scripture  evidence  ;  that,  having 
satisfied  ourselves  that  the  Bible  is  the  word  of  God, 
our  inquiry  is,  whether  the  Bible  teaches  the  doctrine, 
not  whether  there  are  any  speculative  difficulties 
attending  it.  We  proceed  in  the  same  way  as  to  the 
atonement,  the  resurrection,  et  ceetera.  And  this  is 
the  only  safe  and  correct  mode  of  proceeding  in 
regard  to  the  subject  now  before  us.  The  doctrine 
that  man  is  by  nature  entirely  sinful  is  supported  by 
the  clearest  evidence  from  the  word  of  God  and  from 
well-known  facts.  Our  depravity  has  as  many  marks 
or  evidences  of  being  natural  as  any  of  the  attributes 
or  qualities  of  our  mind.  First ;  it  is  universal. 
Secondly;  it  shows  itself  very  early,  —  i.  e.  just  as 
soon  as  we  become  capable  of  acting  it  out.  Thirdly  ; 
it  cannot  be  attributed  to  any  change  which  takes 
place  in  man  subsequently  to  his  birth.  Fourthly  ;  it 
operates  spontaneously,  like  other  natural  qualities. 
Fifthly ;  it  is  hard  to  be  resisted  and  subdued. 
Sixthly ;  such  obviously  is  the  nature  and  condition 
of  mankind,  that  we  can  certainly  predict  that  all 
who  are  born  into  the  world  during  the  present  and 
every  future  generation,  will  sin,  and  sin  only  through 
their  whole  moral  existence,  unless  they  are  created 
anew  by  the  Spirit  of  God.  These  marks  of  native 
depravity  are  presented  before  us  by  the  word  of  God 
and  by  observation  and  experience.     I  hold  that  this 


iki 


104  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

evidence  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  doctrine.    If  any 
proper  objection  is  made,  it  must  be  made  against 
,  ,  this  evidence.     But  if  no  one  can  show  any  fault  in 

P^^  X  the  evidence,  tlien  the  doctrine  is  proved.  Does  any 
one  affirm  that  the  evidence  is  defective?  Let  him 
show  wherein  it  is  defective.  What  better  evidence, 
nay,  what  other  evidence  could  the  doctrine  have, 
supposing  it  to  be  true?  Review  the  whole  argument 
again,  and  examine  every  part  carefully.  Take  each 
of  the  marks  of  native  depravity  above  mentioned  by 
itself,  and  see  whether  it  is  not  as  clear  an  evidence  as 
could  be  supposed,  in  case  depravity  did  certainly 
belong  to  man.  It  is  universal.  Could  it  be  more 
evidently  universal  if  it  actually  belonged  to  the  moral 
nature  of  man  from  the  beginning  ?  It  shows  itself 
early.  If  it  were  in  fact  a  native  quality,  could  it 
show  itself  earlier  than  it  now  does?  Does  it  not  take 
the  very  first  opportunity  which  the  state  of  the  body 
and  mind  affords,  to  act  itself  out?  And  does  it  not, 
as  it  were,  press  for  such  an  opportunity,  even  before 
the  season  for  moral  action  fully  arrives  ?  Does  not 
the  principle  of  evil  thrust  itself  out  in  a  partial  and 
broken  manner,  before  a  capacity  exists  for  any  more 
perfect  forms  of  transgression  ?  * 

*  **  In  combatting  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  Mr  Locke, 
following  Aristotle,  has  compared  the  human  mind  to  a  sheet  of 
white  paper,  on  which  characters  of  different  descriptions  maj 
subsequently  be  written.  By  those  philosophers  who  deny  the 
innate  depravity  of  human  nature,  the  comparison  has  frequently 
been  applied  to  the  mind  in  regard  to  its  moral  state,  its  dispositiong 


inadmissiblf:.  105 

Again ;  moral  evil  in  man  is  not  owing  to  any 
change  which  takes  place  in  his  disposition  .or 
character  subsequently  to  his  birth.  If  this  is  true, 
is  it  not  a  clear  proof  that  depravity  is  a  natural, 
original  property  of  man?  Most  evidently  moral 
depravity  belongs  to  him  afterwards,  when  he 
becomes  capable  of  showing  what  he  is.  Now  if  he 
afterwards  has  a  depraved  disposition,  and  if  no 
change  takes  place  in  his  disposition  subsequently  to 
his  birth,  then  this  depravity  of  nature  belongs  to  him 
from  the  first.  Is  not  this  evident?  Our  first 
parents  were  depraved.  But  the  Scriptures  show  that 
their  depravity  implied  a  change  in  their  moral  state. 
They  were  first  obedient  and  holy.  After  a  time  they 
disobeyed.  That  act  of  disobedience  was  their  fall. 
Before,  they  stood.  They  were  upright.  The  act  of 
sin  mentioned  was  their  first  sin.  Accordingly  we 
never  say  that  their  depravity  was  natural.  If  they 
had  possessed  the  same  disposition  from  the  first,  as 
they  showed  when  they  violated  the  divine  command; 

and  tendencies.  It  will  be  a  juster  comparison,  if,  in  this  respect, 
we  liken  the  mind  to  a  sheet  of  paper  on  which  have  been  written 
characters  in  sympathetic  ink,  which  are  not  discernible  by  the  eye, 
till,  by  approximation  to  the  fire,  or  by  some  appropriate  chemical 
application,  they  are  brought  out  into  legible  distinctness.  So  is  it 
with  the  principles  of  evil  in  infancy.  We  may  not,  for  a  time, 
be  sensible  of  their  presence  ;  and  may  be  delighted  with  the  smiling 
harmlessness  of  the  little  babe.  But  the  principles  are  there  ;  and 
require  only  the  influence  of  circimi stances  to  bring  them  into  prac- 
tical and  visible  manifestation,  a  manifestation,  which,  to  the  eye 
of  even  a  superficiahobserver,  commences  at  a  very  early  period." 
Wardlavo^s  Christian  Ethics ^  p.  98.   London  Ed. 

10 


106  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

if  that  had  been  only  the  developement  of  a  heart 
disincHned  to  obey  God,  which  they  had  always 
possessed,  we  should  say  their  sinfulness  was  natural, 
that  it  originally  belonged  to  them,  that  they  com- 
menced their  existence  in  a  state  of  moral  depravity. 
But  there  is  clear  evidence  that  this  was  not  the  case. 
Now  how  is  it  with  their  posterity?  Is  there  any 
evidence  that  their  first  state  is  a  state  of  moral  purity? 
that  they  are  originally  inclined  to  good?  What 
evidence  should  we  expect  if  this  was  actually  the 
case?  We  should  expect  the  evidence  of  facts.  We 
should  expect  to  see  a  natural  inclination  to  good 
unfolded  in  acts  of  goodness,  as  soon  as  men  are 
capable  of  such  acts.  We  should  expect  to  see  an 
early  developement  of  those  right  feelings  which  are 
the  first  principles  of  holiness, — just  such  a  devel- 
opement as  was  made  hy  the  child  Jesus.  He 
began  his  existence  as  a  man  in  a  state  of  perfect 
moral  purity.  His  nature  was  holy  from  the  first, 
and  he  acted  out  that  pure  and  holy  nature  very 
early,  in  the  w^ay  of  loving  and  obeying  God.  The 
good  tree  bore  good  fruit.  This  was  the  visible 
evidence  he  gave  of  his  native  purity,  —  his  original 
disposition  to  goodness.  It  was  just  such  evidence  as 
would  naturally  be  expected.  And  it  is  what  we 
should  now  expect  of  human  beings  generally,  if  they 
were  born  in  a  state  of  moral  purity,  —  unless  they 
were  corrupted  after  they  were  born,  and  before  they 
were  capable  of  visible  moral  actions.  But  do  the 
children  of  men  show  any  such   signs  of  a  nature 


INADMISSIBLE.  107 

originally  pure  and  holy?  I  demand  then  of  any 
who  may  assert  the  native  purity  of  man,  that  they 
produce  some  plain  proof  of  such  purity.  And  if 
there  is  no  proof  of  this,  then  clearly  there  is  no  proof 
of  any  moral  change  in  man  after  his  birth,  in  order 
to  his  being  depraved.  If  it  is  said,  as  it  is  said  by 
Dr.  John  Taylor  and  Dr.  Ware  and  others,  that  we 
are  originally  without  any  moral  bias  one  way  or  the 
other,  —  neither  inclined  or  disinchned  to  holiness  or 
to  sin,  —  that  we  are  perfectly  neutral;  here  again 
I  call  for  evidence.  What  proof  might  we  naturally 
and  justly  expect  were  this  the  fact?  If  the  minds 
of  men  were  at  first  as  much  inchned  one  way  as  the 
other,  certainly  we  should  expect  they  would  show 
this.  And  if  in  some  circumstances,  that  is,  in  cir- 
cumstances strongly  tempting  and  urging  them  to  sin, 
they  were  to  bend  that  way ;  in  other  circumstances 
as  strongly  urging  them  to  holiness,  we  should  expect 
they  would  bend  the  other  way.  But  our  expecta- 
tion would  be  sadly  disappointed.  For  the  children 
of  men,  though  supposed  to  be  equally  inchned  both 
ways,  all  actually  incline  one  way^  and  that  the 
wro7ig  xoay  ; — all  of  them,  as  soon  as  they  are  capa- 
ble, yielding  themselves  servants  to  sin;  —  Jesus  only 
excepted,  not  one  of  the  whole  race,  unless  born 
again,  ever  inclining  to  the  way  of  holiness.  I  say 
then,  there  is  no  such  evidence  as  we  should  naturally 
look  for,  to  prove  that  men  commence  their  existence 
in  an  indifferent,  neutral  state,  inclined  neither  one 
way  nor  the  other.     Of  course  there  is  no  evidence 


.■O''^' 


i 


108  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

against  the  common  position,  that  the  depravity  which 
shows  itself  in  early  hfe  is  natural  to  man  ;  as  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  is  the  result  of  a 
change  either  from  an  original  state  of  hohness  or 
from  a  neutral  state.  The  evidence  in  favor  of  our 
position  is  then,  in  this  respect,  subject  to  no  abate- 
ment ;  nor  is  it  conceivable  bow  it  could  be  greater 
than  it  is. 

Another    evidence    in    favor    of    considering    our 

NftN,   depravity  native,  is,  that  it  operates  spontaneously. 

^  r    It  operates  thus  in  early  life,  and  ever  afterwards.     Is 

«u/        not  this  such  evidence  as  we  should  naturally  look  for 

(  to  prove  human  depravity  to  be  natural?     Is  it  not 

the  same  proof  that  we  have  that  any  thing  else  is 

L  vj        natural?     Does  not  this  principle  of  evil  which  we 

^<r^  .       have  in  our  hearts,   operate  as  freely  and  spontane- 

A——^  -  ously  as   any  of  our  bodily  appetites?     Does  it  not 

^.manifest  as   much  intrinsic  force,  as  much  impulse  to 

action,  as  what  we  call  natural  affection  ?     And  does 

it  not  manifest  this  as  early  as  the  state  of  the  body 

and  mind  allows  ?     Now  admitting  our  depravity  to 

be  natural,    could    we  in  this   respect  look  for   any 

greater  evidence  of  its  being  so  than  we  have?     Is  it 

conceivable  that  a  heart  really  depraved  from  the  first, 

could  act  out   its  depravity   more  spontaneously,  more 

promptly,  or  under  less  force  of  temptation,  in  early 

life,  and  afterwards,  —  than  the  heart  of  man  actually 

does? 

Farther ;  depravity  has  the  same   mark   of  being 
natural,   with  other  things  commonly  considered  as 


INADMISSIBLE.  "        '  P^  WQ^^   W^ 

natural,  in  this  respect  also,  that  it  is  hard  tobe-/^ 
resisted.  Is  not  this  one  of  the  marks  which  we  ^^  <^ 
should  expect  to  find,  supposing  our  depravity  to  be  '^'^^ 
natural  ?  And  so  far  as  this  is  concerned,  is  there 
any  defect  in  the  evidence  ?  Is  there  any  instance 
among  human  beings,  even  among  those  who  attend 
to  religion  in  very  early  life,  in  which  the  principle  of 
evil  in  the  heart  is  easily  subdued  ?  Is  there  any 
instance  in  which  it  is  overcome  and  eradicated  with- 
out immense  labor  and  difficulty  ?  Yea,  is  it  ever 
overcome  without  the  almighty  help  of  God's  Spirit  ? 
On  supposition  that  depravity  does  really  belong  to 
our  moral  nature  from  the  beginning,  can  we  conceive 
that  it  would  require  more  severe  or  lasting  effort,  or 
more  divine  help,  to  overcome  it,  than  is  found  to  be 
necessary  now  in  the  experience  of  Christians?  In 
this  respect  then,  could  any  one  demand  greater 
evidence  that  depravity  is  natural,  than  we  actually 
have  ? 

There  is  still  another  point;  namely;  such  man- 
ifestly is  the  nature  of  man,  —  such  the  state  in 
which  human  beings  are  born,  that  we  can  certainly 
predict  that  they  will  all  sin,  and  only  sin,  unless 
they  are  born  again.  Is  there  any  defect  in  this 
evidence  of  native  corruption  ?  Does  not  the  circum- 
stance that  we  can  certainly  foretell  what  will  be  the 
moral  developement  of  the  mind  in  every  one  of  our 
race,  imply  that  the  original  state  of  the  mind  is 
disordered  ?  As  to  this  matter,  we  do  not  wait  for 
developement.  We  do  not  wait  for  a  single  action  m* 
*10 


110  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

motion  of  a  new  born  child.  As  soon  as  we  see  a 
human  being,  though  at  the  very  beginning  of  Hfe, 
we  know  that  such  a  being  will  sin.  Does  not  this 
imply  that  we  know  what  sort  of  a  being  he  is?  But 
do  we  know  this  ?  And  how  do  we  know  it  ?  Why, 
how  do  we  know  that  a  young  grape-vine  will  bear 
grapes,  and  that  a  young  fig-tree  will  bear  figs? 
And  how  do  we  know  that  a  young  thorn-bush  will 
bear  thorn-berries,  and  not  oranges  ?  And  how  do 
we  know  that  a  young  lion  will  be  fierce  and  carniv- 
orous ?  And  how  do  we  that  a  new  born  child  will 
think  and  remember  and  feel?  We  know  it  from 
uniform  experience.  But  is  not  experience  just  as 
uniform  in  regard  to  sin?  Accordingly,  we  know 
that  every  human  being  will  sin,  as  certainly  as  we 
know  what  will  take  place  in  any  of  the  other  in- 
j^  stances  above  mentioned.  Have  we  not  then  in  this 
respect  the  highest  possible  evidence  that  man's  moral 
nature  is  from  the  first  depraved  ?  Does  not  this  per- 
.  feet  uniformity  of  effects  indicate  a  settled  constitution 
'<^-  of  things,  —  a  uniform  cause?;  Is  not  this  a  maxim 
with  all  sober  men,  both  as  to  the  physical  and  moral 
world?  Does  any  one  stare  at  the  conclusion  and 
say,  it  may  6e,  after  all,  that  something  different 
will  result  from  the  nature  or  state  of  mind  which 
man  originally  has.  Children  are  horn  intelli- 
gent, free,  moral  agents.  Now  it  may  be  that 
som^e  of  them  will  avoid  sin  and  be  completely 
holy,  as  Jesus  was.  It  may  be  that  some  change  of 
circumstances  will  lead  to  this.     It  may  be  that 

It 


INADMISSIBLE.  Ill 

some  of  these  millions  of  free  agents  will  give  a 
right  direction  to  their  rational  and  moral  powers^ 
.  and  hy  a,  sinless  life,  show  that  they  had  no  sin- 
fulness of  nature.  It  may  he  that  some  of  these 
trees  loill  hear  good  fruity  and  will  thus  Tnanifest 
that  they  are  good  trees.  To  any  one  who  thinks 
this  may  be  the  case,  1  would  just  say,  if  you  have 
doubts  on  this  subject,  wait  and  see.  Let  future 
experience  solve  your  doubts.  If  you  find  any  of  the 
descendants  of  Adam,  in  any  circumstances,  who  are 
not  sinners, — if  you  find  any  of  the  multitude  who 
are  now  in  infancy,  or  any  who  shall  be  born  here- 
after,—  if  you  find  any  one  of  them  free  from  sin, 
any  one  who,  without  being  born  again,  has  any 
degreee  of  holiness  ;  then  I  will  acknowledge  that  the 
evidence  here  presented  is  defective.  The  effects,  if 
not  perfectly  uniform,  could  not  be  considered  as 
proceeding  from  the  uniform  cause  above  mentioned, 
i.  e.  the  original  state  of  the  human  mind,  or  the 
moral  nature  of  man.  But  as  all  past  experience  has 
been  uniform,  we  must  consider  the  argument  good, 
until  future  experience  shall  furnish  some  exception. 
And  if  one  single  exception  shall  ever  be  made ;  if 
there  is  ever  found  one  son  or  daughter  of  Adam 
who,  without  being  changed  by  the  Divine  Spirit, 
shall  love  and  obey  God,  then  and  only  then  will  it 
be  evident  that  there  is  a  flaw  in  the  argument  here 
used.  And  if  future  experience  should  prove  a  flaw 
in  the  argument,  it  would  prove  the  Bible  false. 


112  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

As  to  the  evidence  from  Scripture,  I  put  the  same 
question :  Is  there  any  defect  in  it  ?  Take  the 
passages  separately  and  together.  Do  they  not  teach 
as  clearly  as  any  language  could  teach  that  the 
character  which  we  have  by  nature,  or  in  consequence 
of  our  natural  birth,  is  such  that  we  cannot  be  ad- 
mitted into  heaven,  without  being  changed  by  the 
power  of  God  ?  No  words  could  more  certainly  show 
that  we  have,  while  unrenewed,  a  sinful  character  ; 
or  that  this  character  comes  in  consequence  of  our 
natural  birth.  No  words  could  more  certainly  show 
that  we  are  depraved  by  nature.  The  texts  need  not 
be  repeated.  I  contend  that  the  Scriptures  teach  the 
common  doctrine  very  clearly,  and  that  it  is  not  easy 
to  conceive  how  they  could  teach  it  more  clearly. 

I  make  the  appeal  then  to  those  who  love  the  truth, 
and  who  are  accustomed  to  use  their  reason  and  to 
judge  according  to  evidence.  Is  there  any  flaw  in  the 
argument  by  which  the  doctrine  is  supported  ?  Is 
there  any  mistake  in  the  facts  which  lie  at  the  found- 
ation of  the  reasoning  ?  Is  not  the  fact  in  each  case 
such,  both  in  regard  to  nature  and  degree,  as  I  have 
represented?  And  does  not  each  fact  contain  evidence 
which  bears  directly  upon  the  question  at  issue?  We 
hold  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity  and  produce 
evidence  to  prove  it.  Is  the  evidence  deficient  ?  If 
so,  show  wherein.  In  what  respect  does  it  fail  ? 
But  if  you  have  nothing  to  offer  against  the  evidence 
of  the  doctrine,  showing  that  it  is  in  some  way  faulty 


INADMISSIBLE.  113 

or  inconclusive ;  then,  according  to  the  rules  of  reason- 
ing, the  doctrine  is  established. 

The  objections  which  are  most  frequently  urged 
against  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity,  and  which 
have  the  greatest  weight  in  the  minds  of  men,  are  of 
such  a  kind,  that  they  may  be  dismissed  at  once  as 
worth]/  of  no  regard.  They  are  of  no  weight  in 
respect  to  the  point  at  issue.  Consisting  as  they  do 
of  speculations,  abstract,  a  priori  reasonings,  conjec- 
tures and  cavils,  they  can  never  avail  any  thing 
against  the  evidence  of  facts.  Let  these  objections  be 
multiplied  a  hundred  fold,  —  if  arrayed  against  sober, 
unimpeachable  evidence,  —  evidence  which  is  ad- 
dressed to  common  sense,  and  such  as  is  acknowl- 
edged in  all  other  cases  to  be  conclusive  ;  we  fling 
them  to  the  winds.  An  objection  is  stated.  We  say, 
what  of  that  ?  We  have  clear,  conclusive  evidence  of 
the  fact.  Another  objection  is  stated,  and  another, 
and  another.  We  scatter  them  in  a  moment  with 
the  same  question,  What  of  that?  It  is  said,  we 
cannot  reconcile  the  common  notion  of  native 
depravity  with  the  benevolence  of  God,  nor  with  his 
justice,  nor  with  our  free  moral  agency  and  accounta- 
bility. Well,  admit  that  we  cannot  reconcile  these 
things.  What  then?  Does  it  follow  that  God 
cannot  1  Are  we  equal  to  God  ?  Farther  ;  because 
we  are  not  now  able  to  reconcile  these  things,  does  it 
follow  that  we  shall  never  be  able  ?  Be  it  so  then,  as 
the  objector  alleges,  that  we  cannot  reconcile  the 
doctrine  of  our  native    depravity    with    the    divino 


114  COMMON    OBJECTIONS 

benevolence,  or  justice.  What  does  this  inabihty,  or 
more  properly,  what  does  this  ignorance  of  ours  weigh 
against  clear  evidence  of  the  fact?  Be  it  so  that  we 
cannot  reconcile  our  doctrine  with  our  moral  agency 
and  accountabihty,  or  the  principles  of  a  righteous 
moral  government.  What  does  our  ignorance  in  this 
respect  weigh  against  a  matter  of  fact?  If  our 
ignorance,  or  the  objections  and  difficulties  which  arise 
from  our  ignorance,  are  to  be  regarded  as  valid 
arguments,  —  if  they  are  sufficient  to  outweigh  clear 
evidence  and  to  disprove  well  attested  facts ;  then  I 
can  disprove  the  Scripture  account  of  the  creation,  the 
deluge,  and  the  destruction  of  Sodom ;  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity,  the  atonement  of  Christ,  the  influence 
of  the  Spirit,  the  resurrection,  future  punishment,  and 
most  of  the  doctrines  of  revelation.  And  in  the  same 
way  I  can  disprove  well  known  facts  in  regard  to  the 
magnetic  power,  the  growth  of  a  tree,  the  operations 
of  mind,  both  awake  and  asleep,  and  numberless 
things  which  occur  in  our  daily  experience;  yea,  I 
can  disprove  the  existence  of  God,  and  all  the 
doctrines  of  natural  religion.  For  I  can  ask  questions 
in  regard  to  each  of  these  which  no  man  can  answer. 
I  can  bring  forward  objections  and  difficulties  which 
no  man  can  solve.  But  what  do  these  unanswerable 
objections  and  these  insolvable  difficulties  prove? 
They  prove  our  ignorance,  and  should  make  us  very 
humble.  But  can  they  be  admitted  as  valid  argu- 
ments against  obvious  and  well  attested  facts? 


INADMISSIBLE.  115 

The  remarks  above  made  involve  a  principle 
which  is  of  great  practical  importance.  We  are  often 
employed  in  attempting  to  answer  the  speculative 
objections  which  are  urged  against  the  doctrine 
of  natural  depravity  and  other  important  articles 
of  our  faith.  And  we  sometimes  proceed  in  such  a 
manner  as  implies  that  we  cannot  consistently  hold 
the  doctrines  of  our  religion  unless  all  objections  and 
difficulties  are  removed.  And  so  we  labor  hard  and 
spend  much  precious  time  in  endeavouring  to  remove 
them.  But  this  is  altogether  needless.  These  spec- 
ulative objections  may  be  dismissed  at  once  as  of 
no  weight,  —  as  totally  inadmissible.  What  are 
empty  notions,  imaginations,  surmises,  dreams,  origi- 
nating in  minds  disordered  and  dark  ?  and  what  are 
complaints  and  cavils,  originating  in  proud,  unbeliev- 
ing hearts,  that  they  should  avail  any  thing  in  oppo- 
sition to  clear  evidence  and  fact?  When  we  have 
looked  at  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  word  and 
providence  of  God,  and  find  what  is  the  fact,  our 
great  business  as  inquirers  after  the  truth  is  at  an  end, 
and  our  faith  settled.  And  if  any  one  comes  forward, 
not  to  show  any  want  of  clearness  or  force  in  the 
evidence  we  produce,  or  any  flaw  in  our  arguments, 
but  to  bring  speculative  objections  and  complaints 
against  a  Scriptitre  doctrine^  —  a  loell  established 
truth  ;  the  Apostle  has  taught  us  how  to  meet  him  : 
"  Who  art  thou,  O  man,  that  repliest  against  God  ?  " 
We  prove  the  doctrine  of  divine  purposes  by  clear, 
indisputable    arguments,    drawn     from    reason    and 


116  COMMON    OBJECTIONS   INADMISSIBLE. 

Scripture.  Now  suppose  the  objector  passes  by  all 
ibis  evidence,  which  is  the  very  thing  he  is  concerned 
with,  and  goes  to  finding  fault  with  the  doctrine 
itself:  I  say,  he  replies  against  God.  He  is  a 
caviller.  We  prove  that  all  men  are  naturally  de- 
praved,—sinners  from  the  first,  and  that  they  are  so 
in  consequence  of  the  original  apostacy  ;  that  they  are 
constituted  sinners  by  the  one  oflence  of  Adam.  We 
prove  this  doctrine  by  the  plainest  and  most  conclusive 
evidence.  The  objector  passes  by  this  evidence  and 
disputes  against  the  doctrine  itself  —  against  that 
which  the  word  of  God  and  facts  clearly  teach.  He 
too  acts  the  part  of  a  caviller.  He  replies  against 
God.  He  finds  fault  with  God's  appointment,  with 
the  mode  of  his  operation,  and  says,  it  is  unjust.  He 
says,  if  this  is  God's  constitution,  then  we  are  not 
culpable  for  our  sinfulness ;  and  to  punish  us  will  be 
unrighteous.  Now  when  it  comes  to  this,  I  have  only 
one  answer,  the  answer  of  Paul  to  the  caviller  of  his 
day :  "  Who  art  thou,  O  man,  that  repliest  against 
God?  Shall  the  thing  formed  say  to  him  that 
formed  it,  Why  hast  thou  made  me  thus?  Hath 
not  the  potter  power  over  the  clay?"  Who  art  thou 
that  demandest  the  reasons  of  God's  unsearchable 
dispensations  ?  Does  it  belong  to  thee  to  give  counsel 
to  the  only  wise  God,  or  to  pronounce  judgment  on 
his  ways  ?  Does  it  become  a  sinful  man  to  say  to 
the  Almighty,  "  What  doest  thou  ?  "  Shall  the  infi- 
nite God  ask  such  a  one  as  thou  art,  what  will  be 
proper  for  him  to  do  in  creating  a  world  and  in  fixing 


OBJECTIONS  EXAMINED.  117 

the  condition  of  his  creatures?  Has  he  not  wisdom 
enough  without  coming  to  be  instructed  by  thee7 
Has  he  not  justice  and  benevolence  enough  without 
being  prompted  to  do  what  is  just  and  benevolent 
by  theel  And  is  he  not  powerful  enough  without 
borrowing  strength  of  thee  7  If  he  needed  help  he 
would  not  ask  it  of  a  worm.  Who  art  thou  that 
repliest  against  God? 


CHAPTER    VII. 

Objections  to  native  depravity  particularly  examined. 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  it  has,  I  think,  been 
made  to  appear  that  the  objections  commonly  brought 
against  the  doctrine  of  depravity,  relating  as  they  do, 
not  to  the  evidence  by  which  the  doctrine  is  supported, 
but  to  the  doctrine  itself^  which  is  a  matter  of 
revelation  as  well  as  experience,  —  are  totally  inad- 
missible.  The  great  question  to  be  settled  is,  whether 
the  doctrine  is  true,  not  whether  it  is  attended  with 
difficulties ;  —  whether  it  is  proved  by  sufficient 
evidence,  not  whether,  being  thus  proved,  it  is  liable  to 
objections  from  the  ignorance  or  pride  or  ingenuity 
of  man.  Even  if  the  objections  remain  unanswered, 
they  cannot  be  allowed  to  have  any  weight  against  a 
doctrine  which  rests  on  clear,  abundant,  and  unques- 
tionable evidence.  Accordingly  I  might  claim  the 
right  of  stopping  here,  resting  the  truth  of  the  doctrine 
on  the  direct  arguments  which  have  been  urged  in  its 
11 


^' 


118  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

favor,  and  leaving  objections  to  take  care  of  them- 

ff   selves.     This,   I   conceive,   would   in   itself  be  right. 

t^^     And  nothing  more  is  necessary  when  the  doctrine  is 

^i^^^J^J  taught  for  common,  practical  purposes.     There  is  even 

^  an   injury  to   be   apprehended   from    an  attempt    to 

obviate  metaphysical  objections  and  difficulties,  before 

' '        those  who  are  not  capable  of  pursuing  a  metaphysical 

'^  discussion. 

rtckx^y^  But  inasmuch  as  objections  have  been  continually 
urged  by  learned  and  able  disputants,  and  as  these 
objections  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  occasion  doubt 
and  perplexity  to  many  sincere  Christians,  and  to 
diminish  the  salutary  influence  of  divine  truth,  I  have 
thought  it  expedient  to  bring  the  chief  of  them  under 
particular  consideration.  If  I  succeed  in  detecting  the 
fallacy  of  the  principles  which  they  involve,  or  in 
showing  that,  however  plausible,  they  have  httle  or  no 
weight ;  or  if  I  make  it  appear  that  they  are  not 
conclusive  against  the  truth  of  the  doctrine ;  I  shall  do 
all  that  the  case  requires. 

The  first  objection  that  I  shall  now  more  particu- 
larly examine,  relates  to  the  moral  perfections  of 
God,  It  is  alleged  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  holi- 
ness and  benevolence  of  God,  and  even  with  his 
justice,  to  bring  men  into  existence  destitute  of  that 
holiness  which  is  essential  to  their  well-being,  and  in 
such  a  state  of  depravity  as  will  certainly  lead  on  to  a 
life  of  sin  and  an  eternity  of  misery,  unless  redeeming 
grace  prevent,  —  and  to  involve  the  whole  human  race 
in  this  dreadful  calamity  on  account  of  the  one  offence 
of  their  first  father. 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  119 

To  this  objection  I  have  aheady  attended.  But  the 
principle  impUed  in  it  is  so  important,  that  I  shall  pre- 
sent it  again  in  a  varied  form. 

With  our  very  Hmited  faculties,  and  especially 
while  those  faculties  are  so  disordered  by  sin,  we  are 
not  competent  to  determine  what  is  or  is  not  consistent 
wyth  the  moral  attributes  of  God,  except  as  we  are 
instructed  by  his  word  and  providence.  "  Who  hath 
known  the  mind  of  the  Lord  ?  Who  hath  been," 
and  who  is  quaUfied  to  be,  "his  counseller  ?  "  Who  is 
qualified  to  tell  God  what  will  be  fit  and  what  will  be 
unfit  for  him  to  do?  What  means  have  we  of  deter- 
mining beforehand  in  what  manner  infinite  perfection 
will  be  developed,  what  plan  infinite  wisdom  and 
goodness  will  adopt,  and  how  that  plan  can  best  be 
carried  into  execution  ?  In  order  to  judge  on  such 
a  subject,  we  must  have  an  understanding  capable 
of  taking  into  view  and  knowing  perfectly  the 
whole  extent  of  a  created  universe,  and  all  its 
operations  and  results  through  endless  duration: 
whereas  we  are  not  able  perfectly  to  know  the  small- 
est part  of  it,  even  at  the  present  time.  Before  the 
incomprehensible  greatness  of  such  an  object  as  the 
universe,  —  even  that  inconsiderable  part  of  it  to 
which  we  belong,  —  we  are  constrained  to  say,  "  We 
are  of  yesterday  and  knoio  nothing.''^  An  ability  to 
judge  on  this  subject  would  moreover  imply  a  com- 
prehensive and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  infinite 
perfections  of  God,  because  the  whole  system  of 
creation  and  providence  must  be  considered  as  stand- 


120  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

ing  in  a  most  intimate  relation  to  the  divine  perfec- 
tions, as  entirely  corresponding  with  them,  and  as 
suited  most  clearly  to  make  them  known  to  intelHgent 
creatures.  This  view  of  the  subject  is  calculated  to 
cure  our  pride  and  arrogance,  and  to  make  us  feel 
that  we  are  to  occupy  the  place  of  learners,  not  of 
judges. 

What  then  is  the  position  which  we  are  to  take? 
As  rational  creatures,  with  the  works  and  word  of  our 
Creator  before  us,'  and  with  the  idea  of  his  infinite 
perfection  within  us,  what  have  we  to  do?  Not 
surely  to  settle  the  question  whether  God  is  infinitely 
wise  and  good,  but  to  inquire  how  this  infinitely  wise 
and  good  being  has  made  himself  known  ;  not  what 
he  could  consistently  do,  but  what  he  has  done; 
not  what  his  plan  of  operation  should  be,  but  what  it 
is.  There  is  nothing  within  the  province  of  our 
inteUigence  which  we  know  more  certainly  than  this, 
that  whatever  God  does  is  right.  We  can  deter- 
mine then  in  any  case  what  is  right,  if  we  can  deter- 
mine what  God  does.  As  soon  as  we  come  to  know 
what  the  manner  of  God's  acting  is,  either  in  creation 
or  providence,  that  moment  we  know  what  agrees  with 
infinite  wisdom  and  benevolence.  This  is  true  in 
rjespect  to  every  particular  thing  which  God  accom- 
plishes in  the  whole  compass  of  his  agency.  Viewed 
in  the  light  in  which  God  views  it,  and  in  relation  to 
the  ends  which  he  aims  at,  it  is  right.  And  when 
we  know  in  any  case  what  the  divine  arrangement 
is,  though  we  are  totally  unable  to  understand  in  what 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  121 

particular  light  God  regards  it,  or  what  particular  ends 
he  means  to  subserve  by  it,  we  still  believe  and  know 
that  it  is  right.  But  why  do  we  believe  this  ?  and 
how  do  we  know  it  ?  We  beheve  and  know  it  to 
be  light  merely  because  God  does  it.  Our  conclu- 
sion results  from  our  confidence  in  God.  Suppose  that 
Abraham,  not  yet  informed  of  God's  intentions  respect- 
ing Sodom,  inquires  with  himself;  "  What  ought 
to  be  done,  and  what  will  a  righteous  God  do,  with 
that  guilty  city?"  He  cannot  answer  the  question. 
Suppose  the  inquiry  arises  in  his  mind,  whether  God 
will  destroy  the  city  and  all  its  inhabitants,  both  old 
and  young,  with  a  sudden  and  dreadful  destruction ; 
he  cannot  answer :  or  perhaps  he  may  say,  "  Far  be  it 
from  a  God  of  infinite  mercy  to  do  this."  But  the 
moment  he  sees  that  God  has  done  it,  or  knows  that 
he  will  do  it,  he  says,  it  is  right.  And  if  any  one 
had  said  to  him  :  "  Do  you  think  that  your  God  and 
the  God  of  your  seed  will  command  you  to  offer  up 
your  son  Isaac  as  a  sacrifice  ? "  he  would  probably 
have  answered,  "  No ;  a  holy  and  merciful  and 
covenant-keeping  God  can  never  do  this."  But  what 
does  he  do  when  God  actually  commands  it  ?  Does 
he  hesitate  and  inquire  how  it  can  be  consistent  with 
the  holiness  find  goodness  and  faithfulness  of  God? 
No;  he  instantly  acquiesces,  and  goes  to  acconipl  sh 
what  is  commanded.  He  has  confidence  in  God,  and 
believes  and  knows  that  what  he  does  is  right. 

This  is  the  principle  on  which  St.  Paul  proceeds  in 
Rom.  ix.     He  shows  what  is  the  actual  conduct  of 

ni 


122  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

God  in  saving  some  and  not  saving  others ;  in 
making  some  vessels  of  mercy,  and  others  vessels  of 
wrath.  He  teaches  an  important  fact  in  the  divine 
administration.  Some  call  in  question  the  propriety 
of  this,  and  object.  But  Paul  allows  no  objection  to 
be  brought.  He  does  not  allow  men  to  put  the 
question  ;  "  Why  doth  God  then  find  fault  ? "  He 
shows  them  that  it  is  an  unbecoming  thing  for  them 
to  reply  against  God,  or  to  call  in  question  the  right- 
eousness of  what  he  does.  He  rebukes  them.  The 
principle  he  adopts  is,  that  we  are  to  have  perfect  con- 
fidence in  God ;  that  as  soon  as  we  know  what  he 
does,  we  must  be  satisfied  that  it  is  right. 

This  principle,  if  carried  into  our  reasoning  on  the 
present  subject,  will  help  us  at  once  to  dispose  of 
the  common  objections  and  difficulties,  and  will  pre- 
pare us  to  believe  the  truth  just  as  it  is  made  known 
by  God's  word  and  providence. 

The  first  point  we  are  to  settle  is  the  matter  of  fact. 
Do  men  come  into  existence  destitute  of  that  hoUness 
which  is  essential  to  their  well-being,  and  in  such  a 
state  of  depravity  as  certainly  leads  to  a  life  of  sin 
and  an  eternity  of  suflTering  ?  The  evidence  of  this 
fact  from  the  word  and  providence  of  God,  we  have 
considered.  Hardly  any  doctrine  has  proof  so  abun- 
dant and  satisfactory.  Do  you  say  then,  this  fact  is 
not  consistent  with  the  perfections  of  God?  This  is 
now  the  same  as  to  say,  that  the  perfections  of  God 
are  not  consistent  with  a  well  attested,  unquestionable 
fact.     But  who  is  to  determine  whether  any  particular 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  123 

thing  is  consistent  with  the  perfections  of  God ;  — 
whether  it  is  consistent  for  him  to  do  what  he  actually 
does  ?  God  himself  has  decided  that  it  is  consistent, 
by  doing  it.  Do  you  say  he  has  not  done  it  ?  I 
ask,  why  you  say  this?  Is  it  because  evidence  of  the 
fact  is  wanting  1  No ;  you  admit  other  things  upon 
evidence  not  half  so  clear.  Is  not  this  the  reason 
why  any  say  that  God  has  not  brought  man  into 
existence  in  the  state  above  described,  namely,  that 
they  have  made  up  their  minds  beforehand,  that  it  is 
not  consistent  for  God  to  do  it.  And  have  they  not 
made  up  their  minds  thus,  merely  because  they  are 
not  able  to  make  out  the  consistency  of  it  by  their 
own  reason  ?  But  is  this  just  7  Would  it  be  safe  to 
apply  this  mode  of  reasoning  to  ether  things  ?  Sup- 
pose we  find  it  impossible  for  us  by  our  own  reason 
to  prove  the  justice  and  propriety  of  God's  "visiting 
the  iniquities  of  the  fathers  upon  the  children,  unto 
the  third  and  fourth  generation ; "  may  w^e  hence 
conclude  that  it  is  not  just,  and  so  contradict  the 
express  declaration  of  God,  uttered  on  Mount  Sinai 
and  written  on  a  table  of  stone,  and  say,  he  does  not 
visit  the  iniquities  of  fathers  upon  the  children  ?  We 
should  not  be  able  by  our  own  reasoning  to  make  out 
the  justice  of  God's  commanding  the  Israehtes  to  cut 
off  all  the  inhabitants  of  Canaan,  both  men  and 
women  ;  and  that  he  should  be  particular  in  requiring 
them  to  destroy  all  the  children^  —  thousands  and 
thousands  of  little^  infant  children  !  Now  because 
we  are  not  able  to  reason  out  the  justice  of  this,  shall 


124  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

we  say  it  is  not  just ;  and  then  deny  that  God  ever 
commanded  such  a  thing  ?  In  this  way  we  should 
deny  no  small  part  of  the  Bible,  and  no  small  part  of 
the  facts  which  occur  in  the  course  of  divine  provi- 
dence. We  are  never  to  adopt  this  principle,  that 
what  we  think  to  be  just  and  right,  God  will  do,  and 
what  we  think  not  just  and  right,  God  will  not  do. 

This  is  a  fair  reply,  and  all  that  is  due  to  one  who 
denies  a  well  known  fact,  and  takes  upon  him  to  say 
that  the  natural  depravity  of  man  w^ould  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  perfections  of  God. 

But  I  will  now  go  into  a  more  free  and  thorough 
examination  of  this  and  other  principal  objections. 

The  objector  alleges  that  the  common  doctrine  of 
man's  natural  state  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the 
rectitude  and  goodness  of  God.  The  doctrine  is,  that 
all  men  come  into  being  in  such  a  moral  state,  that  as 
soon  as  they  are  capable  they  will  certainly  and  uni- 
formly sin,  or  that  their  moral  affections  and  actions 
will  all  be  wrong,  unless  they  are  regenerated  by  the 
Holy  Spirit ;  and  that  they  are  thus  constituted  sin- 
ners by  the  one  offence  of  their  first  father.  Now  in 
what  respects  does  this  doctrine  appear  inconsistent 
with  the  perfections  of  God  ?  What  are  the  particu- 
lar difficulties  which  attend  it  in  relation  to  the  divine 
character  and  government  ?  It  is  said  that  the  doc- 
trine seems  to  imply  that  God  is  pleased  with  sin  and 
misery,  inasmuch  as  he  brings  men  into  being  in 
such  a  state,  that  they  will  all  certainly  sin,  and  so 
expose  themselves  to  endless  misery. 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  l25 

Reply.  This  difficulty  may  be  merely  apparent, 
arising  from  our  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  case.  It 
may  be  that  if  we  could  have  a  perfect  view  of  the 
subject,  as  God  has,  we  should  be  satisfied  at  once 
that  no  such  difficulty  exists.  We  must  be  careful 
then  not  to  make  too  much  of  appearances,  especially 
seeing  that  we  have  so  often  found  them  fallacious. 
But  let  us  inquire  a  little  as  to  the  fact.  Are  there 
sufficient  reasons  to  satisfy  us  that  God  is  not  pleased 
with  sin  ?  Here  the  Scripture  affords  the  clearest 
possible  intructions.  God  in  his  commands  forbids  all 
sin  and  requires  all  that  is  opposite ;  thus  expressing 
his  feelings  perfectly  as  to  sin  and  holiness,  and 
showing  that  he  hates  the  one  and  loves  the  other. 
His  law  too  contains  sanctions.  He  promises  tokens 
of  his  approbation  to  those  w^ho  avoid  sin,  and  threat- 
ens tokens  of  his  disapprobation  to  those  who  commit 
it.  Besides  this,  he  expressly  declares  that  sin  is  the 
abominable  thing  which  his  soul  hateth ;  and  the 
whole  course  of  his  providence,  from  the  beginning  of 
the  world  to  the  present  moment,  has  shown  his  per- 
fect abhorrence  of  sin  and  his  love  of  holiness.  The 
very  constitution  of  our  minds  shows  this.  The 
whole  work  of  redemption  shows  it.  The  judgment 
day  and  the  retributions  of  eternity  will  show  it. 
The  evidence  of  God's  hatred  of  sin  is  exceedingly 
and  indescribably  great,  so  that  all  sinners  have  the 
greatest  possible  reason  to  tremble  in  view  of  his  indig- 
nation and  wrath  against  sin.  We  certainly  know 
then  that  God  is  so  far  from  being  pleased  with  sin. 


126  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

that  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  that  he  hates 
so  much.  And  as  to  suffering,  he  inflicts  it  as  an 
expression  of  his  displeasure  against  sin.  Were  it  not 
for  sin  there  would  be  no  misery. 

What  now  is  the  use  of  these  remarks  in  relation 
to  the  difficulty  before  us  ?  It  is  this.  As  we  have 
the  clearest  possible  evidence  that  God  hates  sin,  we 
are  sure  the  fact  of  our  depravity  must  be  consistent 
with  his  hatred  of  sin.  As  both  are  obviously  and 
certainly  true,  we  know  they  are  consistent  with 
each  other ;  and  the  difficulty  above  supposed  is  imag- 
inary. 

Again ;  it  is  said  that  the  doctrine  of  natural  deprav- 
ity is  inconsistent  with  the  betievolence  of  God.  Be- 
nevolence seeks  to  do  good  ;  it  aims  at  the  happiness 
of  intelligent  beings.  How  then  can  it  be  reconciled 
with  benevolence  in  God,  that  he  should  bring  a 
whole  race  of  intelligent  creatures  into  existence  in 
a  state  which  will  be  certainly  followed  with  their 
disobedience  and  their  consequent  punishment  ?  For 
God  voluntarily  to  give  them  existence  in  such 
circumstances,  would  seem  wholly  incompatible  with 
benevolence. 

Reply.  The  alleged  inconsistency  between  our 
natural  depravity  and  God's  benevolence  may  be 
merely  in  appearance.  When  we  arrive  at  that 
degree  of  intelligence  which  will  qualify  us  to  judge 
correctly  on  this  subject,  we  may  see  with  perfect 
satisfaction  that  these  two  things,  which  now  seem  to 
be  inconsistent,  are  perfectly  consistent.     It  may  be 


OBJECTtONS    examine!).  127 

that  angels  and  saints  in  heaven  see  this  now.  And 
it  may  be  that  some  men  of  illuminated  minds  and 
purified  hearts  on  earth  see  it  too.  And  all  who  have 
divine  teaching  may  hereafter  obtain  such  clear  and 
extensive  knowledge,  that  they  will  be  so  far  from 
thinking  the  fallen,  depraved  state  of  man  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  benevolence  of  God,  that  they 
will  look  upon  it  in  its  bearings  and  results,  as  afford- 
ing the  brightest  illustration  of  that  benevolence. 
This  is  a  most  delightful  thought  to  those  who  sin- 
cerely desire  to  know  the  truth  and  are  pressing  after 
higher  and  better  views  of  it.  The  time  will  come 
when  we  shall  have  those  higher  and  better  views. 
Present  difficulties  will  vanish.  We  shall  behold  in 
noon-day  brightness  the  excellence  of  God's  character 
and  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  all  his  dispensations. 
And  we  shall  look  back  with  shame  upon  the  igno- 
rance to  which  we  are  now  subject,  and  the  mistakes 
into  which  we  are  now  continually  falling.  To  a 
mind  laboring  in  the  dark  in  regard  to  many  impor- 
tant subjects,  it  is  a  mighty  relief  to  dwell  upon  such 
a  reflection  as  this.  The  certain  expectation  of  clearer 
light,  and  the  habit  of  anticipating  it,  may  have 
an  influence  upon  us  in  some  respects  like  what 
we  should  experience  if  we  actually  possessed  that 
light. 

But  there  is  another  view  to  be  taken  of  this  difii- 
culty.  As  the  benevolence  of  God  is  the  benevolence 
of  the  Creator  and  Governour  of  the  universe,  it  must 
have  respect  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole  creation,  and 


128  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

must  have  respect  to  this,  not  only  for  the  present  time^ 
but  through  all  future  time.  The  benevolence  of 
God,  considered  in  this  large  sense,  which  is  the  only 
just  sense  in  which  the  benevolence  of  such  a  being 
can  be  considered,  cannot  be  satisfied  with  any  meas- 
ure because  it  would  be  beneficial  in  its  influence  on 
a  small  part  of  the  creation,  unless  at  the  same  time 
the  welfare  of  the  whole  would  -be  promoted,  and 
promoted  in  the  highest  degree  and  in  the  best  man- 
ner. And  if  the  highest  welfare  of  the  whole  intelli- 
gent creation  through  all  ages  to  come  requires  an 
arrangement  less  favorable  to  some  part  of  the  creation, 
or,  for  the  present,  less  favorable  to  the  whole,  than 
some  other  arrangement  might  be ;  that  arrangement 
will  certainly  be  chosen  by  a  God  of  love.  Clearly  if 
God  is  the  guardian  of  the  interests  of  that  universe 
which  he  has  created  and  which  he  has  destined  to 
exist  forever,  his  benevolence  will  lead  him  to  adopt 
those  measures  which  he  knows  to  be  most  beneficial 
to  those  great  interests,  though  not  beneficial  in  the 
highest  conceivable  degree  to  the  interests  of  a  par- 
ticular part.  This  however  does  not  imply  that  God 
ever  adopts  a  measure  which  is  unjust  to  a  part,  in 
order  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  whole.  Far  other- 
wise. The  supposition  is  impious.  Can  such  a  Being 
as  God  do  an  act  of  injustice?  The  supposition  is 
absurd  too.  God's  kingdom  is  a  moral  kingdom.  It 
is  placed  under  a  moral  law.  That  law  requires 
holiness  and  justice  and  truth,  and  forbids  the  con- 
trary.    And  the  welfare  of  the  universe  is  made  to 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  129 

depend  on  the  manifested  glory  of  God,  and  on  the 
supp.ort  which  he  gives  to  his  just  and  holy  law. 
Now  to  suppose  that  God  will  do  an  act  of  injustice  to 
a  part  of  his  kingdom  for  the  good  of  the  whole,  is  in 
reaHty  to  suppose  that  he  will  promote  the  good  of  the 
whole  by  injuring  the  whole.  For  God  to  do  an  act 
of  injustice  would  be  to  countenance  the  principle  of 
injustice.  This  would  destroy  his  character.  And 
the  destruction  of  his  character  would  be  the  destruc- 
tion of  his  kingdom.  His  glorious  character,  displayed 
in  a  righteous  and  benevolent  law  and  administration, 
is  the  grand  and  only  security  to  the  interests  of  his 
kingdom.  It  estabhshes  the  principles  of  his  moral 
government,  and  binds  his  subjects  to  him  and  to  one 
another.  That  glorious  character  injured,  and  the 
universe  is  undone.  I  say  tlierefore,  it  is  the  greatest 
absurdity  to  suppose  that  God,  by  an  act  of  injustice 
even  to  the  meanest  of  his  subjects,  should  injure  that 
great  interest  which  he  aims  to  promote,  and  that  he 
should  injure  it  for  the  sake  of  projnoting  it.  The 
view  which  I  take  of  the  subject  is  this.  The  only 
wise  God,  acting  as  the  guardian  of  the  universe, 
adopts  those  just  and  righteous  measures  which  he 
sees  will  be  most  beneficial  to  the  whole,  though  they 
may  bring  less  good  to  a  part  than  some  other  meas- 
ures. Thus  he  places  a  part,  perhaps  even  the  greater 
part  of  our  race,  in  circumstances  less  favorable  to  their 
happiness,  than  other  circumstances  would  have  been. , 
But  he  does  them  no  injustice.  He  violates  no  obli- 
gation, not  even  the  obligation  of  infinite  benevolence. 
12 


130  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

The  acts  of  his  goodness  towards  them  are  constant 
and  numberless ;  and  they  have  reason  to  thank  and 
love  and  obey  him  with  all  their,  hearts  forever.  And 
yet  it  is  a  fact  well  known  and  acknowledged,  that  the 
circumstances  in  which  God  has  placed  them  are  less 
favorable  to  their  present  and  eternal  happiness,  than 
some  other  circumstances  might  have  been.  Now  the 
all-wise  God,  as  the  God  of  the  universe,  adopts  such 
a  measure,  (it  being  in  all  respects  just  and  righteous,) 
because  he  sees  that  it  will  ultimately  be  more  condu- 
cive to  the  welfare  of  the  whole,  than  another  measure 
which  would  be  more  advantageous  to  a  part,  but  less 
advantageous  to  the  whole.  And  this  is  only  saying, 
that  God,  being  infinitely  benevolent,  prefers  a  greater 
amount  of  happiness  in  his  kingdom  to  a  less.  This 
exercise  of  God's  sovereign  wisdom  respects  a  great 
part  of  his  own  acts  as  God  of  the  universe. 

The  sum  of  my  remarks,  as  they  respect  the  pres- 
ent subject,  is  this.  If  God  saw  that  such  a  constitu- 
tion of  things  as  this,  namely,  that  all  mankind,  in 
consequence  of  the  transgression  of  their  common 
father,  should  be  constituted  sinners,  and  should  have 
their  moral  existence  from  the  first  in  a  state  of 
depravity ;  if  he  saw  that  such  a  constitution  would 
be  just  and  suitable  as  a  part  of  his  universal  system, 
and  would  on  the  whole  be  beneficial  in  its  influence 
upon  the  great  interests  of  his  kingdom ;  it  was  not 
only  consistent  with  benevolence,  but  was  what  be- 
nevolence required,  that  he  should  adopt  such  a 
constitution.     If  any  one  asks  what  proof  we  have 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  131 

that  God  actually  viewed  such  a  constitution  in  such  a 
light ;  I  answer,  we  have  the  best  proof,  namely,  that 
he  has  actually  adopted  it. 

We  see  here  what  is  incumbent  on  those  who 
assert  that  man's  existing  in  a  depraved  ruined  state 
is  inconsistent  with  the  benevolence  of  God.  To 
support  their  allegation,  they  must  prove  that  the  fact 
of  man's  depravity,  considered  as  involved  in  God's 
universal  system,  will  not  be  made  to  promote  his 
glory  and  the  ultimate'  good  of  his  creation.  This  is 
what  they  assert ;  and  this  is  what  they  ought  to 
prove.  And  as  it  is  a  very  serious  matter,  they  ought 
to  prove  it  by  clear  and  conclusive  evidence.  We 
allow  the  fact  of  man's  sinfulness  to  be,  in  itself j 
altogether  and  in  the  highest  degree  undesirable  and 
deplorable.  And  we  look  upon  the  consequences  of 
the  fact,  namely,  the  endless  misery  of  such  a  mul- 
titude of  rational  beings,  with  grief  and  horror.  But 
we  hold  that  all  this  evil  has  been  and  will  be  so 
overruled  by  the  Almighty  Governour  of  the  w^orld, 
that  it  will  be  the  occasion  of  making  the  brightest 
displays  of  his  glorious  attributes,  and  of  promoting, 
in  a  degree  not  to  be  measured  by  finite  minds,  the 
blessedness  of  his  moral  empire.  Those  who  bring 
the  objection  above  named,  must  prove  that  sin  will 
not  be  overruled  in  this  manner.  For  if  God  does 
thus  overrule  it  for  good,  his  benevolence  cannot  be 
impeached  ;  and  so  the  objection  falls  to  the  ground. 

The  other  principal  objection  is,  that  God's  bring- 
ing us  into  existence  in  such  a  state  as  the  common 


132  OBJECTIONS  EXAMINED. 

doctrine  implies,  is  mconsistent  loith  our  heiJig 
fnoral,  accountable  agents^  a?id  so  inconsistent  luith 
the  Scripture  doctrine  of  a  just  and  impartial 
retribution. 

But  I  ask,  how  or  in  what  manner  is  it  inconsis- 
tent? First;  how  is  it  inconsistent  with  7noral 
agency  7  Is  it  the  fact  of  our  beirig  sinners^  that  is 
thought  to  be  inconsistent  with  moral  agency  ?  But 
how  strange  a  supposition  is  this,  when  our  being 
sinners  is  one  of  the  ways  in  which  our  moral  agency 
is  exhibited.  To  suppose  that  we  are  sinners  without 
being  moral  agents^  is  the  same  as  to  suppose  that 
we  are  sinners  wdthout  being  sinners.  Sinners  are 
had  moral  agents^  —  moral  agents  of  a  wrong  char- 
acter. They  are  agents  certainly ;  and  they  are 
moral  agents,  because  they  have  sin  ;  for  sin  can  be 
attributed  only  to  a  moral  agent. 

Is  it  then  the  fact  of  our  being  sinners  from  the 
beginning  of  our  rational^  moral  existence,  that 
is  thought  to  be  inconsistent  with  moral  agency? 
But  why  is  it  any  more  inconsistent  with  moral 
agency  for  a  man  to  be  a  sinner  at  the  very  com- 
mencement of  his  existence,  than  at  any  subsequent 
period?  It  is  substantially  the  same  thing  to  be  a 
sinner  at  one  time  as  at  another.  And  he  who  is  the 
subject  of  sin,  whether  it  be  at  one  period  of  his  exist-^ 
ence  or  at  another,  is  truly  a  moral  agent.  If  sin 
exists,  it  must  begin  to  exist  either  at  the  commence- 
ment of  our  being  or  at  some  subsequent  time.  And 
the  only  difference  between  its  commencement  at  one 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  133 

time  and  another,  must  respect  its  particular  form  and 
degree.  If  sin  takes  place  when  the  rational  and 
moral  powers  are  in  a  low  and  feeble  state,  it  will 
exist  in  a  low  degree,  and  in  a  form  corresponding 
with  the  state  of  the  mind.  If  it  takes  place  after- 
wards, when  the  powers  of  the  mind  are  increased, 
its  form  and  degree  will  be  altered,  so  as  to  be  still 
correspondent  with  the  state  of  the  mental  faculties. 

Does  any  one  say,  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  very 
nature  of  sin,  that  it  "should  exist  at  the  beginning  of 
our  existence?  I  ask,  why?  The  answer  of  Dr 
John  Taylor  and  others  is,  that  the  first  existence  of 
sin  must  be  the  consequence  or  result  of  the  actual 
exercise  of  our  moral  powers  for  some  time  ;  in  other 
words,  that  a  person  must  produce  sin  in  himself,  or 
make  himself  a  sinner,  by  his  own  previous  deter- 
minations and  voluntary  actions. 

This  view  of  the  subject  we  are  now  to  examine. 
The  supposition  is,  that  a  person,  in  the  first  instance, 
makes  himself  a  sinner,  or  produces  in  himself  the 
very  commencement  of  sin,  hy  voluntary  determin- 
ations and  acts;  which  determinations  and  acts 
must  of  course  precede  the  existence  of  the  sin  which 
they  produce.  Now  it  is  a  clear  case  that  these  pre- 
vious determinations  and  acts  must  be  either  right  or 
wrong, — either  holy  or  sinful,  —  or  else  they  must 
be  indifferent,  that  is,  neither  right  nor  wrong,  and 
so  not  moral  acts.  If  the  previous  acts  are  what  they 
ought  to  be,  i.  e.  right ;  then  we  have  the  strange 
*12 


134  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

supposition,  that  the  right  voHtions  and  actions  of  a 
moral  agent  produce  what  is  wrong  ;  that  his  hoHness 
produces  sin  ;  that  the  consequence  of  his  wilhng  and 
acting  right  is  that  he  becomes  a  sinner.  If  this  is 
the  fact,  then,  how  is  a  man  culpable  for  becoming  a 
sinner,  seeing  that  all  those  determinations  and  actions 
of  his  which  produce  sin,  are  right?  According  to 
this  notion,  what  assurance  could  we  have  that  any 
being  will  not  soon  corrupt  himself  and  make  himself 
a  sinner  by  acting  right!  Indeed  why  would  it  not 
on  this  supposition  be  true,  that  the  sure  way  for  a 
a  man  to  produce  sin  in  his  own  heart,  is  to  do  just 
what  is  right?  A  wonderful  motive  truly  to  the 
exercise  of  holiness. 

Take  then  the  other  supposition  ;  viz. ;  that  a  per- 
son produces  in  himself  the  commencement  of  moral 
evil,  or  makes  himself  a  sinner  in  the  first  instance, 
by  previous  volitions  and  actions  which  are  wrong. 
According  to  this,  a  person  has  wrong  exercises,  and 
has  them  voluntarily,  before  he  has  any  thing  wrong ; 
exercises  which  are  sinful,  before  he  has  any  sin. 
But  how  long  must  sinful  volitions  and  acts  be  con- 
tinued in  a  person  in  order  to  his  beginning  to  have 
sin?-  How  long  must  he  be  a  sinner  in  order  to 
become  a  sinner?  Doubtless  the  sinful  exercises 
which  precede  the  first  existence  of  sin,  occupy  time. 
How  long  must  that  time  be  ?  But  enough  of  this. 
Any  man  who  will  accustom  himself  to  reason  cor- 
rectly, will  see  the  gross  absurdity  of  the  supposition 


OBJECTIONS  EXAMINED.  135 

above  made.  Sin  is  not  the  product  or  effect  of  wrong 
exercises  of  mind,  but  lies  in  them.  They  themselves 
are  sin. 

The  only  supposition  which  remains  for  one  who 
holds  the  above  named  opinion  is,  that  a  person 
makes  himself  a  sinner  or  produces  sin  in  himself,  by 
volitions  and  acts  which  are  itidifferejit, —  neither 
holy  nor  sinful. 

Now  inasmuch  as  the  person  supposed  is  a  moral 
agent,  and  inasmuch  tis  he  wills  and  acts  in  this  case 
with  reference  to  moral  objects ;  how  happens  it  that 
his  volitions  and  acts  are  not  of  a  moral  nature?  Is 
it  because  at  the  time  he  is  not  capable  of  good  or 
evil,  and  so  is  not  accountable  for  his  actions  ?  It 
would  then  come  to  this,  that  before  a  person  is  a 
moral  agent,  i.  e.  while  he  is  incapable  of  good  or  evil, 
and  so  not  accountable  for  his  actions,  he  does  that 
which  corrupts  his  heart  and  makes  him  a  sinner. 
And  here  one  might  naturally  ask,  whether  it  would 
not  be  a  strange  constitution  of  heaven,  that  such 
amazing  consequences,  —  consequences  affecting  our 
immortal  condition,  should  depend  on  our  conduct 
before  we  are  capable  of  doing  either  right  or  wrong? 
According  to  this  supposition,  things  are  so  arranged 
by  our  Creator  that  we  destroy  ourselves  by  our 
actions,  before  we  are  moral  agents. 

But  w^e  must  look  at  this  matter  a  little  farther.  A 
person  now  puts  forth  acts  which  are  in  no  respect 
wrong,  as  he  is  not  capable  of  any  thing  wrong,  not 
being  a  moral  agent.     But  these  indifferent  actions,  — 


136 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 


actions  wholly  blameless.  —  are  soon  to  result  in  sin,  a 
thing  which  belongs  to  a  moral  agent.  Now  by  what 
process  or  in  what  manner  does  he  become  a  mora\ 
agent  ^  And  how  does  it  happen  that  he  becomes 
so  just  at  this  time?  Do  those  indifferent,  blameless 
actions  which  produce  sin,  produce  moral  agency  too? 
And  if  so,  how  does  it  always  happen,  that  moral 
agency  and  sin  come  into  existence  precisely  at  the 
same  time  ?  Or  does  a  person  become  a  moral  agent 
a  very  little  time,  a  moment  or  so,  before  he  becomes 
a  sinner?  -Or  does  he  become  a  sinner  a  moment  or 
so  before  he  becomes  a  moral  agent  ? 

But  it  may  be  said,  there  is  no  need  of  supposing 
the  person  wholly  incapable  of  moral  agency,  nor  yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  of  supposing  that  those  voluntary 
acts  which  produce  sin,  are  really  holy  or  sinful.  They 
may  occupy  a  middle  place  between  good  and  bad ; 
and  the  person  may  somehow  be  responsible  for  them, 
though  he  is  not  responsible ;  and  through  his  own 
fault,  he  may,  before  he  sins,  do  that  which  will  result 
in  sin ;  and  so  he  may  somehow  be  culpable  for 
making  himself  a  sinner,  by  doing  that 'which  he 
does  before  he  is  a  sinner.  But  on  this  supposition, 
does  the  person  aim  at  this  result,  i.  e.  to  make  him- 
self a  sinner?  Does  he  know  what  he  is  about? 
And  does  he  mean  by  what  he  does  to  produce  sin  ? 
If  he  does,  would  not  this  be  a  sin  ?  Would  it  not 
imply  that  he  loves  and  chooses  to  be  a  sinner  ?  But 
if  he  does  not  understand  the  matter,  and  does  not 
mean  to  produce  this  result,  but  something  else,  then 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINE Di  137 

would  it  not  appear  strange  that  he  should  be  plunged 
into  a  state  of  sin  by  his  own  conduct  loilhout  his 
own  choice^  and  when  he  thought  of  no  such  thing? 

But  I  have  not  yet  done  with  the  opinion,  that  a 
person  is  culpable,  not  for  the  present  affection  or  act 
which„  is  wrong,  but  for  that  previous  voluntary 
conduct  or  free  determination  of  mind  which  produced 
that  wrong  affection  or  act.  Take  present  love  of  sin, 
or  enmity  against  God,  which  is  an  affection  of  the 
heart.  Do  you  say,  the  sinner  is  not  culpable  for 
this  affection  or  state  of  mind,  but  for  those  previous 
acts  of  mind  which  occasioned  it  ?  You  say  then, 
that  if  this  wrong  affection  should  be  the  very  first 
act  of  his  mind,  and  so  should  not  be  the  result  of  any 
previous  determinations  or  acts,  he  would  not  be  blame- 
worthy for  it.  Though  it  would  be  a  wrong  affection, 
and  might  in  a  certain  sense,  be  called  sin,  he  would 
not  be  justly  answerable  for  ii,  because  he  did  not 
produce  it  by  his  own  voluntary  agency,  or  by  the  acts 
of  his  free  will. 

Here  it  must  be  noted  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
word  will  is  often  used  in  common  discourse,  and  in 
the  sacred  Scriptures,  to  denote  the  entire  moral  facul- 
ty of  the  mind.  According  to  this  use  of  the  word, 
all  the  affections,  as  well  as  those  acts  of  the  mind 
more  appropriately  called  volitions,  are  acts  of  the  will. 
If  this  is  the  view  we  are  to  take  of  the  subject,  then 
my  question  is,  "  Why  are  we  not  answerable  for  one 
act  of  the  will  as  well  as  another  ?  —  for  the  present 
act,  as  well  as  the  previous  act  ?  "     And  then  it  would 


138  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

seem,  according  to  the  supposition  now  made,  that  we 
are  answerable  for  the  present  act  merely  because  it 
leads  to  a  subsequent  act.  If  this  is  the  case,  then 
it  would  follow,  that  the  evil  and  blame-worthiness  of 
any  affection  or  act  of  the  mind,  does  not  lie  in  the 
act  itself,  but  in  the  circumstance  that  it  tends  to 
produce  other  acts  which  are  wrong  ;  ^ — the  same 
holding  true  of  each  of  those  other  acts,  namel}'',  that 
its  blame-worthiness  lies  not  in  itself,  or  in  its  own 
nature,  but  in  the  circumstance  that  it  leads  on  to 
other  sinful  affections.  And  then,  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  this  influence  of  the  present  act  of  the  mind 
to  produce  other  acts,  is  generally,  to  say  the  least, 
not  a  matter  of  design.  Such  an  effect  is  not 
commonly  aimed  at.  In  exercising  the  present 
affection,  our  mind  has  a  particular  object  in  view. 
Towards  that  object  we  put  forth  an  act.  We  love  it 
or  hate  it.  We  have  a  desire  for  it  or  an  aversion  to 
it.  The  affection  is  very  simple,  being  a  feeUng  of 
the  mind  towards  that  object.  As  a  general  fact,  we 
have  no  other  object  in  view  ;  and  certainly  we  do  not 
commonly  consider  the  effect  of  this  present  act  upon 
future  acts  of  the  mind  ;  indeed  we  do  not  know  what 
that  effect  will  be  before  we  have  learned  it  by  ex- 
perience. And  suppose  we  have  learned  what  it  will 
be,  and  suppose  we  consider  it ;  still  that  effect  is  not 
the  thing  we  generally  aim  at ;  it  is  not  generally  our 
intention  by  this  present  affection  to  produce  other 
WTong  affections.  Thus  the  supposition  would  imply 
that  we  are  answerable  for  an  affection  or  act  of  the 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED,  139 

mind  on  account  of  a  circumstance  which  does  not  fall 
under  our  voluntary  control ;  which  generally  is  not  a 
matter  of  choice  or  intention  on  our  part,  and  which 
is  very  often  contrary  to  our  choice.  For  how  fre- 
quently is  it  the  case  with  the  sinner,  that  he  would 
be  glad  to  avoid  the  effect  of  his  present  act  upon  the 
subsequent  state  of  his  mind?  He  desires  not  that 
effect ;  he  dreads  it.  In  the  present  act  of  his  mind, 
he  hag  quite  another  object  in  view.  The  supposition 
would  therefore  make  us  answerable  for  a  circum- 
stance, (viz.  the  influence  of  our  present  affection  or 
act,)  which  does  not  depend  on  our  choice,  and  which 
is  often  contrary  to  it. 

But  why  is  it  supposed  that  we  are  answerable  for 
the  previous  act  of  mind,  and  not  for  the  present ;  and 
that  our  blame-worthiness  lies,  not  in  the  present,  but 
in  the  preceding?  Is  it  because  the  one  is  thought  to 
be  of  a  different  nature  from  the  other  ?  But  why  is 
it  thought  to  be  of  a  different  nature  ?  Suppose  the 
present  affection  of  the  mind  relates  to  the  same 
object  as  the  past.  Suppose  that  object  to  be  a  moral 
object,  and  the  feeling  of  the  mind  towards  it  to  be 
love  and  desire,  or  hatred  and  aversion.  Does  the 
circumstance  that  one  of  them  follows  the  other,  make 
any  difference  in  their  nature  ?  The  present  affection 
will  indeed  be  likely  to  be  stronger  than  the  former, 
and  if  so,  will  be  more  culpable  in  degree  ;  but  is  not 
its  nature  the  same  ?  They  are  by  supposition  both 
exercises  of  the  will,  and  so  in  the  sense  now  intended 
equally  voluntary.     Both  relate  to  the   same  object. 


140  OBJECTIONS  EXAMINED. 

The  mind  is  equally  active  in  both,  and  equally  free 
from  all  compulsory  influence.  Why  are  they  not 
both  of  the  same  nature?  And  if  so,  why  are  we  not 
as  answerable  for  one  as  for  the  other  ? 

But  the  word  ivill  is  used  in  a  more  restricted  sense, 
by  Locke  and  others.  In  this  sense  a  volition  or  an 
act  of  the  w^ill  is  that  determination  of  the  mind  which 
produces  some  bodily  act,  or  some  other  act  of  the  mind, 
and  in  which  we  actually  aim  at  that  eflfect ;  as  when 
we  will  to  move  our  limbs,  or  to  exercise  the  mind  in  a 
particular  way;  and  so  a  volition  is  distinguished  from 
the  affections  of  love,  hatred,  compassion,  (fcc.  Let  us 
examine  the  subject  wnth  this  distinction  in  view.  The 
opinion  we  are  examining  is,  that  our  blame-worthiness 
does  not  lie  in  the  present  affection,  but  in  the  previous 
volition  or  choice  which  led  to  it ;  in  other  words,  that 
we  are  not  answerable  for  the  present  wrong  affection, 
but  for  those  acts  of  our  free-wnll  by  which  we  produced 
or  excited  these  affections.     Here  I  remark, 

1.  That  volition,  in  the  sense  here  intended,  is  not 
the  cause  of  affection.  It  does  not  by  its  own  influ- 
ence produce  it.  This  is  so  obviously  true  that  no  man 
of  sound  judgment  and  experience  ever  expects  such  a 
thing,  as  to  excite  an  affection  in  his  own  mind  by  the 
direct  power  of  volition.  The  affection  is  excited,  and 
from  its  very  nature  must  be  excited,  by  a  suitable 
object  present  in  the  mind's  view,  not  by  an  act  of  the 
will  sohciting  or  requiring  it. 

2.  Volition,  in  this  restricted  sense,  is  the  conse- 
quence of  an  affection.     All  the  volitions  or  active 


OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED.  141 

choices  of  a  holy  being  respecting  God,  are  the  effect 
of  his  supreme  love  to  God  ;  and  the  direction  of  his 
voluntary  agency  in  respect  to  other  beings  arises 
from  his  love  to  them.  The  particular  volitions  or 
active  choices  of  the  selfish  and  worldly  arise  from 
their  selfish  and  worldly  affections.  They  choose  to 
do  such  and  such  things,  because  they  have  such  and 
such  dispositions  of  mind.  Now  as  the  affections  are 
the  source  of  particular  volitions,  we  should  naturally 
conclude  that  the  affections  themselves  are  blame- 
worthy, rather  than  the  volitions  which  flow  from 
them. 

3.  Supposing  these  affections  to  be  in  some  way 
produced  by  the  previous  volitions,  still  what  is  there 
in  those  volitions  which  should  make  us  answerable 
for  them,  more  than  for  the  affections  which  are  sup- 
posed to  be  thus  connected  with  them?  What  is  there 
either  in  the  nature  or  circumstances  of  those  acts 
of  the  mind,  which  should  render  us  praise- worthy 
or  blame-worthy  for  them,  more  than  for  these?  It 
cannot  be  said  that  we  have  less  agency  in  the  affec- 
tions than  in  what  are  more  appropriately  called 
volitions.  Nothing  can  be  conceived  in  which  our 
minds  are  more  truly  active,  or  active  in  a  higher 
degree,  than  in  love,  desire,  hatred,  revenge,  &c.  Nor 
can  it  be  said  that  the  volitions  are  more  voluntary 
than  the  affections.  The  word  voluntary  is  most 
properly  applied  to  that  which  is  the  effect  of  choice^ 
or  which  takes  place  in  consequence  of  a  volition. 
Now  in  this  sense  the  affections  are  not  strictly 
13 


142  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

voluntary;  i.  e.  they  do  not  take  place  as  imme- 
diate effects  or  consequences  of  volition ;  they  do  not 
rise  in  the  mind  in  direct  obedience  to  an  act  of  the 
will.  When  writers  call  the  affections  voluntary^  it 
is  because  they  do  not  make  the  distinction  above 
noticed  between  the  affections  and  volitions,  but 
regard  them  all  as  acts  of  the  will.  Accordingly 
when  they  call  the  affections  voluntary,  they  do  not 
mean  to  imply  that  they  are  consequent  upon  an  act 
of  the  will,  but  that  they  are  themselves  acts  of  the 
will.  If  regarded  in  this  light,  the  affections  are  as 
voluntary  as  volitions,  both  being  acts  of  the  will. 
Volitions  are  not  voluntary  in  the  other  sense,  which 
in  metaphysical  discourse  I  consider  the  proper  sense  of 
the  word ;  i.  e.  they  do  not  flow  from  a  previous  act  of 
the  will,  but  from  the  influence  of  those  inducements 
or  motives  under  which  the  mind  is  placed.  Taking 
the  word  therefore  in  either  sense,  we  find  the  affec- 
tions no  less  voluntary  than  the  volitions.  Why  then 
are  we  not  as  responsible  for  them  ?  I  say  this  with 
reference  to  those  who  suppose  every  thing  for  which 
we  are  accountable  to  be  voluntary. 

I  have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  expose  the 
opinion  we  have  been  considering  as  Edwards  does, 
in  his  work  on  the  Will,  by  showing  that,  if  adopted, 
it  would  exclude  all  virtue  and  vice  from  the  world. 
His  reasoning  on  this  subject  is  a  very  striking  exam- 
ple of  the  reductio  ad  absurdum.  No  one  can  resist 
the  force  of  his  argument  in  any  other  way  than  by 
refusing  to  consider  it. 


OBJECTIONS  EXAMINED.  143 

But  I  have  still  another  inquiry.  Is  not  the  mind 
as  much  the  author  of  the  affections  as  of  the  voli- 
tions ?  And  does  it  not  as  truly  originate  them  ?  I 
introduce  this  question  for  the  sake  of  those  who  dwell 
much  upon  the  idea  that  a  man  must  be  the  author  of 
his  own  actions  in  order  to  be  accountable. 

This  question  I  think  may  be  quickly  answered. 
If  by  being  the  author  or  originator  of  its  affections,  is 
meant  that  the  mind  really  exercises  them,  or  that 
they  are  truli/  and  perfectly  the  acts  of  the  mind; 
then  the  mind  is  evidently  the  author  or  originator  of 
all  its  affections  as  well  as  its  volitions.  But  if  by 
originating  our  affections  or  volitions,  is  meant  that 
we  produce  them,  or  bring  them  into  being,  by 
another  act  of  the  mind,  —  or  by  any  thing  in  the 
mind  distinct  from  its  affections  or  volitions;  then  I 
contend  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  our 
consciousness,  which  can  furnish  the  least  evidence 
that  we  do  originate  our  affections  or  volitions.  We__ 
are  conscious  of  the  a£j|^q£_ouujxuiid,_ajidj;ifjiot^ 
else.  These  acts  of  the  mind  have  indeed  important 
mutual  relations  ;  but  as  to  the  affections,  it  is  not  a 
fact  that  they  are  produced  by  other  mental  acts. 
The  mind,  in  the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  placed, 
exercises  or  puts  forth  its  affections  ;  in  view  of  proper 
objects  or  motives  it  acts  in  the  way  of  loving,  hating, 
<fcc.  This  is  the  whole  history  of  the  case,  The  mind' 
exists  as  an  agent,  rational,  free,  mora].  Under  the 
influence  of  its  various  circumstances,  i.  e.  the  objects 
or  inducements  presented  before  it,  it  acts  as  it  does. 


'f'i 


144  OBJECTIONS    EXAMINED. 

This  is  all  that  any  man  ever  observed  in  himself  or 
witnessed  in  others  or  read  in  history  ;  and  all  which 
any  man  can  conceive. 

We  have  now  examined  the  position  of  Dr.  John 
Taylor,  Dr.  Ware  and  others,  that  the  first  existence 
of  sin  must  be  the  result  of  previous  voluntary  deter- 
minations or  acts  of  the  will,  and  accordingly  that  it 
is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  sin  that  it  should 
exist  at  the  beginning  of  our  existence ;  and  we  have 
found  this  position  liable  to  objections  in  every  point  of 
view.  The  fact  is,  that  moral  good  and  evil,  virtue 
and  vice,  lie  in  the  affections  or  mental  acts  them- 
selves, considered  in  their  own  nature.  It  were  easy 
to  prove  that  this  is  the  case,  and  that  on  any  other 
principle  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  virtue  or  vice, 
hoUness  or  sin,  in  the  universe.  But  this  has  been  so 
fully  proved  by  Edwards  and  others,  and  is  indeed  so 
perfectly  obvious  to  our  own  consciences,  that  I  shall 
take  it  as  a  settled  matter.  Here  then  we  come  to  the 
,  conclusion  of  our  reasoning  on  this  point.  As  soon  as 
/  a  rational  being  has  a  disposition  or  affection  which  is 
of  a  moral  nature,  he  is  holy  or  sinful.  Whatever 
may  be  the  antecedents  or  circumstances,  the  occasions 
or  excitements  of  his  disposition  or  affection,  he  is 
worthy  of  praise  or  blame  as  soon  as  he  has  it.  At 
its  very  first  existence  it  is  in  itself  right  or  wrong. 
If  it  is  love  to  God  or  benevolence  to  man,  it  is  right, 
and  he  who  has  it  is  virtuous  and  praise- worthy.  If  it 
is  enmity  to  God  or  selfishness,  it  is  wrong,  and  he  who 
has  it  is  culpable.     And  a  person  is  as  truly  worthy  of 


STATE    OF   THE    INFANT    MIND.  145 

praise  or  blame  for  the  first  moral  disposition  or  affec- 
tion, as  he  can  be  for  any  subsequent  one ;  because  it 
is  of  the  same  nature.  Following  affections  may  be 
increased  in  strength,  and  circumstances  may  attend 
them  which  render  them  culpable  in  a  higher  degree. 
But  the  first  affection  being  of  the  same  nature,  is 
as  truly  culpable  as  any  following  affections.  The 
fact  of  its  being  first  makes  no  alteration  in  regard 
to  its  desert.  So  that  the  doctrine  of  man's  native 
depravity,  or  his  sinfulness  from  the  beginning  of  his 
moral  existence,  is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  the 
nature  of  sin. 


CHAPTER    yi^l'XtX^J  &/r~    /, 

State  of  the  infant  mind.  Considerations  in  faror  of  supposing  that  an  infant  is 
incapable  of  moral  affections,  not  conclusive.  Reasons  in  favor  of  the  contrary 
supposition. 

One  of  the  remaining  topics  which  calls  for  a  brief 
consideration,  is  the  state  of  the  infant  mind.  It 
seems  to  be  frequently  taken  for  granted  that  the  mind 
of  an  infant  is  incapable  of  any  moral  affections,  and 
of  course  incapable  of  being  in  any  proper  sense 
sinful  or  depraved.  Many  who  profess  to  l)elieve  the 
doctrine  of  native  depravity,  understand  the  subject  in 
this  light,  and  accordingly  do  not  consider  real,  per- 
sonal sin  as  commencing  immediately  after  birth.^ 
They  do  not  indeed  undertake  to  say  when  the  infant 
child  begins  to  exist  as  a  moral  agent.  And  they 
believe  that  sin  commences  as  soon  as  moral  agency, 
*13 


146  STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND. 

But  their  opinion  after  all  seems  to  be,  that  neither  sin 
nor  moral  agency  commences  either  at  the  commence- 
ment of  human  existence,  or  at  any  time  very  near 
it.  In  regard  to  stich  a  subject  as  this,  it  becomes  me 
to  speak  with  modesty,  and  carefully  to  guard  against 
attempting  to  be  wise  above  what  is  written.  But 
while  I  would  not  take  upon  me  to  assert  the  truth  of 
any  metaphysical  theory  as  to  the  commence  of  sin 
in  the  human  mind,  I  shall  freely  inquire  whether  the 
opinion  above  stated  is  supported  by  any  sufficient 
reasons. 

In  my  opinion  there  are  no  arguments  which  prove 
clearly  and  satisfactorily  that  the  infant  mind  is 
incapable  of  moral  emotions ;  and  of  course  no  one 
has  a  right  to  take  it  for  granted  that  it  is  so,  or  to 
proceed  in  his  reasoning  on  this  assumption. 

I  shall  here  just  touch  upon  the  reasons  which  I 
suppose  generally  lead  men  to  entertain  the  opinion 
referred  to,  and  shall  endeavour  to  show  that  they  are 
not  conclusive. 

1.  The  fact  that  moral  affection  is  not  apparent 
at  the  beginning  of  human  existence  is  no  certain 
proof  that  it  does  not  exist.  Suppose  moral  evil  does 
really  exist  in  the  mind  from  the  beginning  of  hfe ; 
still  the  infant  could  not  make  it  visible  before  arriving 
at  such  bodily  and  mental  improvement  and  activity 
as  to  be  able  to  make  known  inward  feeling  by 
significant  outward  signs.  And  this  evidently  requires 
a  considerable  time.  We  often  see  in  a  little  child  a 
severe  effort  to  express  some  strong  emotion  struggling 


STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND.  147 

within,  before  he  has  the  power  to  express  it.  The 
fact  that  it  is  not  expressed  by  outward  signs,  is  cer- 
tainly no  proof  that  it  does  not  exist. 

2.  The  incapacity  of  the  infant  child  to  receive 
particular  instruction  from  parents  and  others 
respecting  moral  and  religious  subjects,  is  no  certain 
proof  that  he  is  incapable  of  moral  feehng.  The 
very  constitution  of  his  mind,  the  "law  written  on 
his  heart,"  may,  without  any  instruction  from  others, 
render  him  capable  of  moral  feeling.  Without  any 
particular  instruction,  some  objects  may  be  perceived, 
or  some  things  may  take  place  inwardly,  which  will 
call  forth  certain  emotions ;  and  these  emotions, 
though  existing  only  in  their  incipient  state  and  in 
an  exceedingly  low  degree,  may  be  of  such  a  kind  as 
to  be  the  elements  of  moral  character.  No  one  is 
authorized  to  say  that  the  infant  mind  cannot  have 
such  emotions  because  it  is  capable  of  no  instruction 
from  without.  Indeed  the  elements  of  knowledge 
must  of  necessity  exist  in  the  mind,  before  it  can 
receive  instruction.  Instruction  on  intellectual  sub- 
jects does  not  originate  the  first  intellectual  acts,  but 
presupposes  them,  refers  to  them,  and  makes  use  of 
them.  The  same  is  true  of  moral  instruction.  It 
does  not  originate  the  first  moral  emotions,  nor  com- 
municate the  first  moral  perceptions;  but  evidently 
proceeds  on  the  supposition  that  they  already  exist. 
And  it  is  of  no  small  consequence  that  we  should 
remember  this,  and  should  well  consider  what  place 
our  agency  holds  in  the  instruction  we  give  in  early 


148       STATE  OF  THE  INFANT  MIND. 

life.  Much  is  to  be  done  in  the  mind  before  our  work 
can  begin.  There  must  be  various  intellectual  and 
moral  acts  as  elements  of  knowledge,  as  materials  for 
us  to  operate  upon.  Surely  then  we  cannot  prove 
that  an  infant  child  has  no  moral  emotions,  because 
he  is  incapable  of  receiving  instruction  from  human 
teachers.  He  has  not  yet  learned  the  use  of  words, 
nor  the  meaning  of  other  signs,  and  so  cannot  receive 
knowledge  through  the  medium  of  words  or  other 
signs.  But  his  mind  itself,  though  not  capable  of 
receiving  instruction  in  these  ways,  may  be  capable 
of  intellectual  perceptions,  and  consequently  of  moral 
emotions  in  regard  to  the  objects  perceived  ;  and  as 
these  intellectual  perceptions  are  the  elements  of 
knowledge,  the  moral  emotions  attending  them  are 
the  elements  of  moral  character. 

3.  Our  not  being  able  ^to  recollect  that  we  had 
moral  affections  in  our  infancy,  is  no  certain  proof 
that  we  had  none.  T!;io  recollection  of  those  acts  of 
our  mind  which  took  place  in  past  time,  depends 
much  on  the  strength  which  our  mental  faculties  had 
at  the  time  when  the  acts  took  place.  The  mind 
must  make  considerable  improvement  and  acquire  a 
considerable  measure  of  strength,  before  it  can  retain 
the  impression  of  its  thoughts  and  feehngs  for  any 
length  of  time.  A  little  child  often  has  a  memory 
sufficient  to  recall  his  mental  acts  for  a  few  minutes  or 
hours ;  and  yet  those  acts  may  entirely  escape  his 
recollection  in  after  time.  Who  has  power  to  count 
up  the  number  of  thoughts  and  feehngs  which  a  child 


STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND.  149 

evidently  has  in  that  early  period  of  Hfe,  to  which  his 
memory  afterwards  never  can  reach?  Certainly  it  can 
be  no  sufficient  proof  of  our  not  having  had  moral 
affections  in  infancy,  that  we  cannot  now  recollect 
them.  If  this  want  of  recollection  is  a  proof  that  we 
had  no  moral  affections  in  infancy,  why  is  it  not 
equally  a  proof  that  we  had  none  in  childhood  for  two 
or  three  years  7  Generally  we  can  no  more  recollect 
any  acts  of  our  mind  which  took  place  during  the 
second  year  of  our  hfe,  than  the  second  month  or 
day.  Evidently  then  we  may  have  had  moral  affec- 
tions from  the  commencement  of  life  notwithstanding 
our  inability  to  recall  them.  When  we  had  them,  we 
may  have  had  a  consciousness  of  them  proportional 
to  their  strength.  But  now  we  can  no  more  recollect 
that  consciousness,  than  the  affections  to  which  it 
related. 

4.  The  circumstance  that  an  infant  child  has  no 
explicit,  formal  knowledge  of  God^s  law,  is  no 
proof  that  he  is  incapable  of  moral  affections.  A 
child  is  without  such  knowledge  till  he  becomes  capa- 
ble of  receiving  religious  instruction.  But  how  can 
he  receive  instruction  before  he  has  learned  the  use  of 
language  and  other  signs  through  which  instruction  is 
communicated?  No  one  can  suppose  that  a  child 
ordinarily  obtains  any  definite  and  correct  ideas  of 
God  and  his  law  during  the  first  two  years  of  his  life. 
But  it  cannot  surely  be  thought  that  a  child  ordinarily 
lives  two  years  without  any  wrong  feehngs.  It  is 
often  the  case  that  the  minds  of  children  are  wholly 


150  STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND. 

neglected,  and  that  they  continue  for  a  long  time  in 
ignorance  of  the  character  and  law  of  God  ;  or  if 
they  have  any  impressions  made  on  their  minds 
respecting  these  subjects,  the  impressions  are  very 
erroneous.  But  who  supposes  that  children,  during 
all  the  years  of  their  ignorance  and  error,  are  incapa- 
ble of  any  feehngs  either  right  or  wrong  ?  And  how 
is  it  with  those  who  are  brought  up  in  heathen  dark- 
ness, and  have  no  proper  conceptions  of  God  and  his 
law  ?  The  Apostle  tells  us,  "  they  are  a  law  to  them- 
selves," that  "  they  have  the  law  written  on  their 
hearts,"  i.  e.  they  have  the  principles  of  law  imprinted 
on  their  minds :  they  have  moral  faculties  and  moral 
perceptions.  Their  being  destitute  of  any  explicit 
and  formal  knowledge  of  God's  law  does  not  render 
them  incapable  of  good  and  evil,  so  long  as  they  have 
a  mpral  nature.  And  when  converts  among  the 
heathen  review  their  former  lives,  they  see  many  of 
their  feelings  and  actions  to  have  been  sinful,  though 
in  their  heathenish  state  they  thought  nothing  of 
them.  In  view  of  these  things,  who  is  authorized  to 
say  that  the  infant  mind  is  incapable  of  moral  feel- 
ings, because  it  is  without  any  explicit  knowledge  of 
God  and  his  law?  Accordingly  those  passages  of 
Scripture  which  speak  of  little  children  as  having  no 
knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  furnish  no  conclusive 
proof  that  they  are  incapable  of  moral  affections  ; 
because  such  passages  may  be  understood  to  speak  of 
children  in  that  comparative  sense  which  is  so  com- 
mon in  the  word  of  God.     Even  adult  persons,  who 


STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND.  151 

are  evidently  sinners,  and  are  spoken  of  as  deserving 
a  degree  of  punishment,  ("  few  stripes,")  are  still 
represented  as  not  knowing  their  Lord's  will. 
They  have  no  such  knowledge  as  others  have,  —  no 
clear,  definite,  formal  knowledge,  which  comes  from 
correct  religious  instruction.  And  if  this  may  be  the 
case  with  adult  persons,  who  are  acknowledged  to  be 
capable,  though  in  a  lower  degree  than  others,  of 
sinful  feelings  and  actions,  why  may  it  not  be  the  case 
with  infant  children?  How  can  their  being  repre- 
sented as  having  no  knowledge,  certainly  prove  that 
this  is  not  the  case  with  them  ?  It  must  however  be 
kept  in  mind  that,  as  they  are  in  such  a  state  of  igno- 
rance, they  are  capable  of  moral  affection  only  in  a 
very  low  degree.  Their  emotions  must  be  regarded 
as  only  incipient  or  elementary,  having  indeed  the 
nature,  but  far  from  having  the  form  or  the  strength, 
of  the  emotions  belonging  to  adult  years.  So  the  first 
little  shoot  which  arises  from  the  opening  seed,  is  in 
nature  the  same  vegetable  substance  and  has  the 
same  vegetable  hfe  with  the  stately  oak  which  it  after- 
wards becomes. 

These  are  the  chief  considerations  which  may  be 
adduced  to  prove  that  the  infant  mind  is  not  capable 
of  moral  feelings.  Few,  I  think,  who  give  them  a 
careful  attention,  will  think  that  they  amount  to  a 
satisfactory  proof.  And  if  they  do  not  amount  to  a 
satisfactory  proof,  then  certainly  no  one  has  a  right 
to  affirm  that  the  infant  mind  is  totally  incapable  of 
emotions  which  are  of  a  moral  nature,  and    no  ont 


152  STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND. 

has  a  right  to  proceed  on 'the  ground  of  such  a  posi- 
tion, either  in  pursuing  a  course  of  reasoning  or  in 
interpreting  the  word  of  God.  If  a  man  comes  to 
those  passages  of  Scripture  which  teach  that  all  are 
sinners,  he  cannot  properly  assume  that  little  children 
must  be  excepted  on  account  of  their  total  incapacity 
of  being  in  any  sense  morally  depraved.  To  reason 
in  this  way  would  be  to  assume  that  which  is  not 
self-evident  and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  proved. 

The  position  I  have  here  taken  is  all  that  the  case 
requires.  I  have  attempted  to  show  that  no  man  can 
properly  assume  the  incapacity  of  the  infant  mind  for 
any  emotions  which  are  of  a  moral  nature.  This  is 
all  that  is  necessary.  It  is  by  no  means  incumbent 
on  me  to  produce  direct  and  positive  proof  of  the 
contrary.  For  plainly  the  various  declarations  of 
Scripture  as  to  the  universality  of  sin  among  the  pos- 
terity of  Adam,  must  in  all  propriety  be  understood  as 
in  some  sense  including  little  children,  unless  there 
are  good  and  sufficient  reasons  for  wholly  excepting 
them.  Nevertheless  it  may  perhaps  answer  some 
good  purpose,  and  particularly  it  may  show  still  more 
clearly  the  impropriety  of  making  the  assumption 
above  mentioned,  just  to  advert  to  some  considerations 
in  favor  of  supposing  that  the  infant  mind  is  capable 
of  the  beginning  of  moral  emotions;  leaving  it  to 
others  to  decide  what  weight  these  consuderations 
ought  to  have. 

1.  The  infant  is  considered  by  all  sober  men  as  hav- 
ing a  rational  soul,  a  mind  indued  with  intellectual  and 


STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND.  153 

and  moral  powers.  Is  not  such  a  mind,  from  its  very- 
nature,  capable  of  intelligence  and  moral  affection  1 
Besides  this,  the  infant  child  possesses  those  bodily- 
organs  which  are  most  intimately  connected  with  the 
mind,  and  which,  under  the  present  constitution  of 
things,  are  essential  to  the  exercise  of  thought  and 
feeling.  Now  the  fact  that  the  child  is  from  the 
beginning  possessed  of  a  mind,  together  with  the 
organs  of  thought  and  feeling,  would  seem  to  imply 
that  he  is  capable  of  thought  and  feeling,  that  is, 
capable  of  it  in  some  small  degree.  As  a  mind  exists 
with  its  proper  bodily  organs,  how  can  we  suppose 
that  there  is  any.  thing  which  will  necessarily  prevent 
its  powers  from  beginning  to  unfold  themselves  in  the 
first  stage  of  life  ?  They  must  begin  to  do  this  some- 
time. Why  may  they  not  begin  at  the  commence- 
ment of  existence  ?  Is  it  quite  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  a  thing  of  so  active  a  nature  as  the  mind,  endued 
with  all  its  faculties  and  its  bodily  organs,  though  in  a 
very  feeble  state,  should  remain  perfectly  dormant  for 
days  and  months;  especially  when  it  is  considered 
that  there  are  from  the  beginning  various  bodily  sen- 
sations, which  are  evidently  suited  to  rouse  the  mind  to 
action  ? 

2.    It  agrees  best  with  common  analogy  to  suppose 

that   feeling  begins  very  early,  and   in   a  very   low 

and  imperceptible  degree.     The  developement  of  our 

corporeal  powers  and  of  our  mental  powers  generally, 

14 


154  STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND. 

begins  in  this  manner.     And  the  same  is  true  ©f  the 
whole  vegetable  and  animal  world. 

3.  But  a  very  short  time  passes  after  the  commence- 
ment of  life,  before  a  child  becomes  capable  of  show- 
ing some  signs  of  feeling.  And  have  we  not  reason  to 
suppose  that  feeling,  as  well  as  thought,  exists  some 
time  before?  A  child  gives  early  and  frequent 
indications  of  strong  emotions,  and  strives  to  utter 
them  long  before  he  is  able  to  do  it  in  the  usual  w^ay. 
And  is  it  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  very  first 
emotions  which  exist  in  the  mind,  have  the  same 
degree  of  strength  with  those  which  are  first  indicated 
by  outward  signs?  Is  it  not  rather  probable  that  the 
first  motion  of  the  heart,  the  first  budding  of  affection, 
takes  place  some  time  previously,  and,  by  a  gradual 
increase,  acquires  that  degree  of  strength  which  it 
shows,  when  it  begins  to  express  itself  by  intelligible 
signs  ? 

4.  To  suppose  that  children  are  in  some  small 
degree  moral  agents  from  the  first,  and  have  incipient 
moral  emotions,  agrees  best  with  the  general  represen- 
tations of  Scripture,  and  the  general  aspect  of  things 
in  divine  providence;  both  of  which  indicate  that  the 
offspring  of  human  parents  are  human  beings, — 
beings  of  the  same  nature  with  their  parents,  belong- 
ing to  the  same  race,  under  the  same  moral  adminis- 
tration, and  possessing  the  elements  of  the  same 
character.  All  these  indications  of  the  word  and 
providence  of  God  would  seem  quite  incongruous,  if 


STATE    OF    THE    INFANT    MIND.  155 

human  beings,  for  a  considerable  time  after  the  com- 
mencement of  their  hfe,  were  totally  destitute  of 
moral  affections  and  moral  qualities,  and  of  all  present 
relation  to  a  moral  government.  But  if  they  are  con- 
sidered as  having,  from  the  first,  some  feeble  begin- 
ning of  moral  affection,  and  of  course  the  beginning 
of  moral  character ;  then  the  representations  of  Scrip- 
ture and  the  conduct  of  divine  Providence  appear  per- 
fectly consistent  and  just.  This  view  of  the  subject 
would  at  once  relieve  the  difficulty  which  is  generally 
thouorht  to  attend  the  fact  that  infant  children  suffer 
and  die.  Some  suppose  they  suffer  and  die  as 
irrational  animals  do,  without  any  reference  to  a  moral 
law  or  the  principles  of  a  moral  government.  A 
strange  supposition  indeed,  ihsii  human  beings  should 
for  a  time  be  ranked  with  beings  which  are  not  hu- 
man, that  is,  mere  animals  !  Children  are  represented 
in  a  very  different  light  in  the  word  of  God.  Now 
this  strange  supposition  is  made  on  the  assumption, 
that  infant  children  are  capable  of  no  unholy  feelings, 
that  they  have  no  personal  depravity,  —  nothing  in 
any  degree  of  the  nature  of  sin.  For  if  they  have 
this  even  in  the  lowest  degree, —  if  the  eye  of  God 
sees  in  them  any  emotions,  however  feeble,  which  are 
in  their  nature  wrong,  and  so  are  the  commencement 
of  a  blame-worthy  character ;  then  they  suffer  as 
other  human  beings  do,  on  account  of  sin.  And  so 
the  affirmations,  that  "  by  the  offence  of  one  all  are 
constituted  sinners,"   and  that  "  death  comes  upon  all 


156  STATE    OF   THE    INFANT    MIND. 

men  because  that  all  have  sinned,"  are  to  be  taken  in 
their  most  obvious  sense,  without  excepting  any  part  of 
the  human  race.  On  the  same  principle,  the  represen- 
tation that  men  are  by  nature  children  of  wrath,  and 
that  no  one  can  see  the  kingdom  of  heaven  without 
being  born  again,  is  to  be  understood  as  applying  to 
all  human  beings  alike.  It  is  indeed  generally 
believed  that  the  representation  does  apply  to  infant 
children  in  some  sense;  though  not  a  few  think  it 
very  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  tell  in  what  sense^ 
But  if  we  admit  that  all  men  have  personal  sinfulness 
as  soon  as  they  are  intelligent,  moral  beings,  and  that 
they  are  intelligent,  moral  beings  from  the  first,  —  that 
they  are  born  so  ■  then  they  are,  in  a  plain,  obvious 
sense,  by  nature,  i.  e.  by  birth,  children  of  wrath. 
Being  born  of  sinful  parents,  they  are  sinful ;  and  they 
need  the  regenerating  Spirit  of  God,  as  really  as  others 
do,  to  make  them  holy.  And  so  they  come  clearly 
and  fully  under  the  dispensation,  in  which  Christ  is 
^exhibited  as  dying  for  sinners,  and  saving  that  which 
was  lost ;  and  the  rite  of  baptism,  denoting  the  reality 
or  the  necessity  of  spiritual  purification,  may  be  ap- 
plied to  children  with  as  much  propriety  as  to  adults, 
jand  prayer  may  be  offered  up  for  the  renewal  of 
.chiklren  by  the  Spirit  withes  much  propriety  as  for 
the  renewal  of  others. 


INNATE    PROPENSITIES.  157 


CHAPTJERIX. 

The  infant  mind  considered  as  the  subject  of  a  wrong  disposition,  or  corrupt  nature. 
Remarks  on  the  words  disposition,  propensity ,  nature.  Sec.  That  man  has  origin- 
ally a  propensity  to  sin  generally  held  by  Orthodox  divines.  Is  this  propensity 
sinful!  The  point  at  issue  between  Dr.  John  Taylor  and  Edwards.  Considera- 
tions on  both  sides.  —  A  united  view  of  the  subject. 

The  particular  view  of  the  infant  mind  presented 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  has  been  maintained  by  Or- 
thodox divines  to  a  considerable  extent. 

The  candid  reader  will  see  that  arguments  are  not 
wanting  in  its  favor,  and  that,  if  found  to  be  true,  it 
would  relieve  the  subject  of  some  of  its  most  serious 
difficulties. 

But  there  is  another  view,  somewhat  different  from 
this,  which  I  shall  now  particularly  exhibit,  suggest- 
ing the  chief  reasons  in  favor  of  it,  and  the  chief 
objections  against  it.  My  object  is  not  to  use  strong 
affirmations,  nor  to  announce  confident  opinions,  but 
to  invite  a  candid  and  patient  examination.  The 
subject,  I  am  aware,  is  abstruse,  and,  in  many  respects, 
lies  beyond  the  bounds  of  our  knowledge.  We  have 
neither  the  means  of  understanding  it  perfectly,  nor 
the  necessary  capacity  for  this,  whatever  means 
might  be  afforded  us.  On  such  a  subject  our  best 
conceptions  will  be  likely  to  be  mingled  with  error, 
and  the  conclusions  which  may  now  appear  to  us 
most  certain,  may  be  found,  on  further  inquiry,  to 
result  from  premises  which  are  partly  or  wholly  false. 
*14 


153  INNATE    PROPENSITIES. 

I  would  remember  these  remarks  myself;  and  instead 
of  appearing  before  the  public  as  a  strenuous  advocate 
of  any  one  philosophical  theory,  exclusively  of  every 
other,  I  would  treat  the  opinions  of  all  wise  and  good 
men  with  respect.  And  though  I  have  been  consider- 
ing the  subject  before  us  for  forty  years,  I  would  still 
place  myself  in  company  with  those  who  are  in- 
quirers after  the  truths  and  who  are  looking  for 
clearer  light  than  has  yet  shone  upon  the  minds  of 
Christians. 

The  depravity  of  man  has  commonly  been  con- 
sidered as  consisting  originally  in  a  wrong  disposi- 
tioHy  or  a  corrupt  nature,  which  is  antecedent  to  any 
sinful  emotions,  and  from  which,  as  an  inward  source, 
all  sinful  emotions  and  actions  proceed. 

In  favor  of  this  opinion  several  things  may  be 
offered. 

We  have  occasion,  most  evidently,  for  the  use  of 
such  words  as  disposition,  inclination,  propensity, 
nature  &c.  Were  there  no  such  words  in  our  lan- 
guage, we  should  be  sensible  of  the  deficiency,  and, 
for  the  purposes  of  reasoning  and  common  discourse, 
should  be  compelled  to  introduce  them.  Without 
words  of  such  import,  how  could  you  express  what 
you  often  wish  to  express,  as  to  the  habitual  charac- 
ter of  an  intelligent  being  ?  You  say,  such  a  man  is 
avaricious.  But  it  may  be  that  he  is  not  now  put- 
ting forth  avaricious  acts  of  mind.  For  though  a 
very  avaricious  man,  he  may  at  present  be  wholly 


INNATE    PROPENSITIES.  159 

occupied  with  thoughts  and  feehngs  of  another  kind. 
But  who  considers  this  as  a  reason  for  not  calling  him 
an  avaricious  man  7  What  then  is  your  meaning, 
when  you  call  a  man  avaricious,  while  his  mind  is 
engrossed  with  other  objects,  and  all  avaricious 
thoughts  and  feelings  are  at  present  excluded  ?  Do 
you  mean  merely,  that  he  has  indulged  avaricious 
desires  and  followed  avaricious  practices  in  times 
past  ?  But  this  alone  would  not  be  a  sufficient 
reason  for  calling  him  avaricious  now ;  because  he 
may  have  reformed,  -and  may  now  possess  a  better 
character.  Paul  was  once  a  persecutor  and  blas- 
phemer ;  but  he  was  not  so  after  his  conversion.  —  By 
calling  the  man  avaricious,  do  you  then  mean,  that  he 
will  certainly  have  avaricious  feelings  hereafter^  when 
the  objects  of  avaricious  desire  shall  come  before  his 
mind?  But  the  mere  fact,  however  certain,  that  he 
will  have  such  feehngs  at  a  future  time  is  manifestly 
not  a  sufficient  reason  for  calling  him  avaricious  now  ; 
because  those  future  feelings  may  come  in  conse- 
quence of  a  change  in  his  character.  There  was  a 
certainty  in  the  divine  mind  that  Adam,  though  at  first 
holy,  w^ould  become  a  sinner.  But  this  surely  was  no 
reason  for  calUng  him  a  sinner  while  he  remained 
holy.  It  is  also  a  certain  .fact  that  some  who  are 
impenitent  sinners,  will  hereafter  become  Christians. 
But  shall  we  therefore  count  them  among  Christians 
now?  — If  a  man  is  with  propriety  called  avaricious, 
it  must  be  on  account  of  something  which  appertains 


160  INNATE    PROPENSITIES. 

to  his  present  character.  He  must  either  have  ava- 
ricious feelings  at  the  present  time,  or  at  least  must 
have  that  in  his  mind  from  which  avaricious  feelings 
will  naturally  arise.  There  must  be  in  the  state  of 
his  mind  an  aptitude  to  such  feelings,  a  foundation 
y  for  such  exercises.  This  aptitude  or  foundation  is  the 
very  thing  which  is  commonly  called  disposition, 
propensity,  inclination,  or  principle  of  action.  Ed- 
wards calls  it  a  "  principle  of  nature  ; "  which  he 
explains  to  be,  "  that  foundation  which  is  laid  in 
nature  for  any  particular  kind  t)f  exercises, — so  that 
for  a  man  to  exert  the  faculties  of  his  mind  in  that 
kind  of  exercises  may  be  said  to  be  his  nature."  Dr. 
Dwight  calls  it  "  a  cause  of  moral  action  in  intelligent 
beings,"—"  a  cause,  which  to  us  is  wholly  unknown, 
except  that  its  existence  is  proved  by  its  effects."  — 
"  We  speak  of  human  nature  as  sinful,^^  he  says, 
"  intending,  not  the  actual  commission  of  sin, 
but  a  general  characteristic  of  man,  under  thein- 
fluence  of  which  he  has  committed  sins  heretofore, 
and  is  prepared  and  prone  to  commit  others."  — 
*'  With  the  same  meaning  in  our  minds,  we  use  the 
phrases,  sinful  propensity,  corrupt  heart,  depraved 
mind,  and  the  contrary  ones."  —  "When  we  use  these 
kinds  of  phraseology,  we  intend  that  a  reason  really 
exists  why  one  mind  —  will  be  the  subject  of  holy 
volitions,  and  another  of  sinful  ones.  We  do  not 
intend  to  assert  that  any  one  or  any  number  of  the 
volitions  —  has  been  or  will,  be,  holy  or  sinful,  nor 


INNATE    PROPENSITIES.  161 

db  we  refer  immediately  to  actual  volitions  at  all. 
Instead  of  this,  we  mean  to  indicate  a  state  of  mind, 
out  of  which  holy  volitions  in  one  case  may  be  fairly 
expected  to  arise,  and  sinful  ones  in  another  :  such  a 
state,  as  that,  if  it  were  to  be  changed,  and  the  exist- 
ing state  of  a  holy  mind  were  to  become  the  same 
with  that  of  a  sinful  mind,  its  volitions  would  hence-^ 
forth  be  sinful,  and  vice  versa.  This  state  is  the 
cause  which  I  have  mentioned,  a  cause  the  existence 
of  which  must  be  admitted,  unless  we  acknowledge 
it  to  be  a  perfect  casualty  that  any  volition  is  sinful 
rather  than  holy."  It  will  be  seen  that  Dwight  uses 
the  word  volitions  in  the  large  sense,  including  the  ^ 
affections  or  emotions. 

To  return  to  the  case  of  the  avaricious  man. 
Most  certainly  it  cannot  be  proper  to  attribute  this 
character  to  him,  except  for  that  which  really  belongs 
to  him  noiD^  —  a  present  quality  or  state  of  his  mind. 
Whatever  avaricious  feelings  may  hereafter  be  excited 
in  his  mind  ;  still,  if  they  do  not  arise  from  something 
improper  in  the  present  state  of  his  heart,  —  if  he  is 
now  entirely  free  from  all  wrong  propensity,  all  apti- 
tude to  such  feelings ;  there  would  be  no  justice  in 
calling  him  avaricious. — Say  the  man  whom  you 
call '  avaricious,  envious,  or  revengeful,  is  not  now 
exhibiting  that  character  in  any  acts  of  mind  ;  why 
do  you  represent  him  as  sustaining  this  character  ? 
What  do  your  thoughts  fix  upon  as  a  reason  for 
applying  these  epithets  to  him  ?     Is  it  not  thtit  very 


^ 


162  SINFULNESS    OP 

thing,  which  is  commonly  called  'propensity^  dis- 
position, or  state  of  mind  ?  Though  he  is  not  the 
subject  of  any  present  feelings  of  avarice,  envy,  or 
revenge,  his  attention  being  occupied  with  other 
things;  he  has  an  invariable  propensity  towards 
them,  and  will  at  once  exercise  them,  when  a  favor- 
able opportunity  occurs.  This  disposition  or  aptitude 
of  mind  is  that  which  is  commorily  regarded  as  the 
substance  of  a  man's  character. 

Now  we  have  abundant  evidence  that  a  disposition 
or  propensity  to  sin,  understood  as  above,  exists  in  the 
human  mind  from  the  beginning ;  such  a  disposition 
as  Dr.  Dwight  describes  in  the  passage  above  cited. 
Some  of  those  writers  who  do  not  fully  agree  with 
Dr.  Dwight  and  other  Orthodox  divines  in  their 
reasoning  on  this  point,  still  hold  that  man's  nature 
since  the  fall  is  such,  that  he  certainly  will  sin,  and 
that  his  nature  is  the  cause  or  reason  of  his  sinning. 
By  nature  I  suppose  they  mean  the  same  as  is  com- 
monly meant  by  disposition,  propensity,  or  ten- 
dency to  sin.  It  has  been  the  common  doctrine  of 
Orthodox  churches  in  this  country  and  in  JEurope, 
that  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  are  the  subjects  of 
natural  depravity,  or  depravity  of  nature,  or  an 
inward  tendency  or  hias  to  sin.  This  quality  or 
state  of  mind  clearly  belongs  to  man  from  the  com- 
mencement of  his  being;  and  this  is  what  is  more  gen- 
erally intended  by  original  sin  ;  although  this  phrase 
is  frequently  meant  also  to  include  the  ffict,  that  de« 


INNATE    PROPENSITIES.  103 

pravity  and  ruin  come  upon  us  as  the  consequence  of 
Adam's  sin.  But  the  particular  question  with  which 
we  are  now  concerned  is,  whether  this  settled,  uni- 
versal propensity  to  sin  in  the  posterity  of  Adam  may 
not  be  the  reason  why  they  are  denominated  sinners, 
and  regarded  as  such,  in  the  divine  administration. 
To  answer  this  inquiry,  let  us  advert  to  the  princi- 
ples already  laid  down.  If  a  man  shows  a  disposi- 
tion to  covetous  feelings  and  practices,  we  call  him 
a  covetous  man.  And  if  we  could  know  at  the 
beginning  of  his  life,  that  he  has  such  a  disposi- 
tion,—  a  disposition  which  will  uniformly  and  cer- 
tainly develope  itself  in  covetous  desires  and  practices; 
we  should  say,  he  has  the  grand  element  of  a 
covetous  character;  he  is  a  young  miser.  And  if  we 
knew  that  any  man  had  a  decided  disposition  to 
commit  murder,  whether  he  had  ever  acted  it  out,  or 
not;  we  should  not  hesitate  to  ascribe  to  him  the 
character  of  a  murderer.  We  should  say,  he  is  a 
murderer  in  hearty  and  a  murderer  in  the  sight  of 
God.  And  if  we  had  evidence  that  the  whole  race 
of  man  were  born  with  a  disposition  to  this  particular 
crime,  that  they  were  universally  inchned  to  commit 
murder;  we  should  speak  of  them  as  a  race  of 
murderers  ;  and  we  should  regard  them  as  murder- 
ers virtually^  not  only  before  they  had  perpetrated 
any  murderous  deed,  but  before  they  had  conceived  . 
any  direct,  formal  purpose  to  do  it.  Their  having  ^ 
an  inclination  or  propensity  to  such  a  deed  of  wick- 


'm-^ 


J 

r 


J 


164  SINFULNESS    OP 

\ 

edness  would  be  sufficient  to  justify  us.  The  same 
might  be  said  of  other  particular  forms  of  moral  evil. 
Now  there  is  evidently  in  every  human  being,  a  dis- 
position to  siuj  a  state  of  mind  from  the  beginning 
of  life,  which  will  certainly  and  uniformly  lead  him 
to  transgress  the  divine  law,  whatever  his  outward 
circumstances  may  be,  and  whatever  causes  may 
operate  upon  him,  either  external  or  internal,  except 
the  regenerating  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  And 
the  existence  from  the  first  of  such  a  disposition  in 
man  has  generally  been  thought  sufficient  to  justify 
us  in  representing  him  as  by  nature  depraved,  sinful, 
and  lost,  and,  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  existence, 
needing  regeneration,  and  all  the  blessings  of  redemp- 
tion. This  view  of  the  subject  shows  regeneration 
to  be  substantially  the  same  thing,  at  whatever  period 
of  life  it  may  take  place.  It  is  the  giving  of  a  new 
heart.  Man's  unrenewed  heart  is,  from  the  begin- 
ning, depravedj  unholy,  prone  to  sin.  This  is  his 
\x  natural  character.  The  child  Jesus  was  never  in 
any  degree  prone  to  sin.  He  never  had  any  disposi- 
tion or  state  of  mind  that  tended  to  sin  in  any  of  its 
forms.  He  had  "no  evil  principle,"  —  "was  not  at 
all  under  the  influence  of  any  native  depravity."* 
For  any  other  child  to  be  regenerated,  is  to  be  so 
changed  in  his  disposition  or  moral  nature  by  the 
divine   Spirit,  as  to  become,  in  a  measure,  like  the 

*  Barnes's  note  on  John  14:  30. 


INNATE    PROPENSITIES.  165 

child  Jesus.  The  same  divine  power  which  gave 
the  Son  of  Mary  a  holy  nature  or  disposition  at  his 
first  birth,  can  make  any  other  child  of  a  holy  nature 
or  disposition  by  a  new  birth.  This  every  child  of 
Adam  needs ;  and  without  it  no  one  can  be  saved. 
And  when  any  one  is  renewed  in  infancy,  the  change 
will  early  show  itself  in  the  love  of  truth,  fear  of  sin, 
desire  of  religious  instruction,  aspiring  after  God,  and 
other  holy  exercises. 

That  such  a  propensity  to  sin  as  I  have  described, 
exists  in  all  men  from  the  beginning  of  their  life,  and 
that  this  constitutes__the  essence  of  depravity,  has  been 
maintained  almost  universally  by  men  who  have 
embraced  the  other  doctrines  of  the  Orthodox  faith. 
It  was  held  by  the  ancient  Fathers,  except  one  sect, 
that  of  the  Pelagians.  It  was  and  is  contained  in  all 
the  creeds  of  the  Reformed  churches,  in  Europe  and 
America.  It  was  held  by  Arminius,  and  is  now 
maintained  by  the  Wesleyan  Methodists.  Even 
those  in  our  country  who  object  to  some  of  the 
expressions  and  modes  of  reasoning  used  by  the  older 
Calvinists,  still  believe  it  to  be  a  fact,  that  a  disposition 
or  propensity  to  sin  exists  in  man  from  the  beginning. 
Dr.  Hopkins,  whose  views  on  most  subjects  are  very 
sober  and  scriptural,  speaks  of  man's  being  sinful  as 
soon  as  he  exists.  He  holds  that  our  moral  corrup- 
tion takes  place  "  as  soon  as  we  become  the,  children 
of  Adam,"  i.  e.  "at  the  beginning  of  our  existence." 
He  speaks  too  of  our  being  inclined  to  sin  from  the 
15 


/ 


166  DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,    (fec. 

first.  Dr.  Dwight  maintains  that  all  men  "  are  born 
sinners ;  "  —  "  that  infants  are  contaminated  in  their 
moral  nature,  and  born  in  the  likeness  of  apostate 
|/^)--^  >^  Adam ;"  and  speaks  of  this  as  what  precedes  moral 
action :  and  with  him  agree  Smalley,  Hart,  Backus, 
and  the  whole  body  of  ministers  and  Christians  in 
Connecticut  who  were  his  contemporaries.  And  Dr. 
Nathaniel  Taylor  has  published  it  as  his  belief  "  that 
all  mankind,  in  consequence  of  Adam's  fall,  are  horn 
destitute  of  holinessj  and  are  hy  nature  totally 
depraved,^^  Other  expressions  of  his  on  this  subject 
may  explain  what  he  means  by  being  born  destitute 
of  holiness,  and  being  hy  nature  totally  depraved. 
Speaking  of  mankind  in  their  present  fallen  state,  he 
says:  "Such  is  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  that 
it  becomes  the  occasion  of  sin  in  men  in  all  the 
appropriate  circumstances  of  their  existence."  Accord- 
ing to  him,  then,  it  is  something  in  the  mind  itself 
in  the  very  nature  of  the  mind,  which  proves  the 
occasion  of  sin.  He  calls  this  "  a  tendency  to  sin," 
and  a  tendency  in  the  very  nature  of  the  mind. 

Various  passages  are  found  in  Stuart's  able  Com- 
mentary on  the  Romans,  which  assert  the  same  doc- 
trine. He  says;  "Men  are  born  destitute  of  all 
disposition  to  holiness."  He  speaks  often  of  the 
"  fallen  nature  and  degenerate  condition  of  Adam's 
posterity."  Of  infants  he  says  ;  "  that  their  natural, 
unregenerate  state  is  a  state  of  alienation  from  God, 
and  one  which  needs  the  regenerating  influence  of  the 


DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,    &C.  167 

divine  Spirit ;  that  if  they  are  saved,"  (which  he 
hopes  will  be  the  case,)  they  must  have  "  a  taste  "  or 
"  rehsh  for  the  holy  joys  of  heaven  implanted  in  their 
souls."  And  he  asks  :  "  Is  there  nothing  then  which 
Christ  by  his  Spirit  can  do  for  infants,  in  implanting 
such  a  taste! ''^  He  speaks  of  those  who  die  before \  rj 
they  contract  actual  guilt  in  their  own  persons,  and 
says ;  "  they  still  need  a  new  heart  and  a  right 
spirit,^^  —  (just  what  all  sinners  need,)  not  prospec- 
tively/, but  now.  And  after  making,  perhaps  inadver- 
tently, some  free  remarks,  which  liave  commonly 
been  understood  to  be  in  opposition  to  the  common 
doctrine,  he  takes  special  care  to  inform  us,  that  he 
believes  all  Adam's  posterity  to  be  born  into  the  degen- 
erate slate  above  described,  and  that  he  has  meant  to 
advance  nothing  at  variance  with  this  doctrine. 

We  see  how  general  is  the  belief,  that  mankind  are 
naturally  inclined  to  sin,  that  they  are  born  with  a         ^ 
tendency  to   sin,  a   tendency  existing  in   their  very -— ^^ 
nature,  previously  to  moral  action  ;  and  that  this  dis-^ 
position   or   tendency    constitutes   their   native    state. 
The  question   now  returns,   whether  it  may  not  be 
chiefly  with  a  view  to  this    degejierate   nature    of 
Adam's  posterity,  that  God  speaks  of  them,  and  in  his 
government  treats  them  as  sinners,  from   the  very 
beginning  of  their  personal  existence,  and  previously 
to  any  actual  transgression.     This  view  of  the  sub- 
ject Dr.  Dwight  particularly  maintains  in  his  system 
of  Theology.     He  rejects  the  idea  that  God  inflicts 


168  IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL  ? 

such  sufferings  as  infants  endure,  "  on  moral  beings 
who  are  perfectly  innocent,"  and  argues  from  the  suf- 
ferings and  death  of  infonts,  "that  they  are  contamina- 
ted in  their  moral  nature,  and  born  in  the  likeness  of 
apostate  Adam  ;  "  —  "a  fact,"  he  says,  "  irresistibly 
proved,  so  far  as  the  most  unexceptionable  analogy 
can  prove  any  thing,  by  the  depraved  moral  conduct 
of  every  infant  who  lives  so  long  as  to  be  capable  of 
moral  action." 

This  is  the  opinion  which  has  generally  been  main- 
tained by  evangelical  writers.  I  bring  it  forward  here 
as  an  opinion  which  is  not  to  be  hastily  dismissed  on 
account  of  any  speculative  difficulties  attending  it 
To  say  the  least,  it  may  he  true.  In  our  very 
nature^  in  the  state  of  our  minds  from  the  beginning 
of  our  existence,  God  may  see  a  moral  contamination, 
a  corrupt  propensity,  which,  in  his  infallible  judgment, 
renders  it  just  and  right  for  him  to  treat  us  as  sinners. 
In  the  native  character  of  Adam's  posterity,  there  may 
be  that  which  is  of  the  nature  of  moral  evil,  —  essen- 
tially the  same  moral  evil  in  God's  view,  with  that 
which  is  afterwards  made  visible  to  us  by  its  devel- 
opements.  And  may  it  not  be  on  this  account  princi- 
pally, that  infants  suffer  and  die? 
'  ^^-M^-  But  there  are  some  who  object  to  calling  any  thing 
sinful^  or  morally  corrupt^  except  actual  transgres- 
sion. They  generally  admit  that  man  has  a  disposi- 
tion or  propensity  to  sin  before  moral  action  commen- 
ces; but  they  deny  that  such  propensity  is  of  the 
^  nature  of  moral  evil. 


5^^-A,  .-^tv.        ^^L.<X 


S^4 


is    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL?  169 

This  was  the  main  point  of  controversy  between 
Dr.  John  Taylor  and  Edwards.  In  vol.  6  of  his 
works,  (Worcester  Edit.)  p.  137,  Edwards  makes  a 
particular  statement  of  the  points  in  which  he  and 
Taylor  were  agreed.  He  first  lays  down  the  general 
proposition,  that  mankind  are  all  naturally  in  such 
a  state^  that  they  universally  run  into  that  which 
is  in  effect  their  own  utter ^  eternal  perdition.  Then 
he  presents  it  in  two  parts :  1.  That  all  men  come 
into  the  world  in  such  a  state,  that  they  certainly  and 
universally  commit  sin ;  and  2.  That  all  sin  exposes 
to  utter  destruction,  and  would  end  in  it,  were  it  not 
for  the  interposition  of  divine  grace.  In  this  general 
proposition  above  stated,  and  in  these  two  particular 
points,  Taylor  and  Edwards  were  agreed,  as  Edwards 
clearly  shows.  What  then  was  the  grand  point  at 
issue  ?  It  was  the  doctrine  of  innate  depravity.  So 
Edwards  says,  that  the  greater  part  of  Taylor's  book 
on  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  against  the 
doctrine  of  innate  depravity.  And  Taylor  speaks  of 
the  conveyance  of  a  corrupt  and  sinful  nature  to 
Adam's  posterity,  as  the  grand  point  to  be  proved  by 
the  maintainers  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  That 
all  ^nen  have  from  the  first  a  corrupt  and  sinful 
nature,  is  what  Edwards  undertakes  to  prove  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  system  of  Dr.  John  Taylor.  I  mention 
this  as  an  interesting  historical  fact.  And  if  any  one 
wishes  to  get  a  just  and  adequate  view  of  the  contro- 
versy  which  has  recently  shown  itself  on  this  subject, 
*i5 


170  IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL  ? 

he  will  find  it  specially  important  to  make  himself 
familiar  with  the  writings  of  Edwards  and  Dr.  John 
Taylor,  on  the  same  subject ;  and  he  will  do  well  to 
trace  the  controversy  back  to  the  days  of  Augustine 
and  Pelagius.  Of  all  the  books  which  have  ever 
been  written  against  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity, 
that  of  Dr.  John  Taylor  exhibits  the  greatest  adroit- 
ness, and  the  most  taking  plausibility. 

The  subject  now  introduced,  is  one  which  I  cannot 
discuss  at  large,  without  going  far  beyond  my  limits. 
I  must  content  myself,  therefore,  with  suggesting  a 
few  things  on  one  side  and  the  other  of  the  question 
at  issue,  for  the  sake  merely  of  aiding  the  contempla- 
tions of  the  reader. 

In  favor  of  the  opinion  that  man's  original  nature 
or  propensity  to  sin,  is  not  morally  evil  and  corrupt, 
and  that  nothing  can  be  called  sin  or  smful,  but 
actual  transgression^  it  may  be  said,  (1.)  That  this 
agrees  with  the  fair  import  of  the  divine  law,  which 
requires  nothing  but  right  exercise  or  action^  i.  e. 
love  to  God  and  our  neighbour,  and  forbids  nothing  but 
the  opposite.  So  an  Apostle  defines  sin  to.be  a  trans- 
gression of  the  law.  (2.)  It  may  be  said,  that  this 
agrees  with  -our  consciousness.  We  never  blame 
ourselves  for  any  thing  of  which  we  are  not  conscious, 
and  we  are  conscious  of  nothing  but  the  exercises  of 
our  own  minds.  (3.)  It  may  be  said,  too,  that  we 
cannot  be  accounted  guilty,  except  for  that  which  is 
voluntary ;  and  that,  as  the  disposition   referred  to, 


t-  L.^Oil 


'  V  ix  -v  t-  y      4    ^f^^t^-t^cryN-  — • 


IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SIlJPU] 


precedes  all  voluntary  action,  it  cannot  cfei^otisidefeC^  r  . 
as   blame- worthy.       These   arguments   may   be    ex- 
pressed in  few  words.     Such  is  human  consciousness,       ^, 
such  our  conception  of  moral  good  and  evil,  and  such 
the  divine  law,  that  nothing  but  action  can  be  con- 
sidered as  holiness  or  sin. 

To  these  arguments   the  following   reply  may  be 
giv^en. 

1.  When  the  Apostle  John  describes  sin  to  be,  as  it 
is  rendered  in  the  common  version,  "  a  transgression 
of  the  law,"  he  uses  the  word  avoixia^  which  has  not 
so  exclusively  an  active  sense,  as  is  sometimes 
thought.  It  may  mean  not  only  actual^  positive 
transgression  of  law,  but,  as  our  Catechism  well 
expresses  it,  "  a  want  of  conformity  to  law."  If  we  are 
destitute  of  any  thing  which  we  should  have  in  a 
state  of  perfect  conformity  with  the  law,  we  are 
chargeable  with  avofiia.  Now  what  is  the  meaning 
of  the  expression,  almost  universally  adopted  by  Chris- 
tian divines,  that  man  is  horn  destitute  of  holiness  7 
Holiness  is  conformity  to  the  divine  law.  And  if  man 
is  naturally  destitute  of  holiness,  he  is  destitute  of^  '^)/ 
conformity  to  the  law.  But  this  cannot  with  any ' 
propriety  be  said  of  one  who  is  not  in  any  sense  under  •  ^' 
law.  And  if  one  is  under  law,  and  is  destitute  of 
conformity  to  law,  he  -is  avofiog^  a  sinner.  Now  is_not 
a  disposition  to  holiness  something  which  belongs  to 
man  in  a  state  of  moral  rectitude  ?  Did  it  not  belong 
to  Adam  at  the  beginning  of  his  existence?     Did  it 


172  IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL  7 

not  belong  to  Jesus  from  the  first?  No  intelligent, 
moral  being  can  be  destitute  of  such  a  disposition 
without  being  morally  depraved  —  without  being 
virtually  a  sinner.  It  is  the  united  opinion  of  the 
great  body  of  Christian  commentators  and  divines, 
from  the  Reformation  to  the  present  time,  that  men 
come  into  the  world  in  a  state  of  moral  pollution. 
Barnes,  who  has  published  the  last  commentary  of 
which  1  have  any  knowledge,  speaks  familiarly  of 
our  "  being  born  with  a  corrupt  disposition,"  and  of 
our"^^a^wre"  as  being  "corrupt."*  Unquestionably 
he  means  to  speak  of  a  morale  and  not  of  a  physical 
corruption.  Such  a  moral  corruption  seems  to  be 
naturally  implied  in  the  language  of  all  those  who 
represent  men  at  the  beginning  of  their  existence  as 
destitute  of  holiness^  as  horn  destitute  of  all  dispo- 
sition to  holiness  J  as  the  subjects  of  a,  falle?i  nature, 
(fcc.  This  destitution  of  holiness  in  moral  beings,  — 
in  other  words,  this  want  of  conformity  to  the  law, 
may,  it  is  thought,  be  fairly  included  in  the  word 
ocvofiia,  which  the  Apostle  uses  to  describe  sin. 
^  2.  It  may  be  a  serious  question,  whether  conscious- 

ness does  not,  in  an  important  sense,  extend  farther 
than  to  intellectual  and  moral  exercise.     Who  doubts 
that  we  are  conscious  of  existence  7     And  yet  is  not^ 
qui;  existence    sometJiig^   diflerenj^  from   exercise  or^ 
aion.?_  Does  it^  not  precede  action  ?     How  then  do 

*  See  his  notes  on  Rom.  5. 


IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL?  173 

we  become  conscious  of  existence  ?  We  become 
conscious  of  it,  only  as  it  is  developed  in  action. 
Who  doubts  thai  we  are  conscious  of  the  faculty  of 
thinking,  remembering,  loving,  willing,  <fec?  And 
yet  it  is  manifest  that  we  are  not  conscious  of  these 
faculties,  except  as  they  are  brought  to  view  by  their 
exercise.  It  is  very  common  to  speak  of  our  having 
a  consciousness  of  a  power  or  ahility  to  do  this  or 
that  ;  though  we  are  conscious  of  having  the  power 
only  by  its  exercise.  It  is  very  suitable  to  speak  of 
consciousness  in  such  a  case,  though  it  is  not  im/me- 
diate  or  direct  consciousness.  Why  should  conscious- 
ness be  thought  any  the  less  real,  because  we  come 
to  have  it  by  means  of  exercise  1 

It  is  customary  to  use  the  same  language  respecting 
a  disposition  or  propensity.  We  say,  a  man  is 
conscious  of  having  a  revengeful  disposition,  or  of  a 
benevolent,  compassionate  disposition,  or  of  a  propen- 
sity to  covetousness,  though  he  cannot  be  conscious  of 
one  or  the  other,  except  as  it  is  developed  in  the 
feelings  and  acts  of  his  mind.  Now  if  a  man  is  in 
this  way  conscious  of  a  disposition  to  benevolence, 
does  not  a  sentiment  of  self-approval  arise  within  him? 
And  if  he  is  conscious  of  a  propensity  to  covetousness 
or  revenge,  does  not  a  sentiment  of  self-disapproval 
arise  ?  Men  generally  regard  a  settled  disposition 
in  regard  to  moral  objects,  as  the  substance  of  all  that  ^ 
they  mean  by  character,  whether  good  or  bad. 


^ 


J 


174  IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL  ? 

If  then  we  are  conscious,  in  the  manner  just  stated, 
of  what  we  call  disposition  or  propensity,  and  if  we 
do  really  ascribe  this  to  ourselves,  as  virtually  con- 
taining whatever  goes  to  constitute  character ;  may  it 
not  be  true,  that  in  some  analogous  sense,  the  original 
disposition  or  native  propensity  of  man  to  sin,  is  to 
be  regarded  as  the  basis  or  chief  element  of  his 
character?  May  we  not,  in  our  reflections,  trace  back 
the  sinful  feelings  and  actions  of  childhood  and  youth 
to  this  native  disposition,  and  thus  become,  in  the 
manner  above  described,  conscious  of  such  a  disposi- 
tion ?  And  may  not  this  disposition,  developed  and 
made  visible  to  consciousness  by  subsequent  sinful 
action,  be  as  properly  considered  to  be  morally  wrong, 
as  a  disposition  to  covetousness  or  revenge  which  any 
adult  person  now  has,  and  which  he  will  hereafter 
develope  in  action,  and  which  he  has  already  begun 
to  develope  ?  In  other  words,  may  not  the  original 
native  disposition  to  sin  be  essentially  of  the  same 
nature,  though  not  existing  in  the  same  degree  of 
strength,  with  the  disposition  to  sin  which  a  man  has 
at  any  time  in  after  hfe,  when  he  is  not  actually 
sinning  7 

The  view  which  has  been  presented  is  the  one 
which  has  been  generally  entertained  by  Orthodox 
divines.  And  does  it  not  agree  with  plain  common 
sense?  Ask  any  one,  who  has  learnt  the  use  of  lan- 
guage, and  who  judges  of  things  naturally,  whether 


IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL?  175 

a  disposition  to  do  wrong  is  not  a  torong-  disposition  ? 
Inquire  what  be  means  when  he  says,  a  man  has  a 
bad  disposition ;  and  you  will  find  his  meaning  to 
be,  that  the  man  has  a  disposition  to  do  bad  actions. 
The  disposition  is  characterized  by  the  actions  to 
which  it  leads.  You  may  say,  the  character  then 
belongs  to  the  disposition  only  in  a  relative  sense. 
Be  it  so.  A  relative  sense  may  be  a  very  proper 
and  important  sense.  If  you  object  to  expressions, 
because  they  contain  words  which  have  only  a  rela- 
tive sense,  you  would  object  to  a  great  part  of  the 
expressions  in  common  use. 

The  application  of  epithets  denoting  a  moral  quali- 
ty, to  the  disposition  or  propensity  which  originally 
belongs  to  man,  is  analogous  to  our  usual  practice  in 
other  cases  similar  to  this.  A  disposition  to  benevo- 
lent acts!,  though  not  now  in  exercise,  is  called  a 
benevolent  disposition  ;  a  disposition  to  revenge,  a 
revengeful  disposition  ;  a  disposition  to  honesty,  an 
honest  disposition  ;  and  a  disposition  to  feelings  of 
envy,  an  envious  disposition.  In  these  and  various  ^ 
other  instances,  epithets  denoting  moral  qualities  are 
familiarly  applied  to  the  dispositions  of  men,  although 
it  is  understood  that  those  dispositions  are  not  at  the 
time  developed  in  any  kind  of  action.  And  if  every 
other  disposition  may  properly  be  characterized  from 
the  feelings  and  actions  to  which  it  leads  ;  why  may 
not  a  disposition  to  sin  7  And  if  a  disposition  to  sin 
in  one  period  of  our  Ufe  may  be  called  a  sinful  dispo- 


fc    £c 


176  IS    A    PROPENSITY    TO    SIN    SINFUL? 

sition,  why  not  in  another  period  ?  If  in  after  life, 
why  not  in  the  beginning  of  hfe? 

See  how  the  case  would  stand,  if  we  should  take 
the  opposite  ground.  According  to  this,  a  man  has  a 
disposition  to  do  wrong,  but  his  disposition  is  not 
wrong ;  a  disposition  to  envy,  but  his  disposition  is 
not  envious  ;  a  disposition  to  revenge,  but  his  dispo- 
sition is  not  revengeful ;  a  disposition  to  commit 
theft,  but  his  disposition  is  not  at  all  thievish ;  a 
disposition  to  acts  of  'piety,  but  his  disposition  is  not 
pious  ;  —  and  finally,  a  disposition  to  commit  sin,  but 
his  disposition  is  not  at  all  sinful.  The  same  ap- 
pears in  regard  to  the  word  propensity,  inclination, 
heart,  or  nature.  Thus  a  man  has  a  strong  pro- 
pensity to  avarice,  but  not  an  avaricious  propen- 
sity ;  an  inclination  to  do  wrong,  but  not  a  wrong 
inclination ;  a  heart  to  disobey  God,  but  not  a  diso- 
bedient heart ;  a  nature  to  sin,  but  not  a  sinful 
nature.  A  man  governed  by  common  sense,  will  pro- 
nounce all  this  to  be  a  series  of  self-contradictions. 
And  so  it  is  in  fact. 

On  this  subject  the  Scriptures  fully  justify  the 
common  modes  of  speech.  They  represent  the  tree 
that  bears  good  fruit  to  be  a  good  tree  ;  and  the  tree 
that  bears  corrupt  fruit  to  be  a  corrupt  tree.  They 
speak  of  a  heart  which  devises  liberal  things,  or  leads 
to  acts  of  liberality,  as  a  "  liberal  heart ;  of  a  heart 
from  which  feelings  and  acts  of  purity  proceed,  as  a 
"  pure  heart ;  "  of  a  heart  which  leads  to  evil  deeds, 


DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,    <fcc.  177 

as  an  "evi7  heart;"  of  a  heart  which  receives  the 
truth  and  puts  forth  honest  and  good  desires  and 
purposes,  as  "  a/i  honest  and  good  heart;"  and  of 
the  heart  of  man  generally,  which  prompts  deceitful 
and  wicked  exercises  and  practices,  as  a  "  deceitful 
and  wicked  heart."  They  represent  that  treasure 
of  the  heart  from  which  good  things  are  brought  forth, 
to  be  a  "good  treasure;"  and  that  treasure  from 
which  evil  things  are  brought  forth,  to  be  an  "  evil 
treasure."  That  "  heart "  means  something  which 
precedes  moral  exercises,  is  evident  from  Matt.  15: 
19 ;  in  which  moral  exercises,  even  "  thoughts"  are 
said  to  come  forth  out  of  the  heart.  "  For  out  of 
the  heart  proceed  evil  thoughts,  murders,  adulteries, 
&,c."  Now  the  heart  from  which  "  evil  thoughts," 
and  these  various  forms  of  wickedness  come  forth,  is 
the  heart  which  in  Scripture  is  called  wicked,  deceit- 
ful, unclean.  On  the  same  ground,  that  is  called  a 
"  carnal  mind,"  from  which  carnal  thoughts  and 
desires  proceed. 

In  all  the  cases  above  mentioned,  and  in  others  of 
like  kind,  common  use  sanctions  the  propriety  of 
characterizing  the  disposition,  inclinatioti,  propen- 
sity, heart,  <fcc.,  from  those  feelings  and  actions  which 
naturally  proceed  from  it.  If  those  feelings  and 
actions  are  right,  the  disposition  which  leads  to  them 
is  right ;  if  wrong,  the  disposition  is  wrong. 

I  might  show,  that  the  same  modes  of  speech 
respecting  the  application  of  epithets,  are  found  in  the 
16 

/^^  a<^-*^^^  -^^^  ^y   ^\  '•'^'' 


178  DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,   &C. 

Bible,  and  in  common  discourse,  respecting  other 
subjects.  Thus  the  law,  which  requires  hol^  actions^ 
is  a  holj/  law  ;  and  a  law  which  leads  to  unjust  and 
cruel  actions,  is  an  unjust  and  cruel  law.  Now  the 
divine  law  is  not  action,  and  yet  it  is  a  moral  law, 
and  is  holi/  and  good,  and  deserves  our  approbation. 
An  unjust  law  is  not  action  ;  still  we  say,  it  is  unjust j 
and  deserves  our  disapprobation.  Such  is  the  com- 
mon mode  of  speaking,  and  such  it  will  be.  If  you 
say,  the  words  holy,  unjust,  <fcc.,  in  such  cases,  are 
used  in  a  relative  sense ;  I  have  only  to  reply,  that  the 
sense  is  indeed  relative,  but  none  the  less  real  or 
important. 

But  is  there  not  a  difference  between  what  we  call 
disposition  in  a  person  of  adult  years,  whose  state  of 
mind  is  the  result  of  repeated  moral  acts,  and  what 
we  call  disposition,  before  moral  action  has  com- 
menced ?  Undoubtedly  there  is  a  difference  as  to 
the  degree  of  strength,  and  as  to  the  degree  in  which 
moral  qualities  may  properly  be  predicated  of  it,  or 
rather  of  the  person  who  possesses  it.  There  is  a 
difference  as  to  other  circumstances  also.  But  in 
some  .respects  there  is  a  manifest  similarity.  In  both 
cases,  the  disposition  equally  precedes  action.  In  both 
cases  it  e(\wd\\y  produces  action  and  developes  itself  in 
action.  In  both  cases,  therefore,  it  has  the  same  relation 
to  action.  Accordingly  it  has,  in  both  cases,  the  same 
bearing  upon  the  position,  that  nothing  but  action  can 
be  denominated  morally  good  or  bad.     There  is,  then. 


DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,   &C.  179 

a  similarity  as  to  the  main  points.  Now  if  it  is 
proper  to  attribute  moral  qualities  to  disposition 
as  it  exists  in  an  adult  agent,  who  is  not  at  the  time 
developing  his  disposition  in  action ;  why  is  it  not 
proper  to  attribute  moral  qualities  to  disposition,  as  it 
exists  in  the  mind  before  moral  action  has  com- 
menced ?  In  both  cases  it  is  equally  distinct  from 
moral  action,  and  equally  developes  itself  in  moral 
action.  In  both  cases,  it  has,  of  course,  the  same  kind 
of  relation  to  the  exercises  which  arise  from  it. 

Such  considerations  as  these  have  occurred  to  me  in 
favor  of  the  common  opinion.  And  there  is  one  more 
consideration,  which  may  perhaps  appear  more  impor- 
tant than  any  other,  because  it  is  more  practical; 
namely,  that  the  opposite  opinion  has  a  manifest 
tendency  to  prevent  a  just  impression  of  the  evil 
of  sin.  If  men  believe  that  a  disposition  to  trans- 
gressj  is  not  morally  wrong,  they  will  be  very  likely  /' '  ''^ 
to  infer,  that  transgression  itself  is  not  morally 
wrong.  Who  can  think  that  an  act  is  wrong  when 
the  disposition  from  which  it  proceeds,  is  not  wrong  ? 
that  an  act  is  criminal,  when  a  propensity/  to  that  act 
is  perfectly  innocent  ?  How  utterly  abhorrent  would 
it  be  to  conscience,  common  sense,  and  piety,  to  tell 
men,  that  their  propensity  to  lie,  and  steal,  and  murder, 
has  nothing  in  it  which  is  in  the  least  degree  faulty  ! 
that  their  disposition  to  forget  God  and  disobey  his 
law  is  not  at  all  sinful,  and  cannot  be  looked  upon 
with    any    disapprobation !      What    would    be    the 

lie..- .  .      ^Ihj^^ 


180  DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,    &C. 

natural  influence  of  this  view  of  the  subject  upon  the 
minds  of  men?  Would  it  be  likely  to  produce  in 
them  a  deep  conviction  of  sin,  such  as  David  expressed 
in  the  51st  Psalm,  and  Paul  in  the  5th  and  7th  chap- 
ters of  his  epistle  to  the  Romans  ?  Would  it  make 
•them  feel  the  inexpressible  evil  of  a  "carnal  mind," 
and  a  "  heart  of  stone,"  and  the  necessity  of  its  being 
taken  away  by  the  regenerating  power  of  God  ? 
Would  it  lead  them  fervently  to  pray,  that  God  would 
create  in  them  a  new  heart  and  a  right  spirit  ?  Who 
will  labor  most  to  resist  and  overcome  his  propensity 
to  wicked  courses,  —  he  that  regards  it  as  innocent,  or 
he  that  regards  it  as  criminal  and  hateful  ?  Will  it 
not  be  very  natural  for  any  one  to  say ;  if  my  disposi- 
tion to  transgress  the  divine  law  has  nothing  sinful  in 
it,  why  should  I  be  solicitous  to  be  rid  of  it?  Can  I 
be  bound  in  duty  to  take  pains  to  subdue  that,  which 
has  nothinof  wronor  in  it  ?  Can  I  be  blamed  for  hav- 
ing  a  propensity  which  is  not  blame-worthy?  There 
would  be  very  good  reason  why  I  should  earnestly 
pray  God  to  subdue  a  disposition,  which  I  felt  to  be 
morally  wrong  and  culpable.  But  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
why  I  should  be  earnest  in  prayer  to  God,  that  he 
would  subdue  a  disposition  which  is  not  wrong?  On 
the  whole,  what  kind  of  advantage  can  there  be  in 
the  sentiment,  that  a  disposition  to  do  wrong  is  not  of 
a  moral  nature?  Will  sinners  be  more  likely  to 
repent,  and  to  get  rid  of  the  infallible  propensity  of 
their  hearts  to  sin,  because  you  call  that  propensity  by 


DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,   ScC.  181 

a  soft  name  ?  The  existence  of  such  a  propensity  in 
the  heart,  is  a  hateful  and  dangerous  thing.  Will 
you  make  it  any  the  less  so  by  caUing  it  innocent? 

I  have  endeavoured  to  point  out  what  would  be  the 
natural  result  of  the  opinion,  that  a  propensity  to  sin 
is  not  sinful.  If  any  who  advance  this  opinion,  have 
a  meaning  in  their  own  minds,  which  would  not  lead 
to  such  a  result,  that  meaning  is  too  recondite  for 
common  apprehension.  It  is  certain  that  all  the  usual 
modes  of  speech  in  relation  to  this  subject,  imply,  that 
a  propensity  partakes  of  the  same  moral  quality  with 
the  acts  which  proceed  from  it ;  that  a  disposition  is 
wrong,  if  it  prompts  to  wrong  conduct,  and  because  it 
does  so  ;  in  other  words,  that  the  nature  of  the  dispo- 
sition is  determined  from  the  nature  of  the  exer- 
cises and  actions  to  which  it  leads.  This  is  all 
implied  in  the  common  forms  of  speech,  and  in  the 
common  forms  of  thought.  And  it  is  a  well-known 
fact,  that  the  more  men's  understanding  becomes 
enlightened  by  divine  truth,  and  the  more  their 
conscience  is  awakened  to  do  its  office,  the  more  thor- 
oughly are  they  convinced  of  the  sinfulness  of  their 
disposition  to  depart  from  God,  and  the  more  de- 
sirous are  they  of  that  divine  influence  which  can 
remove  it.  When  men  are  led  to  consider  their  ways, 
it  is  generally  the  case  that  their  minds  are  first  occu- 
pied with  their  overt  acts  of  wickedness.  But  if  they 
are  taught  of  God,  they  come  in  the  end  to  a  deep 
and  humbling  conviction  of  the  moral  turpitude  of 
*16 


182  DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,    &C. 

that  constant  disposition^  which  they  find  within 
them,  to  forsake  the  way  of  holiness  and  pursue  forbid- 
den objects.  Once,  in  a  state  of  moral  insensibility, 
they  saw  little  or  no  evil  in  their  disposition  to  sin  ; 
perhaps  they  justified  it.  Now  they  look  upon  it  as 
the  essence  of  evil.  It  is  on  account  of  this  urgent 
propensity  to  do  wrong,  this  sin  which  dwelleth  in 
them,  that  they  most  heartily  abhor  themselves. 
And  when  they  pray  to  God  most  importunately,  it  is, 
that  they  may  be  delivered  from  this  "  lavi^  of  sin," 
this  "carnal  mind,"  this  "  body  of  death,"  this  sum  of 
all  that  is  vile  and  hateful.  Now  if  any  one  comes 
forward  and  advances  the  opinion,  that  a  disposition 
or  propensity  to  sin  is  not  in  any  respect  sinful,  does 
he  not  set  himself,  however  unintentionally,  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  most  spiritual  convictions  of  Christians  ? 
And  does  he  not  teach  that,  which  the  worst  men 
wish  to  be  true,  and  which,  if  they  can  believe  it  to 
be  true,  will  help  them  to  keep  their  consciences  quiet 
in  an  unregenerate  state  ?  In  a  word,  whatever  else 
such  a  man  may  teach  and  do  to  benefit  the  souls  of 
men,  will  not  the  natural  influence  of  this  opinion  be, 
to  hinder  the  conviction  and  conversion  of  sinners  ? 

I  shall  just  advert  to  another  argument  against  the 
opinion,  that  a  propensity  to  sin  is  not  sinful. 

It  has  been  the  common  belief  of  Orthodox  divines 
and  Christians,  that  one  of  the  most  important  things 
which  the  special  influence  of  the  Spirit  accomplishes, 
is,  to  take  away  the  natural  propensity/  which  men 


DISPOSITION^    PROPENSITY,    6cC.  183 

have  to  sin,  and  to  give  them  a  disposition  to 
love  and  obey  God.  Now  if  a  uniform  and  infaUible 
propensity  to  sin  is  not  sinful,  then  why  should  we 
suppose  that  regeneration  takes  it  away  ?  Regen- 
eration, it  would  seem,  must  act  upon  man  as  a  moral 
being,  and  remove  that  which  is  morally  wrong. 
The  rest  may  be  left  as  it  was.  We  should  verily 
think,  then,  according  to  the  opinion  sometimes 
advanced,  that  a  sinner  may  be  regenerated,  and 
still  have  the  same  uniform  propensity  to  sin  as 
before ;  and  that  his  sanctification,  relating  as  it  does 
to  what  is  moral,  may  go  on,  and  that  he  may 
become  perfect  in  holiness,  and  still  retain  hfe  sinless 
disposition  to  commit  sin.  "Why  not?  Surely  holi- 
ness cannot  be  supposed  incompatible  with  any  of  the 
innocent  propensities  of  our  nature. 

After  all,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  the  natural 
propensity  which  men  have  to  sin  m,ust  be  subdued, 
and  finally  taken  away,  by  the  sanctifying  influence 
of  the  Spirit.  And,  so  far  as  I  can  understand  the 
matter,  the  reason  why  certain  writers  do  not  repre- 
sent the  removal  of  man's  propensity  to  sin  as  an 
essential  part  of  regeneration,  is,  that  they  first  adopt 
the  principle,  that  nothing  is  morally  good  or  evil,  but 
action,  (mental  action,)  and  then,  as  regeneraiion  is  a 
m,oral  change^  conclude  that  it  can  relate  only  to  ac- 
tion, and  can  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  disposition^  ■ 
or  principle  in  the  mind  which  precedes  action,  lest 
somehow  it  should  come  to  be  more  or  less  a  physical 


184  DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,   <fcc. 

change.  But  whatever  may  be  said  on  this  point,  it 
must  be  evident,  that  regeneration  would  be  of  little 
worth,  should  it  leave  the  regenerated  person  still 
under  the  influence  of  his  natural  and  uniform 
propensity  to  sin.  Accordingly,  those  who  say  that 
this  propensity  to  sin  is  not  morally  wrong,  must, 
after  all,  so  shape  the  matter,  that  what  is  called  regen- 
eration, though  relating,  as  they  think,  only  to  action, 
shall,  in  some  way  or  other,  remove  the  natural 
'propensity.  And  then  it  will  indeed  follow,  on  the 
principles  which  they  adopt,  that  regeneration  is,  in 
part  at  least,  a  physical  change,  inasmuch  as  it 
removes'a  propensity  which  they  say  is  not  of  a  moral 
nature.  But  all  who  think  soberly  will  see,  that  the 
renewing  influence  of  the  Spirit,  whether  called  moral 
or  physical,  must  take  away  a  man's  governing 
propensity  to  sin,  or  he  would  need  to  be  changed 
again  by  some  other  influence,  in  order  that  he  might 
be  prepared  to  obey  God,  —  unless  indeed  he  can, 
truly  obey  God,  while  he  has  a  uniform  propensity  to 
disobey.  I  repeat  it,  man's  natural  propensity  to  sin 
^nust  he  removed  ;  —  yes,  however  it  may  be  covered 
over  by  gentle  epithets,  it  is  a  great  and  destructive 
evil,  and  must  be  removed  by  the  renewing  of  the 
Holy  Ghost,  or  it  will  bring  certain  ruin  upon  the 
soul.  And  if  any  one  should  still  represent,  that  the 
great  and  only  thing  that  is  necessary,  is,  that  the 
actions  should  be  made  right,  and  that  we  need  the 
influence  of  the  Spirit  solely  to  make  them  right ;  this 


DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,    &C.  185 

representatioQ  would  require  the  words  of  our  Sjaviour, 

— ^  "  Make  the  tree  good  and   the  fruit  will  be  good    7'  '     : 

also,"  to  be  so  altered  as  to  read  thus  ;  make  ihQ  fruit  fi'0^^*^°' 

good,  "  and  the  fruit  will  be  good  also."     The  fruit  '^fJ^x^  -^ 

would  no  longer  show  what  the  tree  is.     For  though 

the  fruit  might  be  good,  the  tree  might  still  be  bad. 

And  the  badness  of  the  tree  would  be  of  no  particular. 

consequence,   and    might  very   safely   remain,   there     ' 

being  no  kind  of  necessity,  either  first  or  last,  to  make 

the  tree  good,  in  order  to  have  good  fruit. 

In  the  extended  remarks  which  I  have  made  on 
this  subject,  it  has  been  my  aim  to  do  justice  to  the 
particular  theory  under  consideration,  and  to  say  what 
may  be  said  in  its  defence.  This  theory  has  been 
generally  regarded,  and  has  here  been  treated,  as 
different  from  that  which  was  presented  in  the  last 
chapter.  In  some  respects  it  is  different.  But  we 
know  that,  in  many  cases,  two  theories  which  are  in 
some  respects  different,  and  which  are  supposed  by/.^^^'. 
many  to  be  opposite  to  each  other,  will,  on  thorough 
examination,  be  found  to  be  not  only  consistent  with 
each  other,  but  to  be  merely  different  views  of  one 
and  the  same  thing,  I  may  survey  an  object  from 
one  position,  and  see  it  on  one  side,  while  you  survey 
it  from  another  position,  and  see  it  on  another  side. 
Confining  ourselves  respectively  to  these  first  views, 
we  may  charge  each  other  with  mistake  ;  and  you 
may  contend  for  your  own  particular  view,  and  I  for 
mine,  as  epcclusively  true.     And  exclusively  true  it 


186  DISPOSITION,    PROPENSITY,    &C. 

would  really  be,  if  the  object  before  us  had  no  othef 
side  but  that  which  you  survey,  or  that  which  I 
survey.  But  if  you  and  I  should  change  positions, 
and  turn  our  eye  towards  the  same  object  on  different 
sides,  we  should  come  to  a  different  conclusion.  We 
should  not  indeed  give  up  our  former  views  as  false. 
But  we  should  add  other  views,  and  should  modify 
our  former  views,  just  so  far  as  our  additional  views 
required.  One  great  mistake  we  should  indeed 
correct,  that  is,  our  supposing  that  the  subject  had 
only  one  side,  and  that  the  particular  view  we  respect- 
ively took  of  it,  was  the  only  one  which  could  be 
taken.  The  final  result .  would  be,  that  by  a  farther 
examination,  —  by  going  beyond  our  former  partial 
views,  ancl  enlarging  our  knowledge,  we  should  be 
satisfied,  that  each  of  the  different  views  which  we 
first  took  of  the  subject,  had  a  portion  of  truth ;  that 
those  views  which  once  seemed  to  clash  with  each 
other,  are  perfectly  consistent ;  that  our  opposition  to 
each  other  arose  from  our  hmited  knowledge;  and 
that  our  examination  of  other  parts  of  the  subject  has 
not  only  increased  our  knowledge,  but  has  given 
greater  clearness  and  correctness  to  the  particular 
views  which  we  first  had.  Locke  happily  illustrates 
this  point.  Speaking  of  "  three  miscarriages "  that 
men  are  chargeable  with  in  reference  to  the  use  of 
their  reason,  he  says:  "The  third  sort  is  of  those 
who  sincerely  follow  reason,  but  for  want  of  that 
which  one  may  call  large^  sound,  round-about  sense, 


DISPOSITION    AND    EXERCISE.  187 

have  not  a  full  view  of  all  that  relatesjo  the  question. 
We  are  all  short-sighted,  and  very  often  see  but  one 
side  of  a  matter :  our  views  are  not  extended  to  all 
that  has  connection  with  it.  We  see  but  in  part ;  — 
and  therefore  it  is  no  wonder  we  conclude  not  right 
from  our  partial  views.  This  might  instruct  nhe 
proudest  esteemer  of  his  own  parts,  how  useful  it  is  to 
talk  and  consult  with  others.  For  since  no  one  sees 
all,  and  we  generally  have  different  prospects  of  the 
same  thing  according  to  our  different  positions,  —  it  is 
not  beneath  any  man  to  try  whether  another  may  hot 
have  notions  of  things  which  have  escaped  him,  and 
which  his  reason  would  make  use  of,  if  they  came 
into  his  mind." 

That  view  of  the  subject  under  consideration 
which,  on  the  whole,  seems  most  nearly  to  accord 
with  the  representations  of  Scripture,  and  with  our 
own  consciousness,  is  one  which  substantially  unites 
the  two  theories,  presented  in  these  two  chapters.  It 
may  be  thus  exhibited.  V 

The  moral  nature  or  disposition  of  man,  though,^ 
in  GUI*  way  oif  contemplating  it,  distinct  from  action^ 
^mental  as  well  as  bodily,  and  though  evidently  pre- 
supposed in  action,  does  not  exist  in  such  a  manner, 
that  it  can  be  considered  and  treated  as  in  fact 
separate  from  action.  What  I  mean  is,  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  a  m,oral  beiiig"  who  is  actually 
treated  as  a  subject  of  retribution^  while  his  moral 
nature  is  not  in  any  %oay   developed  in  holy  or 

/7 


188  DISPOSITION    AND    EXERCISE. 

unholy  action.  The  very  idea  of  a  moral  agent 
receiving  retribution,  implies  the  exercise  of  his  moral 
faculties,  the  acting  out  of  his  disposition*  That  any 
one  can  enjoy  good,  or  suffer  evil,  without  mental 
action,  is  inconceivable.  I  say,  then,  that  there  can 
be  flo  such  thing  as  reward  or  punishment  actually 
dispensed  to  a  moral  being,  whose  heart  is  not  devel- 
oped in  some  kind  of.  exercise.  The  disposition,  the 
moral  nature  does  indeed  exist ;  it  is  a  reality  ;  and 
God  is  perfectly  acquainted  with  it,  before  it  is  made 
known  by  action.  But  it  cannot  be  known  to  created 
beings,  not  even  to  him  who  is  the  subject  of  it,  except 
as  manifested  in  external  or  internal  action.  It 
cannot,  in  any  other  way,  become  a  matter  of  con- 
sciousness. And  as  it  can  never  be  known,  it  can 
never  be  recompensed,  aside  from  its  outgoings  in 
action.  But  what  if  a  human  being  dies,  before  his 
moral  nature  is  in  any  degree  developed  ?  I  answer ; 
if  he  exists  in  another  state,  he  will  doubtless  act  out 
his  disposition  there.  As  soon  as  he  has  opportunity, 
he  will,  if  unrenewed,  show  himself  to  be  a  sinner, 
and  will  thus  make  it  manifest,  that  his  character  was 
'  stamped  for  eternity  by  his  descent  from  apostate 
Adam.  The  disposition  certainly  leading  to  sin, 
existed  in  him  from  the  first;  and  it  would  have 
acted  itself  out  in  the  present  life,  had  opportunity 
been  given.  But  the  want  of  opportunity  does  not 
alter  the  disposition.  Opportunity  however  is  shortly 
given.     Soon  after  death,  —  no    one  can    tell    how 


DISPOSITION   AND    EXERCISE.  189 

soon,  —  the  character    of  the    unrenewed    mind    is 
exhibited  in  sinful  feelings  and  actions.     If  regenera- 
tion takes  place,  which  Professor  Stuart,  in  common 
with  all  Orthodox  divines,  represents  as  indispensable  I 
to  salvation  even  in  infancy ;  then  the  new-born  child,  {^lJ^^(/U'^ 
dying  before  there  is  any  opportunity  to  develope  hisl        / 
renewed  nature  in  moral  exercises,  will  doubtless  havei*  J^^^^i^ 

a  speedy  opportunity  to  develope  them  after  death,  and^-    .    a. 

will  spontaneously  love  what  is  holy,  and  hate  what ' -*^'*'^'**^ 
is  sinful.  ,    //>v<wV 

There  may  seem  to  be  an  inconsistency  between  iS*^- 
these  last  remarks,  and  the  Scripture  doctrine  of 
retribution.  But  the  inconsistency  may  be  only 
apparent.  The  Scriptures  teach,  that  men  shall  be 
rewarded  according'  to  the  deeds  done  in  the  body. 
This  is  unquestionably  the  general  rule.  It  is  tbe*^  "  A 
rule  in  respect  to  all  those  to  whom  it  can  apply  ;  that 
is,  to  all  who  have  had  opportunity  to  do  any  deeds  in 
the  body.  To  these,  of  course,  it  must  be  limited  ; 
on  the  same  principle  that  faith  in  Christ,  as  a  condi- 
tion of  salvation,  is  in  Scripture  required  of  all  men, 
without  any  express  limitation  ;  whereas  it  is  univer- 
sally admitted,  that  the  requisition  must  be  limited  to 
those  who  are  capable  of  exercising  faith.  Of  others 
faith  cannot  be  required.  The  rule  of  judgment,  as 
expressed  in  Scripture,  must  be  considered  as  the 
universal  rule,  in  regard  to  those  to  whom  it  can  be 
applied.  And  even  as  to  others,  the  principle 
involved  in  this  rule  will  be  observed,  though,  of 
17 


190  DISPOSITION    AND    EXERCISE. 

course,  in  a  manner  suited  to  their  condition.  If  there 
are  those  who  die  without  having  made  any  develope- 
ment  of  their  native  disposition  by  moral  exercises, 
what  can  be  reasonably  supposed,  but  that  they  will 
be  treated  in  the  world  of  spirits  according  to  the 
character  which  they  will  there  exhibit?  The 
principles  of  moral  government  manifested  in  such  a 
proceeding,  are,  it  would  seem,  essentially  the  same,  as 
those  which  are  manifested  by  carrying  into  eflfect  the 
common  rule  of  recompensing  men  according  to  the 
deeds  done  in  the  body,  that  is,  according  to  the 
characters  they  exhibit  in  the  present  life? 

This  then  is  the  manner  of  contemplating  the  sub- 
^        ject  before  us,  which  I  would  recommend  to  the  careful 
u^^       consideration  of  thinking  men.     And  though  I  would 
^  J  not  be  confident,  that  I  have  reached  the  theory  which 

J/^  is  exactly  right,  I   wish  it  may  be  made  a    subject 

^'^?  of  ini partial  inquiry,  whether  this,  or  something  Uke 
this,  is  not  conformed  to  truth :  to  wit :  The  native 
disposition  to  sin  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  actually 
standing  alone.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  human 
being,  a  subject  of  government,  coming  into  existence 
with  the  corrupt  propensity  which  every  child  of 
Adam  has,  and  continuing  to  exist  for  any  considera- 
ble time,  without  some  movements  of  mind  indi- 
cating that  propensity.  Should  any  one  be  in  this 
predicament,  and  while  he  is  in  it,  we  cannot  see  how 
g^  he  can  be  treated  as  a  subject  of  moral  retribution.  /' 
^g:  I   have  introduced   the   supposition   merely  to  show 

what  I  mean  by  saying,  that  the  sinful  disposition  of 


<r> 


Z- 


DISPOSITION    AND    EXERCISE.  191 

man  is  not  intended  to  be  separate,  and  cannot  be 
considered  and  treated  as  separate  from  moral  action. 
Though  his  disposition  is  wrong,  (wrong  as  a  dispo- 
sition^) he  is  still  to  be  treated  according  to  his 
actions,  —  his  actions  being  the  true  expression  of  his 
disposition.  His  being  treated  according  to  his 
actions,  is  then,  after  all,  the  same  thing  as  being 
treated  according  to  his  disposition.  The  former 
is  made  the  express  rule  of  the  divine  conduct  towards 
man,  for  the  obvious  reason,  that  actions  are  directly 
visible  to  conscience,  and  can  be  compared  with  law 
by  the  subjects  of  law,  and  so  are  the  proper  grounds 
of  recompense.  In  the  divine  government,  then,  dispo- 
sition is  in  fact  treated  as  morally  wrong,  only  as 
developed  in  action,  and  as  thus  made  visible  to  those 
who  are  the  subjects  of  that  government.  We  cannot 
doubt  that  a  government  which  is  addressed  to  con^ 
science,  must  be  administered  in  this  manner.  And 
when  Calvin  spoke  of  our  natural  pravity  as  deserv- 
ing the  divine  vengeance,  must  he  not  have  intended 
to  speak  of  it  as  developed  in  rnoral  action  ? 

Evidently  then,  the  two  views  which  have  been 
taken  of  the  subject  in  this  and  the  last  chapter  need 
not  be  regarded  as  opposite  and  clashing  views.  They 
are  only  different  views  of  the  same  subject,  contem- 
plated under  different  aspects.  Man,  at  the  com- 
mencement of  his  existence,  is,  according  to  one  view, 
characterized  from  his  disposition,  and  is  regarded  as  a 
sinner  as  soon  as  he  is  born,  on  account  of  his  invaria- 


192  DISPOSITION    AND    EXERCISE. 

hie  propensity  to  sin.  But  then,  according  tojhe  other 
view,  this  propensity  to  sin  is  inseparably  connected  with 
sinful -emotion,  and  is  soon  followed  by  it,  if  not  in  ev- 
ery instance  before  death,  doubtless  immediately  after. 
The  temper  of  the  mind  is  thus  developed,  and  the 
way  prepared  for  a  retribution  which  all  will  see  to  be 
just.  On  one  scheme,  man  is  judged  according  to  his 
actions  ;  on  the  other,  according  to  his  disposition  as 
developed  in  actions.  And  what  is  the  difference? 
If  the  disposition  19  pronounced  to  be  sinful,  it  is 
pronounced  to  be  so  relatively/  to  the  action  to  w^hich 
it  leads.  And  if  the  action  is  pronounced  sinful,  it  is 
relatively  to  the  mind,  and  the  disposition  of  mind, 
from  which  it  proceeds.  Each  is  invariably  related  to 
the  other,  and  in  our  sober  contemplations,  and  in  the 
nature  of  the  case,  each  is  involved  in  the  other.  If 
any  man  ascribes  moral  qualities  to  either,  as  entirely 
separate  from  the  other,  he  is  mistaken.  He  does  not 
follow  the  nature  of  things.  And  if  any  one  confines 
his  attention  to  either,  exclusively  of  the  other,  does 
he  not  betray  the  want  of  enlargement  in  his  habits 
of  thinking  ?  And  let  me  add,  if  any  one  forgets  that 
all  moral  attributes  and  qualities  do,  in  strict  propriety, 
belong  to  the  intelligent  person,  the  agent  himself^ 
and  are  to  be  ascribed  to  him,  and  to  him  only,  he 
forgets  an  obvious  and  essential  truth  ;  and  forgets  it, 
so  far  as  I  can  see,  for  no  other  reason,  than  because 
it  is  so  obvious.  Most  clearly  it  is  the  mind,  or  rather 
the  'man  himself,  that  is    sinful.      Man,   a  being 


DISPOSITION    AND    EXERCISE.  193 

whose  nature  is  essentially  active,  has  this  character.- 
He  is  sinful.  And  this  sinful  being  acts  ;  and  being 
sinful  himself,  he  acts  sinfully.  This  is  the  sum  of 
the  whole  matter. 

And  now,  candid  reader,  if  you  find  that  I  have  in 
any  instance  written  particular  passages,  which,  taken 
by  themselves,  seem  to  be  erroneous  or  defective ;  let 
the  general  current  of  thought,  as  far  as  may  be,  help 
to  correct  the  error,  or  supply  the  defect.  You  cannot 
but  be  sensible,  that  some  parts  of  the  subject  which  I 
have  presumed  to  discuss,  are  involved  in  great  obscu- 
rity, and  that  it  is  almost  impossible  for  us  to  say  any 
thing  respecting  them,  without  the  danger  of  falling 
into  some  mistake  ourselves,  or  of- being  misappre- 
hended by  others.  In  regard  to  any  representations 
or  reasonings  which  may  appear  inconsistent  with 
each  other,  I  have  only  to  say,  that  I  have  sometimes 
aimed  to  exhibit  such  considerations  as  might  suggest 
themselves  to  my  mind,  either  in  favor  of  a  particular 
point,  or  against  it,  without  expressing  and  sometimes 
without  having  any  decided  opinion  of  my  own. 
And  I  have  done  this  for  the  purpose  of  inducing 
others  to  examine  the  subject  for  themselves.  Fur- 
ther :  you  will  perceive  that  I  am  as  Hable  as  other 
men,  to  take  different  and  seemingly  opposite  views  of 
a  subject,  in  consequence  of  contemplating  it  from 
different  positions,  or  in  different  relations.  In  such 
cases,  you  will,  I  hope,  endeavour  to  find  out  a  candid 
and  fair  construction  of  what  is  written,  such  as  you 
*17 


194  DISPOSITION    AND    EXERCISE. 

would  think  due  to  yourself  in  like  circumstances.  But 
let  nothing  prevent  you  from  guarding  with  the  utmost 
watchfulness,  against  any  error,  and  against  whatever 
might  tend  to  error,  in  this  performance.  There  is  no 
sentiment  more  deeply  fixed  in  my  mind,  than  that 
my  views  of  every  subject  are  very  limited,  and  that 
on  such  a  subject  as  that  which  is  brought  forward  in 
this  Essay,  it  would  be  inexcusable  presumption  in  me 
to  think  myself  free  from  mistakes.  The  subject  is 
encompassed  with  difficulties  which  I  pretend  not  to 
be  able  to  solve.  Objections  will  doubtless  arise  in 
your  mind,  against  what  I  have  written,  particularly 
in  these  two  chapters.  I  could  urge  objections  my- 
self ;  and  would  gladly  take  my  place  at  the  feet  of 
any  man,  who  could  satisfactorily  answer  them.  But 
where  shall  I  find  the  man  who  is  quahfied  to  do  this? 
We  ought  always  to  approach  this  subject  with  an 
humble  mind,  remembering  that  the  natural  and  total 
depravity  of  which  we  speak,  belongs  to  us,  and 
striving  with  all  diligence  to  be  rid  of  that  prejudice 
against  the  truth,  which  is  one  of  the  most  common 
inmates  of  the  depraved  heart.  What  becomes  us  in 
these  circumstances  is,  not  dispute  and  strife,  but 
serious,  earnest  inquiry  after  the  truth,  pursued  with 
patient,  persevering  labor,  with  kindness  towards  those 
who  differ  from  us,  with  a  cordial  readiness  to  be 
convinced,  and  with  prayer  to  God  for  the  guidance 
of  his  Spirit.  If  we  inquire  after  the  truth  in  such  a 
manner,  we  shall  obtain  good  to  ourselves,  and  shall 


DISPOSITION   AND    EXERCISE.  195 

contribute  to  the  good  of  others,  though  our  inquiries 
may  for  the  present  fail  of  complete  success.  We 
have  the  comfort  to  believe,  that  the  knowledge  which 
Christians  have  of  divine  truth  is  progressive.  It  will 
undoubtedly  be  growing  in  clearness  and  comprehen- 
siveness, to  the  end  of  time,  and  forever.  When 
Christians  come  to  associate  profound  humility,  un- 
quenchable zeal  for  improvement,  and  the  spirit 
of  prayer,  with  the  exercise  of  their  mental  powers, 
they  will  soon  outgrow  their  errors,  and  their  intel- 
lectual and  moral  httleness,  and  speed  their  way 
towards  a  state  of  perfection.  And  if,  even  after 
attaining  to  the  perfection  of  that  higher  state  to 
which  they  now  aspire,  they  find,  as  they  doubtless 
will,  that  some  subjects  or  parts  of  subjects  lie  beyond 
the  reach  of  their  intelligence  ;  their  very  perfection 
will  teach  them  to  acquiesce  in  their  ignorance. 


CHAPTER    X. 

Remarks  on  the  words  innate,  transmitted,  hereditary,  constitutional,  imputed. 

It  would  accord  best  with  my  views  of  what  is 
proper  and  useful,  to  confine  my  remarks  and  reason- 
ings to  the  doctrine  of  human  depravity,  just  as  it 
stands  in  the  Bible,  and  to  its  practical  uses,  avoiding 
altogether  the  discussion  of  the  abstruse,  metaphysical 
questions  which  are  everywhere  agitated  at  the  present 
day.     I  cannot  but  approve  the  sentiment  of  Howe 


196  INNATE* 

in  the  following  passage,  taken  from  his  Living 
Temple.  "  As  for  thenn  that  could  never  have  the 
gospel,  or  infants  incapable  of  receiving  it,  we  must 
consider  the  Holy  Scriptures'  were  written  for  those 
that  could  use  them,  not  for  those  that  could  not ; 
therefore  to  have  inserted  in  them  an  account  of  God's 
methods  of  dispensation  towards  such,  had  only  served 
to  gratify  the  curious  and  unconcerned,  not  to  instruct 
and  benefit  such  as  were  concerned.  And  it  well 
became  hereupon  the  accurate  wisdom  of  God,  not 
herein  to  indulge  the  vanity  and  folly  of  men."  But 
as  men  cannot  be  kept  from  agitating  questions  of  a 
metaphysical  nature  on  this  subject,  and  as  many  of  the 
opinions  which  they  form,  are,  in  my  apprehension, 
not  only  erroneous,  but  of  hurtful  tendency ;  I  have 
thought  it  expedient  to  join  with  them  for  a  time,  in 
the  consideration  of  these  speculative  matters,  and  to 
endeavour  to  show,  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  results 
of  thorough  philosophical  investigation,  which  is  at 
all  unfavorable  to  the  commonly  received  doctrine 
of  human  corruption. 

Before  closing  this  Essay,  it  seems  necessary  that  I 
make  a  few  remarks  on  the  meaning  of  the  words 
innate^  transmitted,  hereditary,  constitutional,  (fcc. 
and  on  the  propriety  of  applying  them  to  the  depravity 
of  man. 

The  word  innate,  together  with  the  words  which 
Johnson  uses  to  explain  it,  are  applied  as  freely  to  the 
qualities  of  the  mind,  as  to  any  thing  which  pertains 


HEREDITARY.  197 

to  the  body.  Thus  writers  speak  of  innate  integrity, 
innate  eloquencej  iiihorn  passions,  inborn  worth,  in- 
bred affection,  <fcc.  Innate  is  opposed  to  the  word  su- 
peradded, which  in  this  case  would  denote  something 
which  does  not  arise  from  any  thing  in  man's  nature, 
or  from  w^iat  he  is  by  birth.  If  depravity  belongs  to 
man  in  the  state  in  w^hich  he  is  born  ;  if  a  foundation 
is  laid  for  his  sinning  in  his  very  nature  ;  it  is  perfect- 
ly suitable  to  call  his  depravity  innate.  To  say  that 
man  is  born  destitute  of  holiness,  and  with  a  propen- 
sity to  sin,  is  the  same  as  to  say,  that  man's  destitution 
of  holiness,  or  his  propensity  to  sin,  is  innate  ;  in  other 
words,  that  it  is  natural. 

The  word  connate  is  seldom  used  at  the  present 
day;  although  there  would  seem  to  be  no  special 
objection  against  it.  For  how  can  man's  depravity,  or 
propensity  to  sin,  be  innate,  born  in  him,  without 
being  connate,  that  is,  born  with  him  ? 

Hereditary  means,  descended  from  an  ancestor ; 
transmitted  from  a  parent  to  a  child.  Now  is  it  not 
a  plain  matter  of  fact,  that  a  depraved  nature,  a 
propensity  to  sin,  has  descended  from  the  common 
ancestor  of  our  race  to  all  his  posterity,  that  it  is  trans- 
mitted from  parent  to  child?  Are  we  not  "degenerate 
plants  of  a  strange  vine?  "  And  if  depravity  comes 
in  this  way,  what  impropriety  is  there  in  caUing  it 
hereditary  7 

I  beg  leave  in  this  place  to  offer  a  few  more  remarks 
on  the  doctrine  universally  maintained  by  the  Ortho- 


198  IMPUTED. 

dox,  namely,  that  we  are  depraved  and  lost  hi  con- 
sequence of  the  offence  of  Adam.  Let  us  inquire  in 
what  way  Adam's  apostacy  produced  such  an  effect 
upon  liis  posterity. 

First ;  ivas  his  transgression  so  charged  to  his 
posterity^  that  they  are  subjected  to  differing  on 
account  of  it,  while  they  themselves  have  no  sin,  or, 
at  most,  none  which  is  the  ground  of  their  suffer- 
ings ?  My  reasoning  here  will  relate  exclusively  to 
\  that  period 'of  Hfe  which  precedes  any  sinful  exercises. 
Because  as  soon  as  we  have  exercises,  however  feeble, 
which  constitute,  actual  sin,  no  one  supposes  that  we 
suffer  solely  on  account  of  Adam's  sin.  In  regard  to 
the  first  period  of  our  infancy,  there  are  two  supposi- 
tions to  be  here  considered ;  one  is,  that  we  have  a 
I  ^  sinful  iiature,  a  corrupt  moral  propensity;  the 
other,  that  we  have  nothing  which  is  in  any  respect  or 
in  any  degree  of  the  nature  of  sin  ;  that  we  are  free 
from  moral  depravity.  Those  who  beheve  in  the  doc- 
trine of  imputation  in  the  strictest  sense,  hold  the 
former  of  these  suppositions  —  namely,  that  we  have 
from  the  beginning  a  vitiosity  of  nature.  Now  what 
reason  can  they  have  to  deny,  that  in  the  infliction  of 
evil  upon  us  in  infancy,  God  has  a  respect  to  our 
moral  corruption?  Can  they  be  sure,  that  our  depravity 
is  of  no  consideration  with  God  in  respect  to  our  suf- 
ferings at  the  beginning  of  life,  and  that  he  brings 
them  upon  us  on  account  of  Adam's  sin,  and  on  that 
account  exclusively  7     It  may  indeed  be  true  that  we 


IMPUTED.  199 

suffer  at  that  time  on  account  of  the  offence  of  him 
who  was  the  head,  and,  in  an  important  sense,  the 
representative  of  our  race.  And  it  may  also  be  true, 
that  we  suffer  on  account,  of  that  moral  cowuption 
which  belongs  to  us  from  the  first.  God  may  have 
respect' to  each  of  these  in  the  sufferings  to  which  he 
subjects  us  in  early  infancy.  And  he  may  have 
respect  to  one  as  the  primary  reason,  and  to  the  other 
as  the  secondary  or  subordinate  reason.  Or  he  may 
have  respect  to  both  alike,  as  co-ordinate  and  equal 
reasons.  Doubtless  he  has  respect  to  something  as  a 
reason  for  so  .important  a  proceeding  in  his  govern- 
ment. And  if  we  judge  from  the  Bible,  and  from 
observation,  we  shall,  I  think,  be  satisfied  that  either 
Adam's  offence,  or  our  native  sinfulness,  or  both 
together,  must  constitute  the  reason.  And  considering 
what  the  Apostle  teaches  in  Rom.  v.  how  can  we  set 
aside  Adam's  sin,  and  say,  that  it  is  not  at  all  on  that 
account,  that  suffering  and  death  come  upon  infants  ? 
And  admitting  the  fact,  that  we  have  from  the  first  a 
sinful  nature,  how  can  we  set  aside  this,  and  say  with 
confidence,  that  it  is  not  at  all  on  this  account,  but 
wholly  and  exclusively  on  account  of  Adam's  offence, 
that  suffering  comes  upon  infants?  Can  we  be  certain, 
that  they  would  suffer  as  they  do,  if  they  were  not  the 
subjects  of  a  moral  corruption?  'A 

I  proceed  now  to  the  second  supposition  above 
named,  —  that  at  the  beginning  of  life^  we  are  free 
from  moral  depravity ^ — that  we  have  nothing  which 


,< 


200  iMPtruED.  ic\ 

is  of  the  fiature  of  sin.  All  agree,  that  children  at  r 
the  beginning  of  life,  are  subjected  to  various  suffer-  '^ 
ings ;  and  I  should  think  all  would  agree,  that  they 
are  subjected  to  these  sufferings  for  some  reason. 
But  what  is  that  reason  ?  On  what  account  do  they 
suflfer,  they  being  considered  entirely  free  from  moral 
pollution?  Is  suffering  brought  upon  them  in  the 
way  of  moral  discipline^  for  their  benefit  ?  But  how 
can  this  be,  when,  according  to  the  supposition,  they 
are  not  intelligent,  moral  agents,  and  of  course  are  not 
capable  of  moral  discipline?  Is  suffering  brought 
upon  them,  then,  by  way  of  anticipation^  on  account 
of  the  sins  which  thay  will  commit,  when  they 
become  moral  agents  ?  In  other  words,  is  it  a  punish- 
ment for  sin  prospectively/  ?  Let  any  man  judge 
whether  this  can  be  made  consistent  with  our  ideas  of 
law  or  justice?  —  Is  suffering,  then,  brought  upon 
infant  children,  as  a  preventive  of  sin?  But  if  this 
Were  the  design  of  it,  should  we  not  suppose  that  in 
some  instances  it  would  actually  be  a  preventive  ?  — 
Does  the  Bible  then  give  us  any  instruction,  does  it 
bring  out  any  principle,  which  can  aid  our  inquiries 
on  this  subject,  and  show  us  why  it  is  that  suffering 
comes  upon  infant  children  ?  When  I  search  the 
Bible,  I  find  that  God  lays  it  down  in  the  decalogue, 
as  a  standing  principle,  that  he  "  visits  the  iniquities  of 
the  fathers  upon  the  children."  And  the  history  of 
the  divine  dispensations  clearly  shows  that,  to  a  greater 
or  less  extent,  he  acts  on  this  principle.     And  I  find 


i/^^  oJ^-v^  t-^.^L.. 


WHY    DO    INFANTS    SUFFER?  201 

something  which  appears  to  be  still  more  directly  to 
the  purpose  in  Chap,  v.  of  the  epistle  to  the  Romans. 
In  this  place  I  am  told,  that  it  is  thrxiugh  the  offence 
of  Adam  that  his  posterity  die ;  that  hy  one  man's 
offence  death  reigns  over  the  human  family  ;  that  this 
judgment  was  by  one  to  condemnation.  If  I  were 
now  for  the  first  time  to  read  this  part  of  Scripture,  I 
should  be  very  apt  to  think  I  had  found  an  answer  to 
the  inquiry,  —  why  is  it  that  at  the  beginning  of  life 
we  are  subjected  to  suffering?  It  would  verily  seem 
that  I  am  here  taught  by  the  word  of  God,  that  death, 
with  its  attendant  evils,  is  brought  upon  all  human 
beings  without  exception,  and  of  course  upon  human 
beings  in  early  infancy,  "6y  the  offence  of  one^"*  that 
is,  Adam. 

Here,  however,  an  objection  rises  in  my  mind, 
and  I  begin  to  say,  that  such  a  proceeding  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  moral  attributes  of  God.  But  I  check 
myself,  and  ask  how  I  know  this  ?  I  ask  too,  what 
other  view  of  the  case  would  be  more  consistent  ?  and 
I  anxiously  cast  my  thoughts  around  for  satisfaction. 
It  is  clear  that  infants  suffer.  According  to  my  pres- 
ent supposition,  they  are  free  from  sin,  and  therefore 
cannot  suffer  on  account  of  any  moral  evil  in  them- 
selves. I  cannot  think  they  suffer  on  account  of  sins 
which  they  will  afterwards  commit ;  or  that  they 
suffer  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  sin  in  after  life,  /^ 
And  I  here  give  up  the  opinion  that  they  suffer  either 
on  account  of  being  born  in  sin,  or  on  account  of  the 
18 


202  WHY    DO    INFANTS    SUFFER? 

sin  of  Adam.  Now  if  I  take  this  ground,  how  shall 
I  account  for  the  fact  that  infants  suffer  ?  Suppose  I 
try  this  method  ;  that  is,  —  from  a  dislike  to  the  doc- 
trine of  our  native  sinfulness,  and  the  doctrine  of 
imputation,  and  for  the  sake  of  being-  totally  rid  of 
both  of  them,  I  take  the  whole  race  of  man  during 
the  interesting  period  of  their  early  infancy,  cut  them 
off  from  their  relation  to  Adam,  degrade  them  from 
the  dignity  of  human  beings,  and  put  them  in  the 
rank  of  brute  animals,  —  and  then  say,  they  suffer 
as  the  brutes  do.  But  this  would  be  the  worst  of  all 
theories,  —  the  farthest  off  from  Scripture  and  reason, 
and  the  most  revolting  to  all  the  noble  sensibilities  of 
man.  And  then  the  question  comes  up ;  why  1  adopt 
such  an  opinion  ?  I  find  that  I  have  no  reason  for  it 
but  this.  I  first  deny  man's  native  sinfulness,  and  of 
course,  I  deny  that  infants  suffer  on  any  such  account. 
Next,  I  say,  the  doctrine  of  imputation  is,  in  every 
possible  form,  altogether  unreasonable  and  absurd,  and, 
notwithstanding  what  the  Apostle  teaches  as  to  the 
effect  of  Adam's  sin,  I  cannot  admit  the  idea  that 
infants  suffer,  in  whole  or  in  part,  on  that  account. 
Now  if  I  regard  infants  as  belonging  to  the  family  of 
human  beings,  and  as  treated  on  any  principles  which 
are  applicable  to  such  beings,  I  find  myself  in  a 
strait, —  having  set  aside  the  common,  obvious  reason 
why  human  beings  suffer  and  die,  that  is,  their  own 
sinfulness,  and  the  special  reason  which  the  Apostle 
suggests  in  Rom.  v.  that  is,  their  relation  to  apostate 


«..-.  /• 


WHY    DO    INFANTS    SUFFER?  203 

Adam,  and  every  other  reason,  and  thus  finding 
myself  unable  to  give  any  kind  of  reply  to  the 
question,  Why  do  infants  suffer  and  die  ?  UnwilUng 
therefore  to  bear  the  pressure  of  this  question, 
which  is  so  hard  to  be  answered,  I  resolve  to  rid 
myself  of  it  at  once,  and  say,  children  in  early 
infancy  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  belonging  to  the 
human  race ;  they  are  not  treated  as  human  beings, 
but  as  brute  animals ;  and  so  the  evils  which  they 
suffer,  do  not  come  upon  them  either  because  they 
have  any  moral  depravity,  or  on  account  of  the  sin  of 
Adam  and  their  relation  to  him  as  the  head  of  the 
human  race,  or  on  account  of  any  thing  else  which 
appertains  to  beings  possessed  of  a  moral  nature. 

I  have  here  in  a  manner  personated  one  who  denies 
native  depravity,  and  the  fatal  influence  of  Adam's 
disobedience  upon  his  posterity,  and  who  thus  forces 
himself  to  invent  an  hypothesis  which  so  ill  accords 
with  Scripture  and  Christian  feehng.  The  fair  result 
of  the  whole  seems  to  be  this.  As  there  are  only  two 
things  mentioned  in  the  Bible,  which  bring  suffering 
and  death  upon  hunian  beings,  the  apostacy  of  Adam, 
and  their  own  personal  sin  ;  if  we  deny  the  native 
sinfulness  of  man,  or  if  we  deny  that  infants  are  in 
any  sense  subjected  to  suffering  on  that  account,  we 
are  shut  up  to  the  conclusion,  that  they  suffer  exclu- 
sively on  account  of  Adam's  sin,  and  so  that  the  often 
repeated  declaration  of  the  Apostle,  that  death  comes 
upon  ally  hy  the  offence  of  one^  is  to  be  understood  in 


*.l.i 


itM 


204 

the  most  literal,  unqualified  sense  ;  or  else  that  infants 
suffer  and  die  without  any  assignable  reason  what- 
ever. 

But  there  are  other  ways  in  which  Adam's  sin  has 
been  supposed  to  have  an  influence  upon  his  posterity. 
I  inquire  then  whether  that  influence  is  to  be  under- 
stood in  this  way  ;  namely,  that  Adam's  sin  was  the 
occasion  of  bringing  his  posterity  into  life  in  such 
circumMances  of  weakness  and  temptation^  that 
althovgh  they  are  horn  without  any  wrong  hiaSy 
or  any  tendency  to  si?i,  they  willy  after  a  while,  be 
corrupted  and  fall  into  sin.  This  opinion,  which 
is  defended  by  few  at  the  present  day  except  Unita- 
rians, has  been  substantially  considered  in  previous 
chapters.  1  shall  only  say  here,  that  it  leaves  wholly 
untouched  the  question  ;  on  what  account  do  human 
being's  suffer  before  they  commit  actual  sin?  and  that 
it  requires  a  most  unnatural  and  forced  construction  to 
be  put  upon  the  whole  representation  of  the  Apostle  in 
Rom.  V. 

Again  ;  I  inquire  whether  Adam's  sin  affects  his 
posterity  in  this  way  ;  namely  ;  that  by  a  special 
divine  constitution,  they  are,  in  consequence  of  his 
fall,  horn  in  a  state  of  m^oral  depravity  leading  to 
certain  ruin;  or  that,  according  to  the  comm^on 
law  of  descent,  they  are  partakers  of  a  corrupt 
nature,  the  offspring  being  like  the  parent ;  and 
that  suffering  and  death  come  upon  them>  not  as 
personally  innocent  and  pure^  but  as  depraved  and 


EFFECT    OF   ADAm's    SII^.  205 

sinful  beings.  This  opinion  is  maintained  by  Cal- 
vin,  Edwards,  Dwight,  and  Orthodox  divines  gener- 
ally. And  this  is  the  view  of  the  subject  w^hich  I 
consider  as  more  conformable  to  the  word  of  God  and 
to  facts,  than  any  other.  As  to  those  who  deny  the 
doctrine  of  native  depravity,  and  the  doctrine  of 
imputation,  and  the  doctrine  of  John  Taylor  and  the 
Unitarians,  and  yet  profess  to  believe  that  we  are 
depraved  and  ruined  in  consequence  of  Adam's  sin, 
I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  what  their  belief  amounts  to. 
They  say,  Adam's  sin  had  an  influence;  but  they'' 
deny  all  the  conceivable  ways  in  which  it  could  have 
an  influence,  and  particularly  the  ways  which  are 
most  clearly  brought  to  view  in  Rom.  v.,  and  in 
other  parts  of  Scripture.  Is  not  their  belief  merely 
negative  ? 

If  I  am  asked,  whether  I  hold  the  doctrine  of  impu- 
tation ;  my  reply  must  depend  on  the  meaning  you 
give  to  the  word.  Just  make  the  question  definite  by 
substituting  the  explanation  for  the  word,  and  an 
answer  will  be  easy.  Do  you  then  mean  what 
Stapfer  and  Edwards  and  many  others  mean,  namely, 
that /or  God  to  give  Adam  a  posterity/  like  himself 
and  to  impute  his  sin  to  them,  is  one  and  the  same 
thing  ?  Then  my  answer  is,  that  God  did  in  this 
sense,  impute  Adam's  sin  to  his  posterity.  This  is  the 
very  thing  implied  in  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity. 
By  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  do  you  mean,  that 
Adam's  sin  was  the  occasion  of  our  ruin  ;  that  it  was 
*18 


206 

the  distant,  though  real  cause  of  our  condemnation 
and  death  ?  I  consider  the  doctrine,  thus  understood, 
to  be  according  to  Scripture.  Do  you  mean  that  we 
are  guilty^  that  is,  (according  to  the  true,  original 
import  of  the  word,)  exposed  to  suffering  on  account 
of  Adam's  sin  ?  In  this  view  too  I  think  the  doctrine 
Scriptural.  Do  you  mean,  that  God  visits  the 
iniquity  of  our  common  father  upon  his  children, 
through  all  generations  ?  This  too  accords  with  the 
truth.  But  if  the  doctrine  of  imputation  means,  that 
for  Adam's  sin  alone,  God  inflicts  the  penalty  of  the 
law  upon  any  of  his  posterity,  they  themselves  being 
perfectly  sinless,  then  the  doctrine,  in  my  view,  wants 
proof  There  appears  to  be  no  place  for  such  a  doc- 
trine, seeing  all  Adam's  posterity  are  from  the  first 
morally  depraved.  And  if  they  are  allowed  to  be  so, 
I  know  not  why  any  one  should  think  that  God 
makes  no  account  of  their  depravity  in  the  sufferings 
which  he  brings  upon  them.  The  Apostle  does  not 
use  the  word  impute  in  relation  to  the  subject ;  but  he 
does  teach,  in  the  plainest  manner,  that  the  fall  of 
Adam  spread  depravity  and  destruction  through  the 
whole  human  race.  The  particular  word  which  shall 
be  used  to  express  this  doctrine,  is  not  essential ;  and 
as  the  sacred  writers  do  not  express  it  by  imputation  ; 
why  should  we  be  strenuous  for  that  particular  word  1 
Nevertheless,  as  it  is  the  name  which  has  generally 
been  given  to  the  doctrine  in  Orthodox  creeds  and 
systems  of  divinity,  and  as  the  word   may  have  a 


PROPAGATED   AND   CONSTITUTIONAL.  207 

meaning  in  no  small  degree  analogous  to  what  it  has 
in  Rom.  4  :  6 ;  I  can  see  no  reason  for  any  great  zeal 
against  it.  Considering  the  common  meaning  of  the 
word,  J  think  it  not  well  adapted  to  the  "subject,  and 
have  never  used  it.  But  Calvin  and  Edwards  and 
other  distinguished  divines  have  used  it.  The  great 
object  is  to  get  a  right  understanding  of  the  doctrine 
itself,  as  set  forth  in  the  word  of  God,  and  to  express 
it  in  a  just  and  impressive  manner. 

Do  you  ask,  whether  depravity  is  propagated  1 
my  answer  is,  that  human  beings  are  propagated, 
and  are  propagated  as  they  are,  fallen,  corrupt. 
"Adam  begat  a  son  in  his  own  likeness."  This 
contains  the  whole  doctrine,  if  likeness  includes,  as 
undoubtedly  it  does,  likeness  in  regard  to  moral  dis- 
position and  character.  The  word  propagated  is  not 
generally  applied  to  depravity,  and  is  evidently  not  so 
well  suited  to  the  subject,  as  natural,  or  native.  But 
it  is  neither  uncommon  nor  unscriptural  to  speak  of 
depravity  as  coming  in  the  way  of  natural  generation, 
or  natural  descent. 

Is  the  depravity  of  man  constitutional?  The 
chief  objection  against  the  use  of  this  word  in  relation 
to  the  subject  before  us,  seems  to  rest  on  the  assump- 
tion, that  the  word  means  nearly  the  same  as  joAy*- 
ical ;  or  at  least  something  opposite  to  moral.  But 
this  assumption  is  unauthorized.  The  word,  consti- 
tutional, may  relate  to  the  constitution  or  appointment 
of  God,  or  to  the    nature  or  constitution    of   man. 


)^C 


208  CONSTITUTIONAL. 

Now  was  it  not  the  constitution  of  God,  that  is,  the 
principle  or  plan  which  he  established,  that  the 
posterity  of  Adam  should  bear  his  moral  image  1  Is 
there  not,  in  fact,  such  a  connection  between  him  and 
them,  that  condemnation  and  death  were  brought 
upon  them  by  his  one  offence  ?  And  did  not  God 
constitute  this  connection  ?  Was  it  not  his  appoint- 
ment, that  "by  one  man's  disobedience  the  many  were 
constituted  sinners  7  "  And  is  it  not  the  established 
order  of  things,  that  children,  from  generation  to  gen- 
eration shall  resemble  their  parents  as  to  the  substance 
of  moral  character  ?  Evidently  then  the  depravity  of 
man  takes  place  according  to  the  divine  institution; 
and,  in  this  sense,  it  is  constitutional.  And  is  not 
this  a  very  obvious  and  proper  sense  of  the  word  1 
But  the  word  may  also  relate  to  the  nature  or  consti- 
tution of  men.  And  if  their  depravity  is  founded  in 
their  nature,  or  constitution,  may  it  not  properly  be 
called  constitutional  7  I  do  not  now  speak  of  their 
bodily  constitution,  but .  of  the  constitution  of  their 
mind  J  their  moral  constitution,  their  nature  as  moral 
beings.  We  have  a  m,ental  and  m,oral  constitu- 
tion, as  well  as  a  corporeal.  Now  if  depravity  con- 
sists in  our  moral  constitution,  or  directly  and  certainly 
flows  from  it ;  we  may  in  this  sense  call  it  constitu- 
tional,—  just  as  we  •call  it  natural,  because  it  is 
founded  in  our  moral  nature,  or  flows  from  it.  The 
word  however  is  not  used  by  us,  but  by  those  who 
differ  from  us.     To  discredit  our  doctrine  of  native 


J I  ^vl 


fetLl^ 


f 


Ar\ 


wtu^: 


CONSTITUTIONAI//  "      ^^209        ^      \ 

.      .     u         .        ^„    UKIYE.HSITY] 

depravity,  they  say  that  we  hold  i\^a-eonsttt2ihonal^^  / 
depravity.  Be  il  so.  Do  not  thei/  nbl^^iFje  same  ?  % '•*'' 
They  maintain,  —  certainly  the  most  respectable  of 
them  maintain,  that  the  cause  of  sin  lies  in  the 
nature  of  fnan,  not  in  his  circu^nstances.  And 
what  is  the  difference  between  the  nature  of  man, 
and  his  constitution^  whether  taken  physically,  or^, 
morally  ?  And  what  is  the  difference  between  their 
calling  depravity  natural^  meaning  that  it  results  not 
from  man's  circumstances,  but  from  his  nature^  and 
our  calling  it  constitutional^  meaning  that  it  results 
from  man's  moral  constitution  ?  If  there  are  objec- 
tions against  this,  there  are  against  that.  But  there  is 
no  need  of  logomachy.  Those  who  believe  human 
depravity  to  be  native,  do  not  think  it  best  to  call  it 
constitutionnlj  because  the  word  is  liable  to  be  misun- 
derstood. They  are  belter  pleased  witli  the  language 
of  Scripture,  or  with  that  which  is  evidently  conformed 
to  it. 

On  the  whole,  it  is  evident,  that  the  words  native^ 
innate^  hereditary^  &c.  may  all  be  used  to  designate 
some  quality  or  circumstance  of  man's  depravity,  with 
as  much  propriety,  as  they  can  be  used  in  relation  to 
any  thing  else.  They  should,  however,  be  well 
explained,  and  most  of  them  should  be  chiefly  confined 
to  systematic  theology.  The  language  best  suited  to 
the  purposes  of  popular  instruction  and  devotion,  is 
that  which  is  most  scriptural.  But  there  can  be  no 
reasonable  objection  against  the  moderate  use  of  tech- 


210  ALL    THEORIES 

nical  or  scientific  terras  in  the  more  elaborate  theolog- 
ical treatises.  I  know  indeed,  that  an  opposer  of  the 
common  doctrine  may  collect  together  all  the  epithets 
ever  used  by  Orthodox  writers,  and,  by  making  them 
up  into  one  overloaded  sentence,  and  by  contriving  to 
give  them  a  gross  and  offensive  sense,  may  excite 
prejudices  against  the  doctrine,  and  thus  prevent  many 
from  learning  what  the  Scriptures  teach.  In  like 
manner,  opposers  of  the  doctrine  of  election  have 
often  labored  to  make  it  odious,  by  drawing  out  in 
fearful  array  a  great  variety  of  words  which  have 
sometimes  been  applied  to  it,  and  so  managing  the 
matter  as  to  give  the  words  a  meaning  not  at  all  suited 
to  the  nature  of  the  subject.  But  Christian  divines 
and  philosophers  will  easily  see  the  difference  between 
argument,  and  declamation ;  between  appeals  to  reason 
and  piety,  and  appeals  to  passion  and  prejudice. 
What  we  want  on  such  a  subject,  is  candid,  sober, 
thorough  discussion,  based  upon  sound  principles  of 
reason,  and  upon  the  infallible  word  of  God. 


CHAPTER    XI. 

Every  other  theory  as  much  encumbered  with  difficulties  as  the  Orthodox.    The 
spirit  of  cavilling.    Proper  influence  of  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity. 

It  will  help  us  to  form  a  right  estimate  of  the  spec- 
ulative objections  which  have  been  urged  against  the 
doctrine  of  native  depravity,  if  we  find  that  all  the 


EXPOSED    TO    DIFFICULTIES.  211 

Other  views  which  have  been  entertained  of  the  state 
of  man  are  liable  to  similar  objections,  and  some  of 
them  to  objections  of  still  greater  weight.  I  think  it 
no  difficult  task  to  make  this  appear.  I  shall  intro- 
duce my  remarks,  by  quoting  a  passage  from  Whate- 
ley's  Essays  on  the  writings  of  St.  Paul.  This  writer 
zealously  advocates  the  Arminian  views  respecting  the 
purposes  of  God  and  the  state  of  man.  And  yet,  with 
a  candor  and  impartiality  which  are  seldom  found 
either  among  Arminians  or  Calvinists,  and  which, 
should  they  generally  prevail,  would  expel  the  bitter- 
ness of  controversy  from  the  ministry  and  the  church, 
he  writes  thus : 

"  Before  I  dismiss  the  consideration  of  this  subject, 
(i.  e.  election,)  I  would  suggest  one  caution  relative  to 
a  class  of  objections  frequently  urged  against  the  Cat- 
vinistic  scheme,  those  drawn  from  the  moral  attri- 
butes of  the  Deity  ;  which,  it  is  contended,  render  the 
reprobation  of  a  large  portion  of  mankind  an  absolute 
impossibility.  That  such  objections  do  reduce  the 
predestinarian  to  a  great  strait,  is  undeniable,  and  not 
seldom  are  they  urged  with  exulting  scorn,  with  bitter 
invective,  and  almost  with  anathema.  But  we  should 
be  very  cautious  how  we  employ  such  weapons  as 
may  recoil  upon  ourselves.  Arguments  of  this  descrip- 
tion have  often  been  adduced,  such  as,  I  fear,  will 
crush  beneath  the  ruins  of  the  hostile  structure  the 
blind  assailant  who  has  overthrown  it.  It  is  a  fright- 
ful, but  an  undeniable  truth,  that  multitudes,  even  in 


212  ALL    THEORIES 

Christian  countries,  are  born  and  brought  up  under 
such  circumstances  as  afford  them  no  probable,  often 
no  possible  chance  of  obtaining  a  knowledge  of 
religious  truths,  or  a  habit  of  moral  conduct,  but  are 
even  trained  from  infancy  in  superstitious  error  and 
gross  depravity.  Why  this  should  be  permitted, 
neither  Calvinist  nor  Arminian  can  explain ;  nay, 
why  the  Almighty  does  not  cause  to  die  in  the  cradle 
every  infant  whose  future  wickedness  and  misery,  if 
suffered  to  grow  up,  he  foresees,  is  what  no  system  of 
religion,  natural  or  revealed,  will  enable  us,  satisfac- 
torily to  account  for.  In  truth,  these  are  merely 
branches  of  the  one  great  difficulty,  the  existence  of 
evil,  which  may  almost  be  called  the  07ili/  difficulty 
in  theology.  It  assumes  indeed  various  shapes;  —  it 
is  by  many  hardly  recognized  as  a  difficulty  ;  and  not 
a  few  have  professed  and  believed  themselves  to  have 
solved  it ;  but  still  it  meets  them,  though  in  some  new 
and  disguised  form,  at  every  turn,  —  like  a  resistless 
stream,  which,  when  one  cliannel  is  dammed  up, 
immediately  forces  its  way  through  another.  And  as 
the  difficulty  is  not  one,  peculiar  to  any  one  hypoth- 
esis, but  bears  equally  on  all,  w^hether  of  revealed,  or 
of  natural  religion,  it  is  better  in  point  of  prudence,  as 
well  as  of  fairness,  that  the  consequences  of  it  should 
not  be  pressed  as  an  objection  against  any.  The 
Scriptures  do  not  pretend,  as  some  have  rashly  irpag- 
ined,  to  clear  up  this  awful  mystery  ;  they  give  us  no 
explanation  of  the  original   cause  of  the   evil  that 


EXPOSED    TO   DIFFICULTIES.  213 

exists  ;  but  they  teach  us  liow  to  avoid  its  effects ;  and 
since  they  leave  this  great  and  perplexing  question 
just  where  they  find  it,  it  is  better  for  us  to  leave  it 
among  "the  secret  things  which  belong  unto  the  Lord 
our  God,"  and  to  occupy  ourselves  with  the  things 
that  are  revealed,  and  which  concern  us  practically; — • 
which  belong-  unto  us  and  to  our  children,  "  that  we 
may  do  all  the  words  of  God's  law." 

In  accordance  with  these  candid  remarks  of  Whate- 
ley,  I  expect  now  to  show,  that  the  various  hypotheses 
which  have  been  maintained  by  different  writers  as  to 
man's  depravity,  are  as  really  open  to  the  pressure  of 
speculative  objections  and  difficulties,  as  the  common 
Orthodox  doctrine.  And  if  this  is  the  case,  then  it 
must  evidently  be  a  fruitless  thing  for  any  one  to 
attempt  to  rid  himself  of  difficulties,  by  shifting  off  the 
Orthodox  doctrine,  and  adopting  some  other  in  its 
stead.  And  it  will  be  the  dictate  of  true  wisdom  to 
inquire,  not  what  doctrine  is  free  from  difficulties,  but 
what  is  most  agreeable  to  the  word  of  God,  and  to  the 
results  of  experience.  We  shall  perceive  this  to  be  a 
matter  of  great  practical  importance,  when  we  con- 
sider, that  the  principal  reason  why  a  great  number  of 
men  have  rejected  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity, 
has  been,  the  force  of  speculative  objections,  particu- 
larly those  which  arise  from  a  consideration  of  the 
moral  attributes  of  God ;  and  that  the  principal 
effort  of  such  men  has  been,  to  find  out  some  scheme, 
which  would  not  be  open  to  similar  objections ;  — 
19 


214  ALL    THEORIES 

an  effort  which  we  shall  see  has  entirely  failed  of 
success. 

I  shall  now  advert  to  some  of  the  prominent  hypoth- 
eses which  have  been  maintained  respecting  human 
depravity,  by  those  who  have  denied  the  common 
Orthodox  doctrine. 

One  of  these  is,  that  there  is  in  the  character  of 
man  a  mixture  of  moral  good  and  evil ;  and  that 
this  m^ixture  commences  early^  and  continues 
through  life.  This  may  be  thought  to  be  a  very 
rational  and  liberal  view  of  the  subject ;  and  as  those 
who  adopt  it  escape  some  of  the  difficulties  which 
respect  the  theory  of  native  and  total  depravity,  they 
seem  to  think  that  they  are  free  from  difficulties  alto- 
gether. But  is  it  so?  Are  they  not  met  by  various  texts 
of  Scripture  which  plainly  teach,  that  the  unrenewed 
heart  is  entirely  destitute  of  holiness?  And  do  not 
these  texts  stand  as  difficulties  in  their  way  ?  They 
have  also  to  encounter  the  difficulty  arising  from  the 
testimony  of  the  most  intelligent  and  pious  men, 
whose  experience  and  deep  inward  consciousness  con- 
firm the  common  doctrine  of  depravity.  And  finally, 
their  scheme  is  exposed  to  as  real  a  difficulty  as  the 
common  doctrine,  in  relation  to  the  infinite  benevo- 
lence of  God.  For  if  it  is  inconsistent  with  his  benev- 
olence, that  a  race  of  intelligent  beings,  who  are 
wholly  dependent  on  his  will,  should  exist  from  the 
beginning  of  life  in  a  state  of  total  depravity  ;  is  it  not 
also    inconsistent    with    his    benevolence,    that  they 


EXPOSED    TO    DIFFICULTIES.  215 

should  be  found  in  a  state  of  partial  depravity?  Will 
a  God  of  infinite  power  and  goodness  certainly  guard 
his  offspring  against  total  depravity  ?  Why  then  will 
he  not  guard  them  against  being  depraved  at  all  1  Is 
not  any  degree  of  depravity  a  great  and  destructive  evil? 
And  how  can  we  suppose  that  God  will  suffer  so 
destructive  an  evil  to  take  place,  w^hen  he  is  able  to 
prevent  it?  Is  there  no  difficulty  here?  And  if  you 
take  upon  you  to  say,  that  God  is  not  able  to  prevent 
the  depravity  of  men  ;  is  there  no  difficulty  in  this,  — 
that  the  God  of  heaven  and  earth  is  unable  to  keep 
men  pure  from  sin,  when  he  is  infinitely  wise  and 
powerful,  and  has  the  hearts  of  all  men  in  his  hand, 
and  can  effectually  guard  them  against  whatever 
would  have  any  tendency  to  corrupt  them? 

You  cannot  avoid  difficulties  by  adopting  the  opin- 
ion that  the  sinfulness  of  man,  whether  partial  or 
total,  commences  at  a  later  period^  than  what  the 
common  doctrine  implies.  For  if  we  have  reason  to 
conclude  that  the  goodness  of  God  will  certainly  pre- 
serve us  from  being  sinners  at  the  heginyiing  of  life  ; 
why  may  we  not  conclude  that  it  will  preserve  U3 
from  being  sinners  afterxoards  7  Besides  this,  you 
will  have  to  encounter  another  difficulty  ;  that  is,  you 
must  contend  with  the  sacred  writers,  who  teach  with 
great  clearness,  that  all  men  are  sinful  from  the  first, 
and  need  the  grace  of  Christ  to  sanctify  and  save 
them. 

Do  j^ou  object  to  the  common  doctrine,  that  sinners 
turn  it  into  an  excuse,  saying,  if  God  has  brought 


216  ALL    THEORIES 

US  into  existence  in  such  a  state,  how  can  we  be 
culpable  ?  And  may  not  the  ground  which  you  take 
furnish  as  real  an  occasion  to  sinners  to  exculpate 
themselves?  May  they  not  say,  if  our  Almighty 
Maker  has  so  formed  us,  and  so  ordered  our  circum- 
stances, that  we  shall  at  some  period  of  our  hfe,  cer- 
tainly fall  into  sin  ;  then  how  are  we  to  blame  ? 

Say  then,  if  you  will,  with  Dr.  John  Taylor,  that 
the  consequence  of  Adam's  fall  is  only  this,  that  we 
are  placed  in  circumstances  which  particularly  expose 
us  to  sin  and  which  render  obedience  difficult ;  and 
that  we  are  corrupted  by  the  influence  of  bad  example. 
The  objector  is  still  ready  with  his  questions.  Why 
did  the  Author  of  our  being,  and  the  Disposer  of 
all  our  circumstances,  place  us  in  such  a  state  of 
temptation  and  exposure?  If  he  wished  us  to  be 
obedient,  why  did  he  take  pains  to  render  obedience 
so  difficult  ?  If  he  wished  to  preserve  us  from  sin, 
why  did  he  voluntarily  expose  us  to  it,  especially  at 
that  early  period,  when  we  are  incapable  of  enduring 
severe  exposures,  and  when  he  knew  how  unhappy 
would  be  the  result  ?  What  kind  father  would  wil- 
lingly subject  his  children,  in  the  tenderness  of  child- 
hood, to  trials  and  dangers,  for  which  they  are  not 
prepared,  and  which  he  knows  will  be  too  great  for 
them  to  endure  ?  Is  not  God  kinder  than  the  kindest 
of  earthly  parents  ?  And  will  he  so  constitute  the 
whole  race  of  man,  and  so  expose  them  to  the  perni- 
cious influence  of  bad  example,   and  other  corrupting 


EXPOSED    TO    DIFFICULTIES.  217 

circumstances,  that  certain  ruin  will  ensue,  —  and  all 
this  on  account  of  the  one  offence  of  Adam? 

Thus  if  in  your  treatment  of  the  doctrine  of  native 
depravity,  you  open  the  door  for  speculative  objections 
and  cavils,  you  will  find  a  host  of  them  arrayed 
against  every  opinion  which  you  are  able  to  advance 
on  the  subject.  The  fact  is,  that  there  is  no  truth  in 
morals  or  theology,  which  will  not  be  swept  away,  if 
the  objections  which  are  urged  by  worldly  men  and 
cavillers  are  allowed  to  be  valid. 

But  the  theory  which  may  seem  to  deserve  the  most 
particular  consideration,  is  the  one  which  has  of  late 
been  the  subject  of  discussion  in  our  religious  commu- 
nity. If  you  adopt  this  theory,  you  deny  that  man 
has  any  native  sinfulness,  any  original  sinful  pro- 
pensity, or  innate  moral  depravity.  You  maintain, 
however,  that  we  come  into  the  world  with  various 
appetites  and  propensities  which,  though  not  sinful, 
are  the  occasions  of  sin ;  that  these  appetites  and  pro- 
pensities gain  strength  by  early  indulgence,  and 
become  predominant,  before  any  sense  of  right  and 
wrong  can  have  entered  our  minds ;  and  that,  when 
our  moral  agency  commences,  they  are  an  overmatch 
for  our  reason  and  conscience,  and  in  every  instance 
certainly  lead  us  into  sin.  You  hold  that  we  are  bora 
in  such  a  state,  that  we  shall  sin,  and  only  sin,  until 
we  are  regenerated  ;  that  we  are  born  destitute  of 
holiness,  and  of  all  disposition  to  holiness,  and  that  we 
have  in  our  own  nature  a  ground  of  certainty  that 
*19 


218  ALL    THEORIES 

our  first  moral  acts,  and  all  that  follow,  will  be  sinful, 
unless  we  are  born  again ;  and  finally  that  we  are 
brought  into  these  circumstances  not  by  any  fault  or 
^ny  concurrence  of  ours,  but  in  consequence  of  the 
offence  of  Adam.  In  adopting  this  scheme,  you  adopt 
the  leading  features  of  the  common  Orthodox  doctrine, 
except  one ;  namely ;  you  deny  that  our  native  pro- 
pensity to  sin  is  a  sinful  propensity.  You  differ  also 
from  John  Taylor  and  the  Unitarians  in  one  thing, 
namely,  in  holding  that  all  the  moral  acts  of  men  in 
their  natural  state  are  sinful. 

My«ole  object  is  to  show,  that  your  maintaining  this 
hypothesis  exposes  you  to  objections  and  difficulties  of 
nearly  the  same  kind  and  degree,  with  those  which 
have  been  urged  against  Edwards,  and  the  Calvinists 
generally.  And  if  this  is  indeed  the  case,  then  any 
one  who  adopts  this  scheme  instead  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  Calvinists,  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  difficulties,  will 
find  himself  disappointed. 

In  the  way  of  objection  to  the  common  doctrine,  you 
say ;  the  Apostle  does  indeed  teach  that  there  is  a  con- 
stituted connection  between  Adam  and  his  posterity, 
and  that  his  offence  brought  ruin  upon  them  ;  but 
he  does  not  teach  what  the  connection  was,  nor  how 
it  produced  such  an  effect.  He  does  not  tell  us  that  a 
sinful  nature  is  propagated,  or  that  we  inherit  it  from 
Adam.  —  Now  if  it  be  as  you  say,  that  the  Apostle 
does  not  teach  in  what  manner  Adam's  sin  produced 
this  woful  effect  upon  us ;  surely  he  does  not  teach 


Exposed  to  difficulties.  219 

that  it  did  it  ia  the  particular  manner  which  your 
theory  imphes.  You  ask,  where  the  Bible  asserts  that, 
on  account  of  Adam's  fall,  a  sinful  nature  is  communi- 
cated to  us  at  the  beginning  of  our  existence.  And  1 
ask,  where  it  asserts  that  Adam's  fall  affected  us  in  the 
manner  you  describe,  that  is,  by  bringing  us  into 
being  with  such  appetites,  and  in  such  circumstances, 
as  will  certainly  lead  into  sin  as  soon  as  we  are  moral 
agents  ?  If  you  say,  the  Bible  does  not  tell  how  it 
was  that  Adam's  sin  affected  us  ;  why  do  you  under- 
take to  tell  this?  Are  you  authorized  any  more  than 
Cgilvinists  are,  to  point  out  the  manner  in  which 
Adam's  sin  had  an  influence  upon  us  ?  Have  you 
any  more  right  than  they,  to  go  beyond  what  is  writ- 
ten? 

But  you  have  another  objection  to  the  common  doc- 
trine. You  say,  it  is  totally  incompatible  with  the  jus- 
tice as  well  as  goodness  of  God,  to  bring  moral  corrup- 
tion and  ruin  upon  the  whole  human  race,  merely  on 
account  of  one  offence  of  their  common  progenitor, 
without  any  fault  of  theirs. 

And  is  there  not  just  as  much  reason  to  urge  this 
objection  against  yo%ir  theory  ?  You  hold  that  God 
brings  the  whole  human  race  into  existence  without 
holiness,  and  with  such  propensities  and  in  such  cir- 
cumstances, as  will  certainly  lead  them  into  sin ;  and 
that  he  brings  them  into  this  fearful  condition  in  con- 
sequence of  the  sin  of  their  first  father,  without  any 
fault  of  their  own.     Now  as  far  as  the  divine  justice 


220  ALL    THEORIES 

or  goodness  is  concerned,  what  great  difference  is  there 
between  our  being  depraved  at  first,  and  being  in  such 
circumstances  as  will  certainly  lead  to  depravity  the 
moment  moral  action  begins?  Will  not  the  latter  as 
infallibly  bring  about  our  destruction  as  the  former? 
And  how  is  it  more  incompatible  with  the  justice  or 
the  goodness  of  God  to  put  us  in  one  of  these  con- 
ditions, than  in  the  other,  when  they  are  both  equally 
fatal?  Do  you  say,  that  our  natural  appetites  and 
propensities  and  our  outward  circumstances  do  not 
lead  us  into  sin  by  any  absolute  necessity  ?  But  they 
do  in  all  cases  certainly  lead  us  into  sin,  and  God 
knows  that  they  will,  when  he  appoints  them  for  us. 
Now,  how  can  God,  our  merciful  Father,  voluntarily 
place  us,  while  feeble,  helpless  infants,  in  such  cir- 
cumstances, as  he  knows  beforehand  will  be  the 
certain  occasion  of  our  sin  and  ruin  ?  Do  you  say, 
it  is  our  own  fault,  if  we  sin?  True.  But  why 
does  God,  who  desires  our  holiness  and  happiness, 
place  us  in  circumstances,  which  will  not  only  ex- 
pose us  to  this  fault,  but  which  he  knows  will  most 
certainly  involve  us  in  it,  and  so  end  in  our  destruc- 
tion ?  Do  you  say,  the  doctrine  of  a  depraved  nature, 
as  held  by  Edwards  and  other  Calvinists,  makes  God 
the  author  of  sin?  Even  if  this  were  so,  (which 
however  I  do  not  admit ;)  still  how  does  your  theory 
help  the  matter?  What  difference  does  it  make  either 
as  to  God's  character,  or  th^  result  of  his  proceedings, 
whether  he  constitutes  us  sinners  at  first,  or  knowingly 


/tvA^^fe 


.J..-U- 


I^Ai^'Vtv^-    ('1^ 


EXPOSED    TO    DIFFICULTIES.  221 

places  us  in  such  circumstances,  that  wa  shall  cer- 
tainly become  sinners,  and  that  very  soon  ?     Must  not 
God's  design  as  to  our  being  sinners,  be  the  same  in 
one  case,  as.  in  the  other  ?     And  must  not  the  final 
result  be  the   same?      Is  not  one  of  the  conditions 
supposed,  fraught  with  as  many  and  as  great  evils,  as' 
the  other?     What  ground'  of  preference  then  would 
any  man  have?     Suppose  half  of  the  human  race 
should-  be  born   in  a  depraved,  sinful  state ;  and  the 
other  half,  without  holiness,  and  with  such  appetites 
and  propensities  as  will  be  too  powerful  for  reason  and 
conscience  to  control,  and  so  will  certainly  bring  them 
into  a  depraved,  sinful  state,  and  that  so  speedily,  that 
they  never  exist  a  single  moment,  as  moral  agents,  in 
any  other  state.     Would  these  last  have  in  any  respect 
the  advantage  of  the  former  ?     And  if  the  two  condi- 
tions supposed  are  equally  calamitous  and  destructive,  / 
then  how  is  it  more  consistent  for  God  to  bring  men  /r  -^ct-a 
into  one  of  them,  than  into  the  other  ?     And  how  can  ^?tco^^ 
it  be  more  easily  reconciled  with  his  goodness  that  he  "^^^-^ 
should  bring  death  and  condemnation  on  Adam's  pos-          '-*-* 
terity  on  account  of  his  sin,  in  the  way  which  you 
suppose,  than  in  the  way  which  Calvinists  suppose? 
Let  intelligent,  candid  Unitarians,  who  do  not  believe 
either  of  these  schemes,  say,  whether  one  of  them  is 
not  open  to  as  many  objections,  as  the  other  ?     Do 
you  say,  all  the  feelings  of  our  hearts  revolt  at  the  idea, 
that  God  gives  us  a  depraved,  sinful  nature  at  our 
birth,  and  that  no  man  can  believe  this  without  resist- 


222  ALL    THEORIES  , 

ing  and  overcoming  his  most  amiable  sensibilities  ? 
And  do  not  our  moral  feelings  equally  revolt  at  the 
idea,  that  G*  d  creates  us  without  hohness,  and  gives 
us  at  our  birth  such  appetites  and  propensities,  as  he 
knows  will  forthwith  bring  us  into  a  state  of  deprav- 
it}?^  ?  And  have  we  not  as  much  occasion  to  resist  and 
overcome  our  amiable  sensibilities  in  this  case,  as  in 
the  other?  When  you  hold  that  God  has  so  ordered 
things  that  we  come  into  existence,  destitute  of  any 
disposition  to  holiness,  and  with  natural  appetites 
which  will  always  get  the  start  of  reason,  and  will  be 
quite  an  ove  mat  h  for  it  when  moral  agency  begins, 
and  which  will  certainly  involve  us  in  sin  and  ruin ;  — 
when  you  hold  all  this,  you  are  obliged  to  set  aside 
your  amiable  sensibilities  and  all  the  natural  feelings 
of  your  hearts,  as  unsafe  guides  in  such  a  matter  as 
this,  —  you  are  obliged  to  overcome  these  natural  feel- 
ings as  really  in  maintaining  this  scheme,  as  others  are 
in  maintaining  the  Calvinistic  scheme.  Prompted  by 
these  natural  sensibilities,  you  make  an  outcry  against 
the  common  doctrine,  as  though  it  implied  something 
hard  and  injurious  in  God's  treatment  of  his  creatures. 
Whose  act  is  it,  you  say,  that  gave  us  this  sinful 
nature  ?  And  how  are  we  to  blame  for  that  nature 
which  God  created  ?  And  whose  act  is  it,  we  may 
ask,  that  brings  us  into  existence  destitute  of  holiness, 
and  with  a  nature  which  certainly  leads  to  sin  ?  And 
how  are  we  to  blame  for  that  which,  according  to  the 
laws  of  the  human  mind,  invariably  and  certainly 

■  -to '  '^- 


EXPOSED    TO    DIFFICULTIES.  223 

follows  from  an  act  of  God,  or  from  that  state  in 
which  lie  places  us  without  any  concurrence  of  our 
own  1 

Do  you  say,  the  Calvinistic  doctrine  imphes  a  phys- 
ical depravity?  But  your  doctrine  is  much  more 
liable  to  this  charge  ?  Calvinists  ho  d  that  depravity 
originally  and  essentially  lies  in  our  moral  nature. 
But  you  hold  that  it,  arises  altogether  from  those  appe- 
tites and  prop  nsities  which  are  not  moral,  but  phys- 
ical. Thus  you  tra  -e  depravity  to  a  physical  source.  /£.c^  /i 
You  make  the  fatal  danger  of  our  condition  lie  origi- 
nally in  physical  appetites. — But  you  may  perhaps  "^  / 
think  that  you  can  avoid  the  difficulties  of  the  Calvin- 
istic theory  by  alleging,  that  sin  comes  not  in  reality 
from  our  natural  ap[  etites,  nor  from  any  external 
circumstances,  as  its  proper  cause,  but  from  our  free 
will,  and  that  the  acts  of  this  free  will  are  entirely  our 
own,  and  that  we  are  justly  responsible  for  them.  But 
on  the  principle  which  you  have  sanctioned  by  your 
objections  against  the  Calvinistic  theory,  we  may  ask  ; 
who  gave  us  our  free  loill  7  And  who  gave  us  such 
a  free  will,  as  would  uniformly  and  certainly  choose 
sin?  Why  did  not  God  make  our  free  will  such,  or  ' 
at  least  place  it  under  the  influence  of  such  circum-  '^ 
stances,  that  its  choices  should  be  right  instead  of 
wrong?  Might  not  God  do  this  without  interfering  at 
all  with  the  nature  of  a  free  will?  Did  he  not  give  to 
the  elect  angels  such  a  free  will,  and  place  it  under 
such  influences,  that  its  choices  would  certainly  be 

A 


Ch:::r-r. 


224  ALL    THEORIES 

right  ?  And  does  he  not  so  renew  the  wilJ  of  sinful 
men  by  his  Spirit,  and  so  direct  the  causes  which  act 
upon  it,  that  it  shall  now  begin  to  put  forth  exercises 
which  are  right,  and  shall  finally  put  forth  those  which 
will  be  perfectly  right,  and  that  certainly  and  for- 
ever ?  And  has  not  God  done  all  this,  and  is  he  not 
continually  doing  all  this,  without  interfering  with  the 
nature  of  free  will?  Why  then,  if  God  desires  our 
holiness,  does  he  not  give  us  such  a  will,  as  shall  freely 
conform  to  his  law?  Has  not  God  a  free  will  in 
directing  this  affair?  And  is  not  his  free  will  attended 
with  omnipotence?  And  if  he  had  chosen  to  give  us 
a  will  to  put  forth  right  volitions,  could  he  not  have 
done  it?  Why  then  did  he  not  give  us  such  a  will? 
And  if  he  has  given  us  a  different  will, — a  will  that 
certainly  acts  wrong ;  how  does  he  show  his  desire 
for  our  holiness  ?  And  how  are  we  culpable  for  the 
acts  of  such  a  will,  more  than  a  comet  is  for  its  erratic 
motions  ?     Who  gave  us  this  erratic  will  ? 

Thus  it  is,  as  Whateley  says ;  "  The  difficulty  is  not 
peculiar  to  any  one  hypothesis,  but  bears  equally  on 
all?"  —  And  yet  I  hold  that  the  difficulty  is  of  no 
avail,  and  proves  nothing  at  all,  except  our  ignorance. 

It  will  be  evident  I  think  from  all  which  has  been 
said,  that  the  speculative  objections  which  have  been 
urged  against  the  fact  of  our  depravity,  whether  that 
fact  is  contemplated  in  the  light  of  the  common  Ortho- 
dox theory,  or  of  any  other,  cannot  be  regarded  as  of 
any  decisive  weight.     The  spirit  of  cavilling,  from 


EXPOSED    TO   DIFFICULTIES.  225 

which  they  originate,  would,  if  permitted  to  prevail, 
demolish  the  whole  fabric  of  religion.  See  how  it 
poured  forth  its  malignant  sarcasms  and  sneers  against 
every  thing  sacred,  in  the  writings  of  Voltaire  and 
other  French  atheists  !  See  how  it  operates  in  the 
infidels  of  our  own  country !  With  those  who  in- 
dulge this  spirit,  just  and  sober  reasoning  has  no 
influence,  and  truth  becomes  a  dream.  Let  Chris- 
tians then,  take  care  not  to  give  any  countenance  to 
it.  It  belongs  not  to  them.  Its  proper  residence  is, 
the  carnal  mind  which  is  ejimity  against  God  — 
the  heart  of  impiety  and  atheism. 

Be  it  then  your  watchful  care,  candid  reader,  to 
guard  against  that  spirit  of  mind,  which  shows  itself 
in  such  objections  and  cavils,  as  have  been  noticed  in 
this  chapter.  How  sharply  the  sacred  writers  rebuked 
this  spirit !  They  saw  in  their  day,  that  the  thing 
formed  proudly  rose  up,  and  said  to  him  that  formed 
\\^  ^^  why  hast  thou  made  me  thus?^^  The  Apostle 
regarded  this  question  as  the  utterance  of  an  impious, 
rebellious  heart.  A  man  who  has  this  spirit  of  objec- 
tion may  pretend  to  feel  a  respect  for  the  perfections  of 
God.  But  in  reality  he  denies  them.  He  takes  a 
matter  of  fact,  a  well  known  principle  in  the  divine 
administration,  and  says,  that  it  is  inconsistent  with 
God^s  moral  attributes  ;  —  which  is  the  same  as  to 
say,  that  God  cannot  he  a  just  and  good  Being,  if 
he  does  what  he  actually  does.  This  is  the  radical 
fault  of  the  objector  in  this  case.  He  ought  to  learn 
20 


/w   d  Ia^ 


\ 


\ 


226  ALL    THEORIES,    &C. 

what  God's  character  is,  and  what  is  just  and  right, 
by  learning  what  God  does.  Whereas  he  takes  upon 
him  to  determine,  what  God  can  or  cannot  consistently 
do,  by  his  own  mistaken  notion  of  what  is  just  and 
right,  vainly  assuming  that  God  is  altogether  such  an 
one  as  himself.  A  man  who  acts  on  this  principle,  is 
at  war  with  the  divine  administration  and  the  divine 
character. 

I  am  aVare  that  you  may  make  an  objection  of  a 
more  practical  kind  against  the  common  theory, 
namely,  that  it  tends  to  stupify  conscience,  and  to  pre- 
vent a  proper  sense  of  the  evil  of  sin.  But  in  truth, 
who  will  be  most  likely  to  be  deeply  affected  with  the 
evil  of  sin,  —  he  that  considers  it  as  arising  from  the 
innocent  appetites  and  propensities  of  our  physical 
nature,  or  he  that  considers  it  as  originating  in  the 
corrupt  disposition  of  our  moral  nature, — the  sinful- 
ness of  our  heart  ?  What  do  facts  show  'I  Had  not 
Calvin,  Owen,  Watts,  Edwards,  Brainerd,  and  others 
of  hke  sentiments  with  them,  as  wakeful  a  conscience, 
as  deep  a  sense  of  the  hatefulness  and  inexcusableness 
of  sin,  and  as  active  and  successful  a  zeal  in  opposing 
it,  as  those  who  have  denied  the  native  sinfulness  of 
man  ? 

I  have  another  suggestion.  Would  you  test  the 
truth  of  the  different  theories  which  are  held  on  the 
subject  of  our  depravity  ?  Inquire  then,  which  of 
these  theories  most  naturally  leads  its  advocates  to  fall 
in  with  the  current  language  of   Scripture,   and  to 


PROPER    TENDENCY  OF  THE    DOCTRINE.       227 

speak  just  as  the  sacred  writers  do  in  respect  to  the 
depravity  of  man,  and  the  necessity  of  his  being 
renewed  by  the  divine  Spirit?  Which  theory  leads  its 
advocates  to  quote  most  freely  the  affecting  representa- 
tions of  the  Bible  as  to  the  deplorable  state  in  which 
the  posterity  of  Adam  are  born,  to  give  to  those  repre- 
sentations the  most  natural  sense,  and  to  dwell  upon 
them  with  the  greatest  earnestness?  To  which  of 
the  theories  is  the  solemn,  impressive  language  of 
inspiration  most  obviously  and  perfectly  adapted? 
This  plain  test  of  truth  may,  in  many  instances,  turn 
to  great  account. 

In  closing  this  Essay,  I  shall  just  touch  upon  the 
proper,  practical  tendency  of  the  doctrine  of  native 
depravity.  This  can  be  ascertained  only  by  finding 
what  its  influence  ie  upon  the  minds  of  those  Chris- 
tians, who  seriously  embrace  it  as  a  doctrine  of  the 
Bible.  Go  then  to  one  of  this  number,  to  one  who  is 
intelligent  and  devout  and  given  to  reflection,  and 
inquire  what  is  his  manner  of  thinking  on  this  sub- 
ject, and  the  effect  which  the  common  doctrine  has 
upon  his  feelings :  and  let  him  speak  for  himself. 

"There  was  a  time,"  he  will  say, — "and  I  remem- 
ber it  with  shame  and  sorrow,  —  when  my  heart  was 
full  of  objections  against  the  doctrine  of  our  native  and 
entire  sinfulness.  The  thought,  that  God  brings 
us  into  being  in  a  fallen,  ruined  state,  occasioned 
me  great  uneasiness.  And  my  inward  disturbance 
continued,   until    the   Spirit    of    God,   as  I  humbly 


228       PROPER   TENDENCY  OF  THE    DOCTRINE. 

trust,  subdued  my  pride,  and  inclined  me  no  longer 
to  confide  in  my  own  understanding,  but  to  sub- 
mit implicitly  to  the  wisdom  of  God.  First  of 
all,  I  adopted  it  as  my  maxim  to  believe  what- 
ever God  makes  knoion  in  his  word,  and  to  be 
satisfied  with  lohatever  he  does  in  his  providence. 
I  determined  to  reject  no  truth,  because  it  trans- 
cends my  intellectual  powers,  or  because  it  is 
attended  with  speculative  difficulties  which  I  cannot 
solve.  I  soon  saw  that  the  doctrine  of  man's  native 
and  total  sinfulness  is  taught  in  the  Bible,  and  is  con- 
firmed by  experience  and  observation.  The  habit 
which  I  formed  of  contemplating  the  doctrine  itself , 
as  set  forth  in  the  word  of  God,  gradually  enabled  me 
to  dispose  of  the  difficulties  attending  it  very  satisfacto- 
rily. I  have  been  brought  to  look  upon  sin,  whether 
in  disposition  or  in  act,  upon  sin  itself  wherever 
found,  and  in  whatever  form,  and  however  occasioned, 
as  an  evil  and  bitter  thing,  altogether  blameworthy 
and  hateful.  Considering  myself  as  the  subject  of 
this  evil  from  the  beginning  of  my  hfe,  as  born  in 
sin,  and  contemplating  the  outgoings  of  my  depraved, 
sinful  heart  in  sinful  actions,  I  abhor  myself,  and 
repent  in  dust  and  ashes.  A  deep  conviction  of  sin 
has  banished  from  my  mind  all  philosophical  specula- 
tions and  questions  of  controversy.  My  great  concern 
is  to  obtain  deliverance  from  the  power  of  sin,  and  to 
be  renewed  in  the  spirit  of  my  mind.  I  offer  daily 
and  fervent  prayer  to  God,  that  he  would  sanctify  me 


PROPRR    TENDENCY  OP  THE   DOCTRINE.       229 

wholly ;  that  he  would  increase  my  faith,  and  work  in 
me  all  the  good  pleasure  of  his  goodness.  The  belief 
which  I  have,  that  sin  is  natural  to  man,  and  that  it 
extends  its  deleterious  influence  through  all  his  facul- 
ties, excites  me  to  great  watchfulness  and  unceasing 
efforts  against  its  subtle  and  powerful  operations,  and 
to  a  humble  reliance  on  the  help  of  divine  grace. 
Viewing  myself  as  by  nature  a  child  of  wrath,  and  as 
deserving  the  whole  penalty  of  the  violated  law,  I  am 
led  to  exalt  the  infinite  grace  of  God  in  redemption) 
and  to  give  glory  to  the  Saviour  who  bestows  eternal 
life  on  sinners,  even  the  chief.  And  when  I  come  to 
consider,  that  this  utter  ruin  is  brought  upon  the 
human  family  by  the  offence  of  Adam,  their  federal 
head,  I  bow  before  that  righteous  Sovereign,  whose 
judgments  are  unsearchable,  with  a  full  persuasion, 
that  all  his  ways,  though  past  finding  out,  are  perfectly 
holy,  just,  and  good,  and  that  sin  belongs  wholly  and 
exclusively  to  man.  Without  the  shadow  of  a  doubt 
I  believe,  that  what  God  does  in  constituting  us  sin- 
ners in  consequence  of  the  offence  of  Adam,  he  does 
in  perfect  consistency  with  his  infinite  holiness  and 
goodness,  and  without  the  least  infringement  of  our 
moral  agency.  I  have  done  with  the  impious  ques- 
tion, why  doth  he  yet  find  fault  7  or,  why  hast  thou 
made  me  thus  7  Who  am  I,  that  I  should  call  in 
qtfestion  the  wisdom  or  the  rectitude  of  God's  conduct? 
In  a  word,  when  I  consider  that  I  belong  to  a  race  of 
rebels,  that  I  am  "  the  degenerate  plant  of  a  strange 


230       PROPER   TENDENCY  OF  THE    DOCTRINE. 

vine,"  and  that  the  heart  of  every  man  is  like  my 
own,  I  see  that  all  the  world  is  guilty  before  God,  that 
no  flesh  can  glory  in  his  presence,  and  that  salvation 
is  wholly  of  grace." 

Such  are  the  thoughts  and  feelings  which  arise  in 
the  mind  of  a  Christian,  who  is  led  by  the  holy  Scrip- 
tures, and  by  his  own  spiritual  convictions,  cordially  to 
embrace  the  doctrine  of  native  depravity,  and  to  make 
it  a  subject  of  devout  meditation,  and  who  rises 
above  his  speculative  difficulties,  not  by  a  mere  intelr 
lectual  process,  but  by  the  power  of  holy  affection.  It 
seems  fo  me  exceedingly  manifest,  that  whatever 
objectors  may  say,  the  proper  tendency  of  the  doctrine, 
when  rightly  received,  is,  to  exalt  God^to  humble 
maUj  and  to  make  the  Saviour  precious.  And 
happy  shall  I  feel  myself  to  be,  if  I  have  been  enabled 
so  to  treat  the  subject,  as  to  contribute  to  this  most 
desirable  effect. 


■c^> 


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